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It is commonly understood that as a matter of federal law, states may 
have divergent substantive policies with respect to those matters that are not 
violative of the United States Constitution.  Such diversity among polities is 
one of the frequently heralded benefits of our federal system.1  As a 
practical matter, however, what degree of political heterogeneity among 
states is possible vis-à-vis substantive policies that are not unconstitutional?  
In short, what is the degree of legal pluralism that our Constitution’s federal 
regime permits? 
The answer to the question turns in large part on whether states, if they 
so choose, can regulate their cit izens even when they are out of their Home 
States.2  If they cannot, citizens can bypass their Home States’ laws by 
simply traveling to a more legally permissive state to do there what is 
prohibited at home.  Such “travel-evasion,” which in effect gives citizens 
the power to choose which state’s laws are to govern them on an issue-by-
issue basis, can cripple the ability of states to accomplish constitutional 
 
1 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1558 (2000) (stating that a good associated 
with federalism is the “diversity of choices [it] permits”). 
2 The Article refers to the place where the traveler lives as the “Home State” and the 
place to where she has traveled as the “Host State.” 
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objectives.  Consider, for example, how travel-evasion can frustrate 
legislation banning assisted suicide:  the state’s interests that drive such a 
law are undermined if one of its sick citizens takes a bus to a jurisdiction 
that allows her to end her life.  As this Article explains, such travel-evasion 
may have the systemic effect of creating a “race-to-the-bottom” to the 
lowest common denominator of regulation, thereby undercutting the degree 
of political heterogeneity possible among states in our federal system among 
policies that are not foreclosed to states by the United States Constitution.  
On the other hand, a Home State’s direction of its citizens’ out-of-state 
activities can run up against the interests of the Host State, and, for many 
other reasons, may threaten to undermine our federal system.  How the 
interests of the Host State, Home State, and the federal system are to be 
accommodated is the subject of this Article. 
There are many constitutionally legitimate state goals that can be 
frustrated if citizens can free themselves of their Home State’s legal 
requirements merely by crossing a border.  For example, those states that 
require motorcyclists to wear helmets typically do so to protect both their 
citizens’ health and the state’s coffers (since badly injured people require 
medical assistance, may become public charges, etc.).  Of course, the state’s 
interests are no less implicated if one of its bare-headed citizens is injured 
while motorcycling in a sister jurisdiction without helmet laws.  So can a 
state require that its citizens wear helmets when riding motorcycles 
wherever they might be?  Consider as well: 
• A state may ban gambling altogether for moral reasons, to prevent the 
costs imposed on gamblers’ families, or to reduce the creation of public 
charges.3  Since such policy goals are undermined regardless of where 
the citizen’s gambling occurs, can a Home State ban its citizens from 
gambling not only at home but also in all other states?4 
• Many states have refused to accept the battered spouse defense for 
wives that kill their battering husbands (and vice versa).  Is a Home 
 
3 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185-87 (1999) 
(noting that the federal government may assist states in their assertion of a “legitimate and 
substantial interest” in alleviating the societal ills of “injury and loss to [compulsive] gamblers 
as well as their families, communities, and government”). 
4 This Article does not address the question of whether and to what extent states can 
regulate their citizens’ behaviors in foreign countries.  The time required by, and costs of, 
international travel make interstate travel the major means by which citizens attempt to evade 
their Home State’s laws.  To be sure, extraterritorial interstate regulation might lead to 
increased efforts of citizens to leave the country to escape the force of their Home State laws.  
States’ powers are more limited internationally insofar as they may interfere with the federal 
government’s powers over foreign affairs.  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (preempting and declaring unconstitutional a state law that imposed 
sanctions on Burma because the state law conflicted with federal sanctions and law). 
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State that does not accept the defense without recourse if a battered 
husband kills his wife while the couple is on vacation in a Host State 
that accepts the defense?5  
• A Home State may prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation to protect gay men and lesbians and to counteract 
homophobia by requiring interaction between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals.  Can the Home State apply its regulations to a citizen 
who runs a business in a state that does not have such an 
antidiscrimination law?6 
• It is constitutional for states to enact parental notification laws that 
protect the interests of the pregnant minor’s parents by providing them 
the “opportunity to consult with [their daughter] in private, and to 
discuss the consequences of her decision in the context of the values 
and moral or religious principles of their family.”7  What, if anything, 
can the Home State do to keep its policy from being skirted by the 
minor crossing the border?8 
 In fact, a broad array of state laws can be circumvented through 
travel—laws running the gamut from citizen welfare and the integrity of 
government to the conduct of business.  This Article explores the 
circumstances under which states can counter such “travel-evasion” to 
ensure the efficacy of policies that they are constitutionally permitted to 
pursue.  It suggests that to a large degree they can.  For instance, this Article 
will show that states can regulate extraterritorially to counter all the above-
mentioned kinds of travel-evasion.9 
 
5 This intriguing hypothetical was put forward in Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice 
and Choice of Law:  Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in 
American Federalism , 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 499 n.169 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, Law of 
Choice].  I discuss it at length infra  notes 423-26 and accompanying text. 
6 This Article does not consider the converse case of whether a gay man from a Home 
State with antidiscrimination laws can assert that law against a business located in a state 
without such laws.  That scenario implicates the question of whether and to what extent Home 
States may regulate noncitizens, a complex query that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
7 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).  The Court in Casey 
upheld a parental notification law.  Id. 
8 In fact, this frequently occurs.  See, e.g. , CRLP:  Judicial Bypass Fails Young Women 
Seeking Abortions, U.S. NEWSWIRE , July 15, 1999 (reporting that a Louisiana woman traveled 
to Texas to obtain an abortion after her petition for a waiver of Louisiana’s parental 
notification requirement was denied by a Louisiana state court judge), available at LEXIS.  
See generally Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 455 n.14 (citing newspaper articles 
enumerating studies that document the extent of travel-evasion to circumvent restrictive 
abortion regulations). 
9 This Article considers states’ powers to act unilaterally so as to regulate their cit izens’ 
out-of-state conduct.  A work-in-progress explores two alternatives to unilateral efforts to 
regulate extraterritorially:  (1) congressional authorization to states to regulate citizens 
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The question of extraterritorial regulation to counter travel-evasion is of 
more than just theoretical interest.  Pennsylvania recently prosecuted an 
adult who helped a pregnant minor travel out of the state to avoid the 
parental notification requirements of her Home State, 10 and a few years ago 
the United States House of Representatives approved a bill that would have 
made an adult’s assistance to such pregnant minors a federal crime.11  
Consider as well Wisconsin’s recent efforts to put small Wisconsin dairy 
farms on an even playing ground with large Wisconsin farms.  Purchasers of 
raw milk paid premiums to large Wisconsin dairy farms in excess of the 
economic savings that attended the purchase of milk from large farms.  To 
deprive large Wisconsin farms of financial benefits that were not the result 
of economic efficiencies and thereby engender fairer competition, 
Wisconsin prohibited premiums to the extent they exceeded the real 
economic savings of purchasing milk from large farms.  The large 
Wisconsin farms and milk purchasers then engaged in classic  travel-
evasion:  with the express purpose of avoiding the Wisconsin law, they 
restructured the sales so they technically occurred in Illinois, which did not 
have such a restriction on premiums.  Wisconsin in turn sought to apply its 
prohibition extraterritorially to such Illinois sales.12 
These examples notwithstanding, few states have tried to frustrate 
travel-evasion by regulating their citizens’ out-of-state activities.  There is 
 
extraterritorially and (2) interstate compacts.  Mark D. Rosen, Concurrent Legislative 
Jurisdiction 40-45 (Jan. 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Both 
alternatives to unilateral state action are difficult to accomplish polit ically, however, and 
hence are unlikely on their own to adequately protect states’ interests.  See id. at 40-44 
(identifying political and potential constitutional problems with the two alternatives). 
10 Commonwealth v. Hartford, No. 95-98 (Ct. Com. Pl. Sullivan County, Pa. Dec. 5, 
1996).  Professor Kreimer helpfully points out that Ms. Hartford’s conviction was reversed 
due to improper jury instructions in an unpublished, unreported decision.  See Seth F. 
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand:  The Importance of Borders in American Federalism , 150 U. PA. 
L.  REV. 973, 975 n.8 (2001) [hereinafter Kreimer, Lines in the Sand].  Pennsylvania was 
interested in retrying the case, see Robert L. Sharpe, Supreme Court Drops Appeal over N.Y. 
Abortion, 22 PA. L. WKLY. 1029, 1029 (1999) (“An upstate Pennsylvania prosecutor said he 
would likely re-try the case.”), however the defendant and the Sullivan County district 
attorney ultimately entered into an agreement under which Ms. Hartford was to perform the 
same community service and undergo the same rehabilitative treatment that the court had 
ordered following her conviction.  Telephone Interview with Max P. Little, District Attorney, 
Sullivan County, Pa. (Dec. 20, 2001). 
11 See House Passes First Federal Criminal Anti-Abortion Measure, U.S. NEWSWIRE , 
June 30, 1999 (reporting that the House passed the Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 1218, 
106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), which would have made it a federal offense to transport a minor 
across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion if the minor’s state of residence 
required parental involvement in her decision to obtain an abortion), available at LEXIS. 
12 For a discussion and analysis of this case, Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609 
(7th  Cir. 1999), see infra  Part II.C.2. 
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evidence that this paucity of examples is attributable to a perception among 
the states that they are without power to regulate extraterritorially.13  Indeed, 
the House Bill was condemned in the popular press on such a ground,14 and 
Wisconsin’s effort was struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
by a federal court of appeals.15  This Article will suggest that such criticism 
is misplaced,16 and that the court’s analysis was erroneous.17  I hope in this 
Article to correct the misperception of state incapacity to regulate 
extraterritorially, so as to allow states to consider this form of regulation on 
its merits.18 
Courts and commentators have asserted several doctrinal objections to 
state efforts to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  The first claim 
is that states simply do not have the power to regulate conduct occurring 
outside their borders.  Language from the United States Supreme Court case 
Bigelow v. Virginia19 has been said to support this view.20  The Court in 
Bigelow stated that a “State does not acquire power or supervision over the 
internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its 
own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State.”21  Similarly, 
the Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that “‘[l]aws have no force of 
themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them, and can 
have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states.’”22  Much 
 
13 See infra  note 32 (discussing cases and materials that support the proposition that 
states do not have extraterritorial powers). 
14 See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Far from Chile?, NATION, July 27, 1998, at 9 (asking “[s]ince 
when is one still subject to one’s home state’s laws in another state?” and arguing that such a 
law accordingly would be unconstitutional); Editorial, Crossing the Line, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, July 28, 1998, at B8 (“Imagine traveling to Portland from another state, abiding 
by every local law, then returning to face arrest for your completely legal conduct on Oregon 
soil . . . . [F]ederal lawmakers are [not] justified in using a back-door ploy to interfere with 
prerogatives of individual states to make laws affecting the people who live within their 
borders.”). 
15 See Dean Foods, 187 F.3d at 620 (“[T]he commerce at issue here occurred wholly 
outside of Wisconsin, and thus any attempt by Wisconsin to enforce its volume premium rules 
against it would violate the extraterritoriality principle.”). 
16 Infra  Part II. 
17 Infra  Part II.C.2. 
18 Relevant to analyzing the merits of such extraterritorial regulation is the extent to 
which a state could enforce such regulations.  Concurrent Legislative Jurisdiction, a work-in-
progress, analyzes enforcement issues and shows that states would have many efficacious 
options to ensure compliance with laws that regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  
Rosen, supra  note 9, at 45-46. 
19 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
20 Professor Kreimer has advanced this view.  See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, 
at 460-62 (arguing that Bigelow has strong foundations in American federalism). 
21 421 U.S. at 824. 
22 Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., 816 P.2d 919, 925 (Ariz. Ct. 
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Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence seems to take a similar approach, 
as such caselaw announces that states may not enact “extraterritorial 
legislation” that “‘directly regulates transactions which take place across 
state lines.’”23  This Article will show that these lines of caselaw do not 
undermine the well-established and normatively sound jurisprudence that 
states have inherent power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct. 
A second possible objection to extraterritorial regulation is that even if 
Home States have some extraterritorial powers with respect to their citizens, 
they do not have the power to prohibit them from engaging in activities in 
Host States that are permissible for the Host States’ citizens.  Professor Seth 
Kreimer has advanced this view, relying in part on the above-mentioned 
case of Bigelow to argue that the “tradition of American federalism stands 
squarely against efforts by states to punish their citizens for conduct that is 
protected in the sister state where it occurs.”24  Professors Rollin Perkins 
and Ronald Boyce have proffered comparable arguments.25  Professor Lea 
Brilmayer has come to a similar conclusion, arguing that with regard to 
issues about which there are sharp moral disagreements among states, such 
as abortion and the right to die, “the structure of our federal system clearly 
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically 
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”26 
This Article argues against the positions advanced by Professors 
Kreimer, Perkins, Boyce, and Brilmayer, as well as the other objections to 
extraterritorial regulation that have been propounded.27  It shows that our 
 
App. 1991) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892)). 
23 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 333 n.9 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 
U.S. 624, 641 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
24 Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 462. 
25 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS &  RONALD N. BOYCE ,  CRIMINAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1982) 
(“[N]o state may punish its citizen for what he does in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of 
another state where what was done was lawful.”). 
26 Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption:  The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the 
Right to Die, 91 MICH . L. REV. 873, 876 (1993). 
27 To date, a few scholars have concluded that states have powers to regulate their 
citizens’  out-of-state conduct under limited circumstances, but none has comprehensively 
analyzed the issue of extraterritorial regulation.  See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If 
Roe Is Overruled?  Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 
170 (1993) (concluding only that there is a “plausible” case on behalf of state extraterritorial 
power in the discrete context of abortion); Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) (stating in a footnote that “[s]tates may punish citizens 
for criminal acts done outside the state”); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays:  (I) CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial 
State Legislation, 85 MICH . L. REV. 1865, 1906-08, 1912-13 (1987) (providing incisive but 
incomplete analysis of extraterritoriality in five pages); William Van Alstyne, Closing the 
Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut  to Roe v. Wade:  An Outline of 
a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1684 (spending one page on the 
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country’s federal union imposes far more modest limitations on states’ 
inherent powers to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their citizens.  The 
Constitution creates a national union, to be sure, but it is a union of 
meaningfully empowered states.  Meaningful empowerment means that 
states can take reasonable steps, including extraterritorial regulation, to 
ensure the efficacy of heterogeneous policies that themselves are not 
unconstitutional.  The political heterogeneity that extraterritorial regulation 
permits is an affirmative good in a country as large and diverse as ours.  
(Professor Seth Kreimer provides a rejoinder to my analysis in a 
commentary immediately following this Article, and the editors of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review were kind enough to allow me an 
extended footnote to respond.28) 
More generally, this Article stands firmly against the current tendency 
among many important legal scholars to dismiss the significance of 
subfederal polities.  Professor Larry Kramer recently opin ed in the pages of 
the Yale Law Journal that “few citizens today think of the United States as 
anything other than a single political community” that “share[s] what is, for 
practical purposes, a single culture.”29  Professors Edward L. Rubin and 
Malcolm Feeley come to a similar conclusion30 and argue that the only 
valuable function of states is to “achieve the managerial benefits that flow 
from decentralizing certain governmental functions.”31  This Article, by 
contrast, elucidates the importance of allowing rich political heterogeneity 
among states. 
The Article is composed of four Parts.  The first Part examines states’ 
presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  These 
baseline extraterritorial powers are confirmed by the Tenth Amendment and 
are limited in the first instance by due process, which guarantees that such 
regulations are fair vis-à-vis individual citizens.  Such extraterritorial 
powers are only presumptive, however, for there are additional federal 
limitations, which are the subjects of Parts II and III.  Part I reviews early 
Supreme Court caselaw, recent scholarly restatements, and contemporary 
due process jurisprudence concerning extraterritoriality.  In so doing, Part I 
develops several powerful normative arguments on behalf of the position 
 
issue). 
28 Infra  note 455. 
29 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1989 (1997). 
30 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:  Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 945 (1994) (“[T]he United States has one political 
community, and that political community is the United States.”). 
31 Id. at 951.  For an explanation of the managerial advantages of decentralization, see id. 
at 910-13. 
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that states have extraterritoriality regulatory powers over their citizens. 
Part II reviews several constitutional provisions that tame states’ 
baseline extraterritorial powers in the service of creating a single, federal 
union of states.  These limitations on extraterritoriality emerge from the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the right to travel, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, as well as nontextual structural limitations.  Although 
courts and commentators have correctly recognized that these constitutional 
constraints limit the extent to which Home States can regulate their citizens’ 
out-of-state activities, their scope has been overstated.  Careful analysis 
shows that these constitutional doctrines place important, but only modest, 
limitations on state power, and that they leave ample room for Home States 
to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities. 
As a result of the doctrines explored in Parts I and II, our federal system 
is one in which both the Home and Host State presumptively have 
concurrent jurisdiction over any given transaction or occurrence.  Part III 
explores the law that establishes and regulates this system of concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Part III also provides a preliminary explanation as to why this 
system does not result in anarchy, but instead generally functions smoothly.  
A short Conclusion follows. 
I. THE PRESUMPTIVE POWER OF HOME STATES TO REGULATE THEIR 
CITIZENS’ OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT  
As a matter of federal constitutional law, states have a presumptive 
power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct.  This is something 
that many state courts appear not to appreciate.32  This extraterritorial power 
 
32 See, e.g., Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., 816 P.2d 919, 925-26 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that states are without extraterritorial power as a matter of 
federal constitutional law); supra  note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the issue 
concluded in Bruce Church).  For a review of cases showing state courts’ “attitude of 
territoriality,” which had led the courts to refrain from applying state laws to extraterritorial 
activities, see Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State 
Criminal Law, 38 T EX. L. REV. 763, 773 & n.59, 774-80 (1960).  Similarly, many 
jurisdictions that have abandoned strict territorialist conflict -of-laws rules and have applied 
Home State laws concerning loss-allocation to out -of-state occurrences are nonetheless of the 
view that the Home State could not regulate the conduct of its out-of-state citizens.  See, e.g., 
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E. 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York guest statute to 
accident occurring out of state).  For example, the court in Babcock stated that if the legal 
issue had 
related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time of 
the accident . . . it [would be] appropriate to look to the law of the place of the tort so 
as to give effect to that jurisdiction’s interest in regulating conduct within its borders, 
and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some 
other place. 
Id.  The distinction between “conduct regulating” and “loss allocating” rules is widespread in 
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is part of the inherent sovereign powers that have been retained by states 
under the Tenth Amendment.  While the scope of these presumptive powers 
is limited by contemporary due process doctrine, states retain significant 
extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis their citizens. 
A.  Early Caselaw 
As a matter of federal law,33 states’ regulatory powers do not end at 
their borders.  Under appropriate circumstances, states have the power to 
apply their laws to their citizens’ out-of-state activities.  Though the 
Article’s focus is on extraterritorial regulation of citizens, any study of state 
extraterritoriality powers must start with an early case that upheld 
Michigan’s criminal prosecution of a noncitizen who had never entered the 
state.  The defendant in the 1921 case of Strassheim v. Daily had engaged in 
bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a scheme to sell used 
machinery to the state of Michigan that he falsely claimed was new.34  
Writing for the United States Supreme Court, Justice Holmes famously 
declared that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and 
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause 
of the harm as if he had been present at the effect.”35  Unfortunately, 
Strassheim is not particularly helpful in explaining the source of the state’s 
extraterritorial powers; it merely says that “the usage of the civ ilized world 
would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in 
the State until after the fraud was complete.”36  As we soon will see, 
subsequent cases have more fully developed the proposition that a state has 
the power to protect itself from harm that is directed against it from outside 
its borders. 
The Supreme Court upheld another state’s exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in Skiriotes v. Florida.37  The Court approved the application of 
 
conflict-of-law doctrine.  See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,  COMMENTARY ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 434-35 (4th ed. 2001) (describing how choice-of-law issues are 
determined in New York and Louisiana depending on this distinction).  To the extent this 
caselaw is premised on the view that federal constitutional law precludes conduct regulating 
extraterritorial regulation, this Article suggests these criminal law and choice-of-law doctrines 
could be different.  Whether they should be different, of course, is ultimately a matter for 
states to decide on the merits.  
33 State extraterritorial powers under federal law are permissive rather than mandatory; 
thus, a state court could legitimately conclude that state law precludes a state from regulating 
extraterritorially. 
34 221 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1911). 
35 Id. at 285. 
36 Id. at 284-85. 
37 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
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a Florida statute prohibiting sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities 
that occurred wholly outside of that state’s territorial waters.  In contrast to 
Strassheim’s epigrammatic discussion, however, the bulk of the Skiriotes 
opinion concerned the source of the state’s power to regulate outside its 
borders and focused on a two-step explanation.  The Court first observed 
that the federal government has inherent extraterritorial power over 
activities implicating “legitimate interests” when those interests can be 
undermined by activities that occur outside of United States territory: 
[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from 
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign 
countries . . . . Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly 
injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to 
particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens of the United 
States upon the high seas or in a foreign country . . . .38 
Second, the Court analogized the states’ sovereign powers to those of 
the federal government and concluded that the states likewise have 
extraterritorial regulatory authority.  The Court’s reasoning turned on the 
Tenth Amendment in concept, though not in name:  the Court states that 
“[s]ave for the powers committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State 
of Florida has retained the status of a sovereign,”39 and the “‘residuum of 
sovereignty’” (the power to regulate its citizens’ extraterritorial conduct) 
was “‘not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.’”40  
Accordingly, 
[i]f the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high 
seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the 
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the 
State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of 
Congress.41 
Four aspects of Skiriotes merit further exploration if we are fully to 
understand the scope of the decision’s holding in respect of 
extraterritoriality.  First, the opinion turned on the fact that the person who 
was subject to regulation was a citizen of the regulating polity.  The 
 
38 Id. at 73-74. 
39 Id. at 77. 
40 Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)).  For an example of a case 
where the Court explicitly tied this type of argument to the Tenth Amendment, see Heath v. 
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), where the Court argued that states’ “powers to undertake 
criminal prosecutions derive from separate and independent sources of power and authority 
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by the 
Tenth Amendment.”  Id. at 89. 
41 Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.  
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Skiriotes opinion repeatedly stressed that the regulated party was a citizen,42 
and the Court distinguished an earlier case on the basis that it concerned one 
state’s effort to regulate the citizens of another state.43  This is not to suggest 
that citizenship is a necessary condition for extraterritorial regulation; 
consider Strassheim.44  Nonetheless, Skiriotes shows that citizenship is a 
significant factor in assessing the constitutionality of extraterritorial 
regulation. 
Second, one might ask whether the Skiriotes decision, which concerned 
a criminal statute, has application to the civil context.  The answer is in the 
affirmative, but the line of reasoning is more complicated than might first 
appear.  Although one might be tempted to say that extraterritorial civil 
authority follows a fortiori from such criminal authority insofar as 
government typically is subjected to stricter requirements in the criminal 
context, where a person’s liberty is at stake, there are two respects in which 
criminal law might be thought to justify state extraterritorial power more 
readily than civil law. 
First, one could argue that criminal law by its nature is concerned with 
vindicating the public interest, and accordingly falls within the sovereign’s 
inherent powers, whereas civil law addresses merely private interests.45  
This objection is far too broad, however, for the civil law also can be a 
vehicle for vindicating public interests;46 consider, for example, marriage 
and divorce law.  It also ignores the fact that the legislature’s choice 
between civil and criminal penalties cannot be so facilely explained in a 
regulatory state, such as ours, that charges executive agencies with pursuing 
noncriminal actions. 
Second, and more plausibly, it could be said that extraterritorial 
 
42 See, e.g., id. at 76 (rejecting the view that “the State could not prohibit its own citizens 
from use of the described divers’ equipment at that place” and stating that “[t]he question is 
solely between appellant and his own State”). 
43 Id. at 76-77 (distinguishing the case of Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 
242 (1891), because it involved Massachusetts’ effort to enforce regulations “as against 
cit izens of Rhode Island”). 
44 See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (opining that a state can be warranted 
in punishing a defendant who defrauded it, “although he never had set foot in the State until 
after the fraud was complete” and thus was not a citizen at the time of the crime). 
45 See, e.g. , Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 657 (1892) (stating that the criminal 
law’s “purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state” whereas civil law 
“afford[s] a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act”); see also  id. at 668 
(stating that the criminal law concerns “wrong[s] to the public [rather than] to the 
individual”). 
46 Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 362 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
State also expresses its sovereign power when it speaks through its courts in a civil litigation 
between private parties.”). 
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application of civil law is problematically complicated insofar as it concerns 
the citizen’s relationships with other private parties; criminal law is more 
simple because it primarily concerns the regulated party’s relationship with 
her home polity.  This second critique is also too broad because many civil 
regulations effectively concern only the regulated party’s relationship with 
her home polity, and many criminal laws have direct effects on third parties.  
It nonetheless highlights an important consideration:  the state’s 
extraterritorial powers in respect of its citizens may well vary depending on 
whether the polity seeks to regulate its citizen’s relationship with other 
private entities (particularly noncitizens)47 or whether the state is regulating 
its bilateral relationship with its own citizens. 
In the end, then, Skiorites’ holding cannot be said to be applicable only 
to criminal laws.  Many civil laws also advance the state’s legitimate 
interests and primarily concern the bilateral relationship between polity and 
regulated actor, and Skiriotes’ holding concerning extraterritorial regulation 
is fully applicable to these types of noncriminal laws.  Moreover, as I will 
soon show, the Supreme Court has since upheld the extraterritorial 
application of state law to noncitizens.48 
To continue with our analysis of Skiriotes’ holding, the case concerned 
regulation on the high seas, and some commentators have suggested that its 
holding is limited to this context.49  The Court’s reasoning, however, is not 
so confined.  As discussed above, the holding turned on the sovereign’s 
inherent powers to guard its “legitimate interest[s]”50 against injuries that 
can be “perpetrat[ed] without regard to particular locality,” and this logic 
extends beyond activities that are performed on the high seas.51  Indeed, the 
opinion explicitly referred to the legitimacy of regulations being applicable 
in “foreign countries.”52 
Finally, the Court in Skiriotes made clear that the extraterritorial power 
 
47 See infra  notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 
281 U.S. 397 (1930)). 
48 See infra  note 94 (mentioning Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 
U.S. 66 (1955)).  In the future, I hope to explore the extent of state extraterritorial regulatory 
power over noncitizens.  Such regulations implicate fundamentally different questions than 
the question addressed here, i.e., Home State extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis its citizens.  
49 See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 475 & n.79 (citing books and periodicals 
that would limit the Skiriotes’  holding to maritime law); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Wh oever 
Treasures Freedom . . .”:  The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH . L. 
REV. 907, 925 (1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom] (“ Skiriotes is 
specifically limited to state prosecution of crimes ‘within no other territorial jurisdiction.’” 
(quoting Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 78)). 
50 Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.  
51 Id. at 74. 
52 Id. at 73. 
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of the United States, and hence also of the states, is not without limits.53  
Namely, the extraterritorial regulation by states cannot lead to problematic 
conflicts with federal law;54 it is in this sense that the extraterritorial power 
over citizens is only presumptive.  The Court spoke of the United States’ 
undoubted extraterritorial powers “when the rights of other nations or their 
nationals are not infringed.”55  Although the Court did not elaborate what 
constituted problematic “infringe[ment],” the Court understood that the 
application of U.S. law in foreign countries does not per se infringe foreign 
rights, for Skiriotes contemplated that application of U.S. law in foreign 
countries would be acceptable at least sometimes.56 
The question then becomes what if any power states have to regulate 
their citizens when they are in sister states.  Skiriotes makes clear that 
federal and state extraterritorial legislative powers are comparable, but the 
question is whether the sister states are analogous to foreign countries for 
these purposes.  The likely answer is both yes and no.  On the one hand, the 
intrinsic need—and power—of the sovereign to guard its legitimate interests 
by extraterritorially regulating its citizens in respect of activities whose 
locus is irrelevant to the state interest is, by definition, unaffected by where 
the activity occurs.  For this reason, Skiriotes supports the conclusion that 
states enjoy such a presumptive power of extraterritorial regulation over 
their citizens.57  On the other hand, what constitutes a problematic 
“infringe[ment]” certainly differs as between foreign countries and sister 
states.  Under Skiriotes’ approach, the way to identify the limitations on 
states’ extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis sister states58 is to consider what 
sovereign powers were delegated to the federal government in the 
Constitution and accordingly not retained by the states under the Tenth 
Amendment.  These limitations—constitutional constraints imposed by due 
process, full faith and credit, privileges and immunities, the right to travel, 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, and any structural constitutional 
 
53 Id. at 78-79. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 73 (emphasis added).  The Court expressly extended the federal analogy to the 
states, noting that there was “[n]o question as to the authority of the United States over these 
waters” and that “[n]o right of a citizen of any other State is here asserted.”  Id. at 76. 
56 Id. at 73 (“[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from 
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries 
when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.” (emphasis added)). 
57 See Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 
n.94 (1988) (coming to same conclusion). 
58 Different principles are relevant to considering states’ powers over their citizens’ 
conduct in foreign countries.  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 263 
(2000) (preempting a Massachusetts law concerning trade with Burma because of a conflict 
with federal trade policy). 
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limitations—are different from the limitations upon the federal government 
in the international context and are explained in Parts II and III.  It is critical 
to recognize, however, the analytical distinction between presumptive 
extraterritorial powers and federal limitations on such powers; the mere fact 
that a state may be without the power to extraterritorially regulate its 
citizens in one context does not mean that states are generally without such 
powers. 
B.  Scholarly Restatements 
Relying on Strassheim and Skiriotes, scholarly restatements of the law 
reflect the understanding that states have a presumptive extraterritorial 
power to criminally and civilly regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct 
where the state’s legitimate interests are implicated by the extraterritorial 
conduct.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that 
states “may apply at least some laws to a person outside [state] territory on 
the basis that he is a citizen, resident or domiciliary of the State.”59  The 
Restatement asserts that this principle applies to both extraterritorial 
criminal and civil legislative powers.60  Directed to the criminal context, the 
Model Penal Code provides that State A may impose liability if “the offense 
is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the 
State.”61  State A has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the 
 
59 RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 reporters’ notes at 5 
(1986).  The reporters’ notes make clear that the Restatement’s authors understood its 
principles to apply to the extraterritorial powers enjoyed by states within the United States.  
See id. (citing inter alia to Skiriotes and Strassheim , and stating that the “exercise of 
jurisdiction to prescribe by States is governed by the same principles whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction has international or inter-State implications”).  The reporters’ notes state that such 
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction generally “involve[s] acts or omissions that also had 
effect within the State.”  Id.  Professor Kreimer criticizes the Restatement on the ground that 
states stand in a different relation vis-à-vis sister states than does the United States vis-à-vis 
other countries.  Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 488 n.122.  I agree that the “same 
principles” are not operative in the two very different contexts of domestic and international 
extraterritoriality, but the Restatement recognizes that the precise scope of extraterritorial 
powers may differ, as well.  See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 
reporters’ notes at 5 (1986) (“In exercising jurisdiction to prescribe, a State must take account 
also of constit utional and other limitations governing judicial enforcement of its laws, 
particularly in criminal cases.”).  Parts II and III of this Article examine the federalism-based 
principles that limit the exercise of states’ extraterritorial powers domestically.  The 
Restatement’s point concerning state exterritorial regulatory power, accordingly, remains 
valid. 
60 The Restatement is explicit about this.  See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. f (1986) (“The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe set 
forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil regulation.”). 
61 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1985). 
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activity it prohibits occurs in a state in which the activity is permissible.62  
The major limitation identified by the Model Penal Code is that the 
regulated conduct must “bear[] a reasonable relation to a legit imate interest 
of [the regulating] State.”63  The comment states that the “reasonable 
relation to legitimate interests” requirement “expresses the general principle 
of the fourteenth amendment limitation on state legislative jurisdiction.”64  
These Model Penal Code provisions have been in whole or in significant 
part adopted by many states.65 
C. Due Process 
Skiriotes did not invoke the term “due process” but instead deployed a 
freewheeling constitutional inquiry bereft of citation to the Constitution.  As 
suggested by the comment to the Model Penal Code, the extent of a state’s 
presumptive legislative jurisdiction today is analyzed under the doctrinal 
rubric of due process.  Under the modern doctrine articulated in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Due Process Clause “prohibit[s] the application 
of law which [is] only casually or slightly related to the litigation.”66  More 
specifically, Shutts requires “‘a significant contact . . . creating state 
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
unfair.’”67  A careful examination of the caselaw, immediately following in 
Subsections 1 and 2, reveals that citizenship on its own virtually suffices to 
give the Home State sufficient interest to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state 
activities.  The caselaw also suggests that even when a citizen is not 
involved, states frequently have the power to exercise legislative jurisdiction 
over persons whose out-of-state activities undermine legitimate state 
interests.  Taken together, it follows that states have a sufficient interest for 
due process purposes to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities that are 
undertaken for the purpose of evading, or have the effect of undermining, 
legitimate state policies.  This logic establishes, however, only a 
presumptive, and not an absolute, power to extraterritorially regulate, for 
there are constitutional limitations outside of due process reflecting the 
 
62 Id. § 1.03(2).  For a discussion of § 1.03, see infra  text accompanying notes 398-405. 
63 Id. § 1.03(1)(f). 
64 Id. § 1.03 cmt. 6.  The comment, however, neglects to consider other constitutional 
limitations that bear on the constitutionality of a state’s extraterritorial regulation.  See infra 
Parts II and III (discussing constitutional limitations on a state’s extraterritorial legislative 
powers). 
65 E.g., ARIZ.  REV.  STAT. § 13-108 (A)(5) (2001); 18 PA.  CONS.  STAT.  ANN. § 102 
(6)(a)-(b) (West 1998). 
66 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).  
67 Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). 
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federal character of our nation that also constrain states’ extraterritorial 
powers.  These limitations will be explored in Parts II and III. 
1. Citizenship 
As both a commonsense and doctrinal matter, citizenship is a 
significant factor for purposes of legitimating state regulation.  Writing for a 
plurality of the Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, for example, 
Justice Brennan observed that “[n]umerous cases have applied the law of a 
jurisdiction other than the situs of the injury where there existed some other 
link between that jurisdiction and the occurrence.”68  Continued Justice 
Brennan, “[t]he injury or death of a resident of State A in State B is a contact 
of State A with the occurrence in State B.”69 
This is not to suggest that citizenship on its own justifies regulation.  In 
fact, the Court in Hague construed the early case of Home Insurance Co. v. 
Dick70 as standing for the proposition that “nominal residence—standing 
alone—[is] inadequate.”71  Careful analysis of the caselaw, however, 
suggests that although “nominal residence” might not suffice, little more 
than bona fide citizenship is required to justify extraterritorial legislative 
powers for states. 
In Hague, for example, the Supreme Court held that Minnesota could 
apply its insurance law even though the accident giving rise to the insurance 
claim had occurred in Wisconsin, the decedent and his widow had lived in 
Wisconsin at the time of the accident, all relevant vehicles had been 
registered in Wisconsin, and the insurance policy had been issued in 
Wisconsin.72  According to the Court, Minnesota had three contacts with the 
parties and occurrence that justified that state’s legislative jurisdiction:  the 
widow had become a bona fide Minnesota resident prior to the start of the 
litigation; the decedent had commuted to and worked in Minnesota; and, 
Allstate Insurance Company did business in Minnesota.73 
Minnesota’s interest in the widow is clear:  obtaining “full 
compensation” for the survivors of accidents so as to keep them “‘off 
welfare rolls’” and to ensure they can “‘meet financial obligations.’”74  The 
other contacts, however, are at best modest in relation to the issue of 
 
68 449 U.S. 302, 314 n.19 (1981). 
69 Id. at 315 n.20. 
70 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
71 Hague, 449 U.S. at 311.  For my alternative explanation of the Dick case, see infra 
notes 79-86 and accompanying text. 
72 449 U.S. at 305-06. 
73 Id. at 313-19. 
74 Id. at 319 (quoting Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978)). 
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Minnesota’s power to regulate out-of-state occurrences concerning its 
citizens.75  Allstate’s presence in Minnesota is relevant to the fairness of 
regulating a noncitizen third party, but it is in no respect relevant to the 
fairness of Minnesota regulating its citizens’ extraterritorial conduct.  The 
final contact cited by the Hague Court—that the decedent had worked in 
Minnesota—is equally dubious with respect to Minnesota’s regulatory 
interest in this context.  The decedent had not been commuting to or from 
work at the time of the accident.76  Nor does the Court’s explanation that 
Minnesota had an interest in the safety and well-being of its work force, 
including its nonresident employees,77 in any way explain the basis for 
Minnesota to apply its insurance stacking laws in the case, for “permitting 
stacking will not further this interest.”78 
In the end, then, Minnesota’s interest in applying its law would appear 
to be wholly derivative of its legitimate interest in its bona fide resident.  
That this is true is suggested by considering whether Minnesota could have 
persuasively claimed an interest in applying its insurance stacking laws had 
the widow remained a resident of Wisconsin; it is hard to imagine that the 
Court would have accepted such a claim. 
In short, Hague suggests that bona fide residence on its own is virtually, 
if not wholly, a sufficient basis for empowering a state to regulate that 
person’s out-of-state activities.  How does this square with Dick?79  One 
response might be that Dick concerned only “nominal residence,” as Hague 
said.80  This explanation turns out to be inadequate, however, because what 
made Dick’s Texas residence only “nominal”?  It was not that Texas was 
 
75 See also  WEINTRAUB, supra  note 32, at 593 (noting that Mrs. Hague’s residence gave 
Minnesota an interest but suggesting that “if it were not for the prior commuting and business 
contacts [of her deceased husband], even the plurality in Hague probably would have thought 
it so outrageous as to be unconstitutional for Minnesota to assert this late acquired interest in 
compensation”); cf. Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems:  As Between 
State and Federal Law, 79 MICH . L. REV. 1315, 1341-47 (1981) (arguing that Minnesota had 
no relevant interests in Hague); Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing 
Standard—Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327, 352-53 
(1982) (same). 
76 Hague, 449 U.S. at 314. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting).  More completely, Justice Powell stated: 
The insured’s place of employment is not, however, significant in this case.  Neither 
the nature of the insurance policy, the events related to the accident, nor the 
immediate question of stacking coverage is in any way affected or implicated by the 
insured’s employment status.  . . . Minnesota does not wish its workers to die in 
automobile accidents, but permitting stacking will not further this interest. 
Id. 
79 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
80 Hague, 449 U.S. at 311. 
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not his bona fide residence; the Court observed that Dick’s “permanent 
residence was in Texas.”81  What made it nominal in the eyes of the Hague 
Court, presumably, was that all things in regard to the formation of the 
insurance contract and the underlying events giving rise to the claim 
occurred outside of Texas and that “[a]t all times here material, he was 
physically present and acting” outside of Texas.82  But what difference 
should that make to Texas’s interest in the matter?  After all, the substantive 
issue was one in which Texas well could have had a strong interest.  At 
issue in Dick was whether a Texas law that prohibited stipulations in 
insurance contracts limiting time for suits to periods shorter than two years 
was to apply to an insurance contract negotiated out of state that contained a 
one-year limitation.83  Thus, at stake was whether Dick would be able to file 
suit to recover insurance for his tug, which had been totally destroyed in a 
fire.84  The loss of property and means of livelihood could well have 
jeopardized Dick’s ability to meet his financial obligations in Texas.  
Consequently, just like the Home State in Hague, Texas had an interest in 
applying its laws; namely, a desire to ensure that survivors of accidents who 
are citizens of the Home State can “meet financial obligations.”85  In short, 
Texas had as much interest in Dick as Minnesota had in the widow in 
Hague. 
Properly understood, the basis for the Dick decision was not that Texas 
had no interest in Dick, but that Texas had no right to regulate noncitizens—
the insurance companies—that had absolutely no contacts with Texas.  The 
insurance contracts had been negotiated out of Texas, in jurisdictions where 
one-year suit limitations were legal, and the tug fire occurred outside of 
Texas as well.  In short, Texas’s effort to legislate extraterritorially failed 
not because of Dick’s “nominal residence,” but because of the regulation’s 
third-party effects on noncitizens.  Dick thus teaches nothing about a state’s 
inherent powers to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities.  In fact, the 
Dick Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, explicitly said as much:  
“We need not consider how far the State may go in imposing restrictions on 
the conduct of its own residents . . . . It may not abrogate the rights of 
parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done 
within them.”86 
 
81 Dick, 281 U.S. at 408. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 406-11. 
84 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 8 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), rev’d, 281 U.S. 397 
(1930). 
85 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978). 
86 Dick, 281 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added).  Professor James Martin has argued that Dick 
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Since Dick was decided, citizenship has been weighted even more 
heavily to justify what is best characterized as extraterritorial regulation.  In 
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,87 for example, citizenship was a basis for 
overriding the express expectations of the contracting parties.  An Illinois 
citizen had purchased from a non-Illinois company an insurance policy that 
required that any lawsuits be initiated within twelve months after the 
occurrence.88  The clause was valid under Illinois law.  The insured 
thereafter made a bona fide move to Florida, which had a statute that 
nullified any insurance clauses requiring suit before five years.89  Loss 
occurred in Florida, and the Supreme Court decided that the contract’s 
twelve-month provision did not apply.90  Although the Court suggested that 
holding otherwise would amount to giving Illinois law extraterritorial 
application,91 the more natural way to conceptualize the operation of the 
Florida statute is that it operated extraterritorially by altering the contractual 
rights that had been created by the parties when they formed their 
contractual obligations in Illinois.92  So understood, Clay gave more weight 
 
is best understood as a decision in which “[t]he deference is to the sovereignty of Mexico and 
not to the personal rights of the parties,” and hence that the case is best understood not as a 
due process “fairness” decision but as a full faith and credit type of decision.  James A. 
Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192 (1976); 
see also id. (emphasizing that due process protects individuals, whereas full faith and credit 
protects states); id. at 199 (concluding that “Dick does not yield to a due process analysis”).  
While the case plausibly could have been decided on the principle of deference to sovereigns, 
Dick plainly was not decided on those grounds.  More importantly, it is unclear why the 
decision need be so reread, for it is sensible on the grounds on which it was decided:  there is 
a strong argument that the noncitizen defendants had no substantial connection to Texas, and 
therefore that applying Texas law would have been unfair to them and accordingly violative of 
due process.  See WEINTRAUB, supra  note 32, at 598 (“[T]he application of Texas law 
violated due process because the contacts that Texas had with the parties and with the 
transaction were not sufficient to make it reasonable for Texas to assert the interest that it did 
have in applying Texas law.”).  For a critique of Martin’s argument, see Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 94, 108-09 (1976) (providing an alternative due process-based explanation of Dick).  
Professor Martin has not responded to this argument posited by Professor Kirgis.  See James 
A. Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151 (1976) (responding to many 
of Professor Kirgis’s arguments, but not to this one). 
87 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
88 Id. at 180. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 181-83. 
91 See id. at 181 (“While there are Illinois cases indicating that parties may contract —as 
here—for a short er period of limitations than is provided by the Illinois statute, we are 
referred to no Illinois decision extending that rule into other States whenever claims on 
Illinois contracts are sought to be enforced there.”). 
92 At the time of the Clay decision, contracts typically were construed under the law of 
the jurisdiction in which they were made because the contractual obligations were 
conceptualized as having come into existence at the time of contract formation.  See, e.g., 
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to citizenship than did Dick, for whereas Dick  was concerned with not 
“increas[ing the parties’] obligation and impos[ing] a burden not contracted 
for,”93 Clay did that very thing.  The key distinction between the cases 
justifying the different outcomes is that Florida in Clay (unlike Texas in 
Dick) had a right to regulate the noncitizen because it did business in the 
state, and was licensed to do so.94 
2. State Interest in Thwarting the Subversion of Legitimate State Policies 
by Out-of-State Activities 
It is well recognized that legitimate state policies frequently can be 
confounded by out-of-state activities, and regulating such extraterritorial 
activities has been upheld frequently, even when the regulated parties are 
not citizens of the regulating polity.  This body of caselaw, in conjunction 
with the cases surveyed above that show the states’ significant interests in 
 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936) (holding that a New 
York statute providing that a false statement in an insurance application regarding medical 
treatment constitutes material misrepresentation voiding the policy is a “term of the contract,” 
and must be applied by a Georgia court, even though under Georgia law what qualifies as a 
material misrepresentation is a question for the jury, and stating that “such recognition does 
not give to the New York statute extraterritorial effect”); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 332 (1934) (“The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of 
a promise with respect to [eight specified issues].”).  To be sure, the Clay Court tried to 
sugge st that the insurance company’s expectations really had not been disappointed because 
the “‘contract did not even attempt to provide that the law of Illinois would govern when suits 
were filed anywhere else in the country,’” 377 U.S. at 182 (quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting)), but such an argument reverses without 
justification the typical default rule of the time that contracts were to be construed under the 
law of the jurisdiction of formation.  
93 Dick, 281 U.S. at 409. 
94 Clay, 377 U.S. at 182 (quoting from Justice Black’s dissent in Clay, 363 U.S. at 221, 
in its holding).  In an even more extreme example of citizenship as a basis for extraterritorial 
regulation than Clay, the Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 
348 U.S. 66 (1954), upheld one state’s extraterritorial regulation of a contract between two 
noncit izens because the contract had an impact on a citizen.  The Court upheld a Louisiana 
statute that allowed injured parties to institute a direct action against an insurer “‘whether the 
policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and 
whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the 
accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana.’”  Id. at 68 n.4 (quoting LA.  REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1950)).  The insurance policy disallowing direct actions had been 
negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and Illinois, where such policies were legal, and was 
between a non-Louisiana insurer and a non-Louisiana insured person.  Id. at 67 & n.2.  What 
was the source of Louisiana’s interest?  The answer is that the injured party was a Louisiana 
citizen, and Louisiana wanted to maximize its citizens’ prospects for recovery.  Id. at 72.  In 
short, the Watson Court allowed Louisiana to conform to Louisiana’s statutory requirements a 
contract negotiated out of its state by noncitizens, thereby altering the express terms of their 
contract.  This de facto extraterritorial regulation was permitted because the contract affected 
the welfare of a Louisiana citizen. 
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regulating their citizens, strongly suggests that preventing citizens from 
evading legitimate state policies through travel constitutes a legit imate state 
interest sufficient to support a presumptive power of extraterritorial 
regulation for purposes of due process. 
Activities can harm a polity’s interests even if undertaken outside of the 
polity’s physical borders.  This can most readily be understood by 
considering the types of activities generally deemed to fall within the 
purview of states’ regulatory powers.  States may seek to protect 
themselves, to control third-party effects, to guard paternalistically the 
welfare of their citizens, and to try to manage norm-generation.95  Each of 
these legitimate state interests can be undercut by out-of-state activities.  
Consider first a state’s guarding of its own interests.  Speaking in the 
context of the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that there are “criminal statutes which are, as 
a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s 
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if 
committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.”96  With respect to such 
crimes, said the Court, “to limit their locus to the strictly territorial 
jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the 
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by 
citizens” when they are outside the polity’s borders “as at home.”97  This 
logic readily carries over to the domestic context and can explain the 
Court’s holding in the aforementioned Strassheim case, which upheld 
Michigan’s assertion of jurisdiction over a person who had not entered the 
state but who engaged in bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a 
scheme to fraudulently sell used machinery to Michigan.98  Similarly, it 
would make sense that public corruption statutes should prevent a public 
official from “evad[ing] guilt . . . by the simple expedient of stepping across 
[the] State border for the sole purpose of accepting the money.”99 
 
95 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (1998) 
(arguing that jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues do not render the regulation of cyberspace 
infeasible or illegitimate and noting that “every nation has mandatory laws that govern 
particular transactions or relationships regardless of the wishes of the parties” and “[t]he 
primary justifications for such laws are paternalism and protection of third parties”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 910 (1996) (arguing 
that the government and the law are rightfully involved in “norm management,” “expressing 
social values,” and “shifting social norms”). 
96 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
97 Id. (emphasis added). 
98 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281-85 (1911).  
99 Commonwealth v. Welch, 187 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Mass. 1963).  Though the court in 
Welch justified the application of the Massachusetts statute on the basis that some acts relating 
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The police powers—a state’s presumptive power to care for the health, 
welfare, and morals of its citizens—provides another predicate for the 
extraterritorial regulation of citizens.  The Supreme Court has “recognized 
that a State ha[s] a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens 
as they venture[] outside the State’s borders.”100  Consider in this regard the 
case of In re Busalacchi,101 which concerned a father’s desire to move his 
daughter, who was in a persistent vegetative state, from Missouri, under 
whose laws he could not remove the feeding tube that sustained her life, to a 
state under whose laws he could more readily withdraw the tube.  Did 
Missouri have a legitimate interest in guarding the daughter’s life by 
blocking the father’s plans so he could not simply cross the border to do in 
Illinois—remove his daughter’s feeding tube—what was prohibited at 
home?  A Missouri state appellate court ruled that Missouri, which 
determined that the guardian, under parens patriae, had such an interest in 
the daughter’s life,102 and it is hard to say that the court was incorrect on this 
point.  The court accordingly sustained Missouri’s effort to control what the 
father could legally do regarding his daughter outside of the state.  
 
to the corruption had occurred in Massachusetts, id., the same outcome should have obtained 
even if all illicit acts had occurred out of state. 
 With respect to guarding the state’s interests, consider as well the analogous context of 
contempt of court for violation of court orders.  As one court stated,  
contempt is an offense against the dignity and authority of the particular court, to 
which the affront is offered. . . . [T]he affront is none the less directly against the 
dignity and authority of that court, no matter to what county or state the offender 
may go to violate the order of the court.  If that were not true, then injunction orders 
in many instances would be a farce.  It would be ridiculous, to say that an order 
enjoining the sale of personal property, over which the court had jurisdiction, could 
be violated with impunity, if the lit igant only took the pains to cross the state line 
before disposing of it. 
Farmers’ State Bank v. State, 164 P. 132, 132 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917). 
 Virtually the same refrain can be seen in the context of the out-of-state attempted murder 
of a key witness in a prosecution:  “The administration of justice is equally obstructed 
wherever the act is done . . . . The act in its nature is not one dependent upon location for its 
greater or less influence on the administration of justice.”  McCaully v. United States, 25 App. 
D.C. 404, 413 (1905). 
100 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 437 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing an observation in Bigelow v. Virginia , 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).  
101 No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991).  
102 Id. at  *7-17.  It is another question as to whether the action of the court —enjoining a 
father from taking his daughter out of state—should have been upheld.  Indeed, it may have 
run afoul of the right to travel.  See infra  Part II.B (exploring how the right to travel imposes a 
limit on states’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities).  An alternative 
response that would have been justified more easily would have been a Missouri statute 
criminalizing the act of taking Missouri citizens in persistent vegetative states out of the state 
for purposes of taking advantage of other states’ more lenient laws in respect of removal of 
feeding tubes.  
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In a context analogous to extraterritorial state regulation, the Supreme 
Court recently has held that states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ 
out-of-state activities if such activities undermine legitimate state policy.  In 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the Court upheld a federal statute 
that prohibited the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by radio licensees 
located in nonlottery states.103  The broadcaster in Edge was located in 
North Carolina, a nonlottery state, but wanted to broadcast Virginia lottery 
advertisements.104  As part of its analysis, the Edge Court concluded that the 
statute directly advanced the federal government’s interest in “support[ing] 
the antigambling policy of a State like North Carolina by forbidding stations 
in such a State to air lottery advertising.”105  The federal interest that served 
to uphold the statute thus was wholly derivative of the state’s interest, 
ineluctably leading to the conclusion that the state’s interest was legitimate.  
The Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy would 
have been undermined had the broadcaster been permitted to broadcast 
advertisements for an activity that was legal in another state but prohibited 
in North Carolina.  In other words, North Carolina’s antigambling policy 
would have been undermined by North Carolina citizens’ out-of-state 
conduct, even if the gambling occurred in a state in which the activity was 
legal. 106  The Court’s rationale makes sense; an antilottery policy might be 
based on a conclusion that “lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to 
afford to purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served 
by spending their money on more promising investments.”107  Surely these 
 
103 509 U.S. at 418. 
104 Id. at 423-24. 
105 Id. at 428. 
106 One might object to this conclusion by suggesting that all the Court meant is that 
North Carolina’s antigambling policy would have been undermined had advertisements for 
the activity emanated from North Carolina and that the opinion did not suggest that North 
Carolina was legitimately concerned with whether its citizens acted out of state on the 
information conveyed by the advertisement.  The reasoning in the Edge opinion defeats this 
highly counterintuitive explanation of the state’s interest.  When analyzing whether a 
reasonable fit existed between the governmental interest and the restriction, the Court stated 
that the broadcaster’s “signals with lottery ads would be heard in the nine counties in North 
Carolina that its broadcasts reached, [and] this would be in derogation of the substantial 
federal interest in supporting North Carolina’s laws making lotteries illegal.”  Id. at 429; see 
also  id. at 432-33 (suggesting that many North Carolina residents would not receive 
information relating to Virginia gambling if Edge were not allowed to broadcast such 
advertisements).  Furthermore, the dissenters in Edge understood the state interest recognized 
by the majority opinion to be “discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run 
lotteries,” not the elimination of lottery advertisements from broadcasters located on North 
Carolina soil.  Id. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 440 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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objectives would be undermined regardless of where gambling occurs.108 
But how broadly should a state’s interest in guarding the morals or 
welfare of its citizens be construed for purposes of determining the state’s 
“legitimate interests” and hence its presumptive extraterritorial powers vis-
à-vis its citizens?  Answering the question first requires a recognition that 
one’s conception of what falls within the state’s purview concerning its 
citizens’ morals or welfare turns on the deep political theory that one holds.  
Under classic Aristotelian political philosophy, for example, the core 
function of the polity is to habituate its citizens to act virtuously.109  
Aristotle, as well as many neo-Aristotelians who go by the name of 
communitarians, believe that government plays an essential role in 
habituating its citizens to virtue, and that without government’s assistance 
people’s potential for excellence will go unrealized.110  Such a notion that 
the state is deeply connected to the moral development and character of its 
citizens is reflected as well in certain strands of republicanism.111  In a 
similar vein, communitarian writers posit that people are partly defined by 
the communities of which they are a part, and they accordingly argue that 
politics is naturally and properly concerned with shaping the community’s 
 
108 Such a state policy is not inconsistent with the fact that the state was not capable of 
effectuating an absolute ban on advertising insofar as broadcasters located outside of North 
Carolina could play lottery advertisements even if their signal came into North Carolina.  The 
inability to realize fully a state’s policy due to legal obstacles beyond the state’s control does 
not make the state’s attempts to advance that policy constitutionally illegitimate.  See Greater 
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999) (holding that a 
prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be applied to gambling 
advertisements by radio and television stations located in states where such gambling was 
legal).  The Supreme Court’s holding in Edge fully supports this sensible point, see 509 U.S. 
at 429-34 (holding that the state’s broadcasting restriction reasonably fit the government 
interest of supporting North Carolina’s antigambling policy even though many North Carolina 
residents could hear lottery advertisements broadcast by radio stations located outside of 
North Carolina), as do cases in other contexts, see, e.g. , Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 
(1986) (holding in the Dormant Commerce Clause context that “[t]he impediments to 
complete success . . . cannot be a ground for preventing a state from using its best efforts” to 
limit an environmental risk). 
109 See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential 
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country:  A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 
1066-68 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Outer Limits] (explaining the Aristotelian theory of 
government). 
110 See A.C. Bradley, Aristotle’s Conception of the State, in A COMPANION TO 
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS  13, 28 (David Keyt & Fred D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991) (describing 
Aristotle’s theory of the prominent role of the state in the attainment of virtue).  For an 
example of a prominent self-identifying neo-Aristotelian who also is viewed by many as a 
communitarian theorist, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE , AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). 
111 See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1067 & n.53 (noting that early in 
American history, public figures expressed the view that republican government required 
virtue in its citizens). 
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character.112  Aristotelian, republican, and communitarian views naturally 
give rise to broad state interests that justify extensive regulation to shape 
citizens’ norms and values.  Furthermore, these political philosophies tend 
to mandate a state regulatory interest in its citizens’ activities and behaviors 
irrespective of where they occur since they inherently reflect an individual’s 
character and hence fall within the state’s purview.113  By contrast, under 
popular understandings of liberalism, the state is largely to leave people 
alone to shape themselves as they deem proper.114 
Which deep political theory ought to prevail for purposes of identifying 
legitimate state interests in a due process analysis?  The best answer is that 
our federal system does not mandate a single answer,115 but that states  can 
adhere to any of the above political theories and are limited in enacting laws 
only by discrete federal (and state) substantive constitutional doctrines.  
This conclusion is consistent with the lessons of Lochner v. New York116 
concerning the dangers of judicial second-guessing of legislative value 
judgments through the wholly open-ended vehicle of substantive due 
process.  This conclusion also is essential to preserving one of federalism’s 
great merits:  the space it provides for rich political heterogeneity at the 
subfederal levels of government.  The freedom of states to adopt different 
deep political theories also is confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, which 
reserves to the states the power to pursue their particular visions of the 
good.117  In short, lim itations on such state powers properly come from 
 
112 See id. at 1066-67 & n.52 (describing the communitarian view of “Interconnected 
Welfare”). 
113 See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-26 
(1991) (arguing that communitarianism and liberalism support different conceptions of state 
jurisdiction). 
114 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 307-08 (1993) (singling out 
necessary “social conditions and all-purpose means to enable persons to pursue their 
determinate conceptions of the good”); Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1091-92 
(discussing Rawls on this point).  In tension with this, of course, is the acknowledgment by 
many that the liberal state deeply shapes citizens’ norms.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra  note 95, at 
907 (suggesting that government inevitably plays a large role in shaping human behavior and 
“norm management”).  
115 Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (“The Constitution 
does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory.”). 
116 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
117 Cf. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (holding that states’ “powers to 
undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate and independent sources of power and 
authority originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them 
by the Tenth Amendment”); id. at 93 (“The Constitution leaves in the possession of each State 
‘certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.’  Foremost among the 
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.” (quoting T HE 
FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961))); Heath , 474 U.S. at 
93 (recognizing that “‘States . . . as political communities, [are] distinct and sovereign, and 
 
2002]   EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY  881 
established constitutional provisions and doctrines, such as equal protection 
and privacy, rather than through appeals to the amorphous Due Process 
Clause.  The “legitimate state interests” test under due process accordingly 
should not act as a bar to a state’s adoption of a political theory under which 
the state seeks to regulate the morals and character of its citizenry.  As long 
as the regulation does not run afoul of established constitutional doctrines, 
ensuring that it not be evaded through travel should qualify as a legitimate 
state interest. 
To quickly conclude, many of the policies whose in-state validity is 
constitutionally unquestioned can be easily thwarted if citizens can free 
themselves of their Home States’ laws by merely exiting their state of 
residence.  Accordingly, states have legitimate interests for purposes of due 
process in seeking to circumvent such travel-evasion by giving their laws 
extraterritorial effect over their peripatetic citizens. 
3. Considerations of Fairness:  The Normative Case for Extraterritoriality 
The final guarantee of the Due Process Clause is that the choice-of-law 
decision cannot be fundamentally unfair.118  Application of the Home State 
law to its out-of-state citizen does not per se run afoul of this final 
protection of due process for two principal reasons.  First, it is not unfair for 
states to ensure the efficacy of constitutionally permissible policies by 
withdrawing from their citizens the effective power to choose which state’s 
legal regime they are to be governed by on an issue-by-issue basis.  States 
can insist instead that their citizens be subject to their Home State’s law for 
so long as they elect to remain citizens of the state.  Second, 
extraterritoriality has a rational fundamental basis in that it advances the 
cause of political heterogeneity among states.  As we will see, these 
normative considerations are relevant not only to due process, but to many 
other constitutional doctrines as well.  Therefore, the normative arguments 
developed below will be drawn upon at many other points in this Article. 
a. Ensuring the efficacy of legitimate state laws 
First, extraterritoriality is fair because, as discussed above, it is 
necessary to ensure the efficacy of many constitutional state policies.119  For 
example, without such power, state laws outlawing gambling or requiring 
 
consequently foreign to each other’” (quoting Bank of United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 32, 54 (1838))). 
118 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (noting that in choice-of-
law questions, fundamental fairness considerations must be satisfied). 
119 Supra  Part I.C.2. 
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parental consent prior to abortions could be readily skirted.  Since consent 
to abide by laws that are lawfully enacted, and to incur the consequences if 
one does not, is a cornerstone of citizenship, it is fair for a state to expect 
that its citizens will obey legitimately enacted state laws and regulations, 
even those laws an individual might not like.120  Given this, it is perfectly 
sensible and fair for a polity to prevent citizens from evading such laws by 
seeking to avail themselves of different laws through travel.  To the extent 
that the control of third-party effects, the pursuit of paternalism, and the 
management of the generation of norms are legitimate predicates for 
lawmaking, it is fair that states are empowered to work against the 
circumvention of these legitimate objectives by denying their citizens (for 
so long as they remain citizens) the power to choose by the expedient of 
travel to be governed by a different State’s legal regime. 
In fact, there are several contexts in which the law limits individuals’ 
powers to elect to be governed by the law of their choice.  This is strong 
evidence that limiting citizens’ powers to avail themselves of different 
states’ laws by curbing travel-evasion is not fundamentally unfair for 
purposes of due process.  Particularly instructive is that the very 
jurisprudence of due process is one place where these rules are found.  For 
example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Kansas had sufficient contacts to justify applying its law consistent 
with the demands of due process.121  Among the factors the Court rejected 
as irrelevant was the plaintiffs’ desire to be governed by Kansas law:  “Even 
if a plaintiff evidences his desire for forum law by moving to the forum, we 
have generally accorded such a move little or no significance . . . . Thus the 
plaintiffs’ desire for Kansas law . . . bears little relevance.”122 
In two other contexts, protecting the state’s ability to advance its 
policies has explicitly justified limiting citizens’ powers to choose the law 
by which they are to be governed.  Consider first the law concerning 
contractual choice-of-law provisions.  Contracts, of course, is a field where 
the law primarily lays down default rules that the contracting parties are free 
to reject; “our society confers upon contracting parties wide power to shape 
 
120 In fact, the Western political tradition long has grounded the duty to obey laws on 
citizens’ implied consent to abide by laws by virtue of their being members of a polity.  Mark 
D. Rosen, Defrocking the Courts:  Resolving ‘Cases or Controversies,’ Not Announcing 
Transcendental Truths, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 725-26 (1994); LEA BRILMAYER, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 241 & n.49 (2d ed. 1995) (citing A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979)).  This is a position that might justify extraterritorial 
regulation even where a citizen’s out -of-state activities do not threaten state policy. 
121 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).  
122 Id. at 820. 
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their relationships.”123  Nonetheless, “[t]he case law generally favors for the 
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses that the chosen law bear a relationship 
of some significance to the transaction.”124  The principal justification for 
this is that without such a requirement “the parties could evade the 
otherwise applicable local law and thereby render state laws regarding 
contract validity meaningless.”125  Some state courts have gone even further 
and overridden parties’ express choice of law where “the state whose law 
would control in the absence of a choice has a materially greater interest in 
the subject matter” than the state whose law the parties selected.126  These 
lines of caselaw are consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws.127 
A similar concern for not permitting parties to effectively opt-out of 
laws so as to protect the state’s ability to further legitimate policies can be 
found in the Supreme Court’s Contracts Clause jurisprudence.  The clause’s 
 
123 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH , CONTRACTS 426 (3d ed. 1999). 
124 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL. ,  CONFLICT OF LAWS 871 & n.1 (3d ed. 2000) (citing 
cases). 
125 Id.; see also  2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A T REATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2, at 
1079-80 (1935) (explaining that permitting parties to choose the law that is to govern their 
contracts would be objectionable private legislation).  Professor Kramer recently has argued 
that “[i]n contract cases, true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the 
parties.”  Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM.  L. REV. 277, 329 (1990).  
However, he appears to conclude that the parties’ choice should be disregarded “if party 
autonomy threatens completely to undermine domestic policy.”  Id. at 333.  Similarly, 
although Professors Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein recently have put forth a vigorous 
argument for the expansion of party choice in contractual choice of law provisions, see Erin 
Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation:  A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of 
Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551 (2000) (providing an analysis of when contractual choice-of-
law provisions are beneficial); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to 
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1164-65 (2000) [hereinafter O’Hara & 
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency] (“To maximize efficiency, choice-of-law rules should, 
in general, facilitate individual choice.”), they too recognize that there may be “lost benefits 
resulting from evasion of laws through party choice of law,” and conclude that choice-of-law 
rules should not be given effect when state legislators prohibit enforcement, O’Hara & 
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency, supra , at 1153, 1164. 
126 See Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) (relying on 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS and disregarding the choice of law 
provision in a shareholders agreement); id. at 469 (concluding that “Delaware therefore has a 
greater interest than does New Jersey in regulating stockholder voting rights in Delaware 
corporations,” notwithstanding the “parties’ express choice of New Jersey law” as the 
governing law). 
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a)-(b) (1971) 
(providing that the parties’ choice of governing law will be overridden if “the chosen state has 
no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties’ choice,” or if “application of the law of the chosen state would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the 
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue”). 
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prohibition against the enactment of laws by states that “impair[] the 
Obligation of Contracts”128 could have had the effect of allowing a citizen to 
immunize herself from the law by contracting in advance of legislation.  A 
party may claim such legislation could not be applied to her because it 
would impair the obligation of her contract.  Such arguments in fact were 
made before the Supreme Court, but it was early established that the 
Contracts Clause 
does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for 
the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of 
the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may 
thereby be affected. . . . Familiar instances of this are, where parties enter into 
contracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or 
distillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment by a 
change of policy on the part of the State, prohibiting the establishment or 
continuance of such traffic . . . .129 
The Court’s reasoning makes sense since “the police power . . . is an 
exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, 
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount 
to any rights under contracts between individuals.”130  Thus, this doctrine 
prevents citizens from effectively opting out of their state’s regulations 
through the expedient of contract. 
Finally, state power to ensure the efficacy of permissible policies is 
consistent with the Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence of the last 
decade.  To be sure, the cases to date have involved questions of the federal-
state relationship.  But the core concern of respecting the states’ inherent 
sovereignty that has animated many of these decisions131 provides equal 
theoretical support for the extraterritorial power to curb travel-evasion.  
After all, if citizens are allowed to circumvent their Home State laws by 
merely traveling across state lines, the state’s capacity to advance what it 
deems to be the common interest within the scope of substantive policies 
that are not precluded by the Federal Constitution—one of the essential 
aspects of state sovereignty—is importantly undermined. 
b. Political heterogeneity 
A second reason that extraterritorial powers to curb travel-evasion are 
 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
129 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905). 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (reasoning that 
states require Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit to maintain their inherent 
sovereignty). 
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not unfair, but are in fact normatively attractive, is that political 
heterogeneity among states requires it.  A federal system that did not permit 
extraterritorial regulation to counter travel-evasion would systematically 
disadvantage states that decide to regulate when others elect not to, perhaps 
even leading to a “race-to-the-bottom” to the lowest common denominator 
of regulation.  Legal constraints imposed for reasons of paternalism or 
norm-generation may be rendered ineffective if citizens could simply cross 
a border to avail themselves of a different legal regime.  This is self-evident 
with respect to paternalistic policies that are intended to protect citizens 
from themselves; such policies cannot succeed if the citizens can cross the 
border to undertake the activity in a lenient jurisdiction. 
Consider as well the effect of ignoring the Home State’s interests in 
norm-generation.  Under many theories, people’s moral sensibilities are 
significantly shaped by the behaviors of people they know and with whom 
they regularly interact.132  A state, accordingly, may be unable to impress a 
norm on its citizens if large numbers of them are engaging in the locally 
proscribed activity in a place where it is permitted.  Importantly, this may 
even be irreversible in the short run; once people start engaging in the 
behavior, the possibility of inculcating a contrary norm might be lost.  In 
short, travel-evasion may reduce political heterogeneity across states with 
respect to policies that are not foreclosed by the United States Constitution 
by rendering less permissive state laws ineffective.  Additionally, this would 
have the corollary consequence of hindering the extent to which different 
states could experiment with different legal regimes, a related benefit of 
federalism.133 
More basically, allowing extraterritorial regulation of citizens to curb 
travel-evasion expands political heterogeneity by extending the range of 
permissible options available to states.  It allows there to be states that fully 
permit a given activity, states that bar the activity only from occurring 
within their borders, and states that flatly prohibit their citizens from 
engaging in the activity.  A regime in which all cit izens could free 
themselves of their Home State’s policies by traveling disallows the third 
option by definition.  The absence of such an option is not merely of 
 
132 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 349, 356-61 (1997) (examining the role of social influence on individuals’ criminal 
decision making). 
133 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 418 (1999) (“[Local 
ratesetting differences] can amount to the kind of ‘experimentation’ long thought a strength of 
our federal system.”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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theoretical significance.  Adherents of certain political theories—for 
example, neo-Aristotelians, republicans, and communitarians—typically are 
concerned with their fellow citizens’ character development and accordingly 
are interested in regulating conduct irrespective of where it occurs.134  Only 
the third option permits adherents of such perspectives the possibility of 
advancing their political goals.  Without the third option, neo-Aristotelians, 
republicans, and communitarians would be hamstrung.135  On its face, this 
might be problematic to those who believe one of federalism’s strengths is 
the diversity it allows.136 
This point can be more formally developed by drawing upon John 
Rawls’ influential works on liberalism.  From a Rawlsian perspective, a 
federal system in which states may extraterritorially regulate their traveling 
citizens is the fair and just political structure.137  Rawls seeks to construct a 
just society by imagining the political institutions that people in an “original 
position” would choose.138  In the original position, people are under a “veil 
of ignorance,” meaning that they do not know the religious, philosophical, 
or moral convictions of the people they represent.139  People in the original 
position accordingly would choose a basic political structure that 
accommodates a broad range of lifestyle choices because they would refuse 
to create a polity that would not accommodate the needs of the person they 
ended up representing.  In the words of Rawls: 
[T]he parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the persons they 
represent [are] a majority or a minority view.  They cannot take chances by 
permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to minority religions, say, on the 
possibility that those they represent espouse a majority or dominant religion 
and will therefore have an even greater liberty.  For it may also happen that 
these persons belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly.  If the 
 
134 See supra  text accompanying notes 109-14 (explicating the philosophical foundation 
for the Aristotelian, communitarian, and republican position that state regulatory interests are 
not contingent upon location). 
135 Professor Kreimer argues to the contrary that permitting extraterritorial regulation 
mutes diversity.  See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 915-16 
(arguing that if the only way dissenters can “escape the force of a state law is to move to 
another state,” the result would be “increas[ed] moral homogeneity”).  I disagree, and I 
explain why infra  notes 256-62 and accompanying text. 
136 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down:  Tolerance Reconsidered, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77, 78 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990) (discussing 
the connection between federalism and diversity). 
137 For an explanation as to why Rawls’s views are relevant to this type of inquiry, see 
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1061-63. 
138 See RAWLS, supra  note 114, at 26 (“The idea is to use the original position to model 
both freedom and equality and restrictions on reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly 
evident which agreement would be made by the parties as citizens’ representatives.”). 
139 Id. at 24 n.27. 
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parties were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take the 
religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in 
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction 
was.140 
The original position is a heuristic tool for enabling a person to imagine 
the political structure that is fairest from the perspective of all of society’s 
citizens.  Stated differently, the veil of ignorance and the original position 
transform personal self-interest into society-wide interest:  People in the 
original position presumably will choose to accommodate everybody in a 
fair way because they do not know whom they actually represent and 
accordingly would not want to create a political structure that did not 
accommodate whoever it is they happened to be.141 
Rawls argues that the original position leads to two principles of justice 
that, in turn, inform the basic political structure of the just polity.142  The 
first principle of justice contemplates certain “basic liberties”—such as 
“freedom of thought and liberty of conscience”—that the polity would be 
required to respect.143  Rawlsians typically understand the first principle of 
justice as creating substantive limits to the government’s regulatory powers 
that roughly correspond to the substantive limits of the Bill of Rights.144 
But what about those activities that are not so protected but that polities 
are free to flatly proscribe, such as gambling?  Analyzed from the 
perspective of the original position, the just and fair basic political structure 
would be a federal system in which each state would have the option of 
extraterritorially regulating its traveling citizens.  Not permitting such 
extraterritorial regulation would limit the powers of subfederal polities such 
that they would be unable to do what many—such as Aristotelians, 
republicans, and communitarians, among others—think is absolutely 
necessary for a polity to do.  People in the original position, not knowing 
whom they represent, would be unwilling to create such a political system 
where, if they happened to be an Aristotelian (for example) they would be 
 
140 Id. at 311 (emphasis added). 
141 Mark D. Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American 
Constitutionalism , 12 J. CONTEMP . LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming Winter 2002) (manuscript at 
9, on file with author) [hereinafter Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures]. 
142 RAWLS, supra  note 114, at 291-99. 
143 Id. at 281.  The second principle of justice, which will not receive any attention here, 
concerns economic rights.  Id. 
144 I have argued that the first principle of justice also can be understood as requiring 
certain governmental regulations in select subfederal polities on behalf of certain “political 
perfectionists,” that is, those who believe that people’s moral powers can only be shaped 
appropriately with the polity’s active intervention.  Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 
1092. 
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deeply dissatisfied.145  More precisely, because Aristotelians believe that 
polities play a necessary role in the habituation of people to act 
virtuously,146 they may well believe that the wrongly structured political 
system would be an obstacle to their fully realizing themselves as human 
beings.  Given a choice between a political structure that would not 
accommodate them if they happened to be Aristotelians (or republicans or 
communitarians) and a political structure that could accommodate them 
regardless of whether they were traditional liberals or adherents of any of 
these other political philosophies,147 people in the original position would 
opt for a political structure that was more broadly accommodating, provided 
that people had a right to exit whichever polity they lived in and move 
elsewhere.  Without an exit option, people who are liberals but who 
happened to be in a communitarian  
state would be trapped in a polity not suited to them.148  Failing to provide 
the option of extraterritorial regulation to curtail travel-evasion, however, 
“would show that [persons in the original position] did not take the 
religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in 
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction 
was,”149 for it would generate a political system that could not accommodate 
Aristotelians, republicans, and communitarians. 
To conclude, because Aristotelians (as well as republicans and 
communitarians) require a political structure that allows extraterritorial 
regulation of citizens, people in the original position, not knowing whether 
they represented a neo-Aristotelian or a liberal, would opt for a political 
structure that permitted the extraterritorial regulation of citizens.  That 
accordingly is the just and fair system.  Should the person behind the veil of 
ignorance be a traditional liberal, she could live in a subfederal polity that 
did not extraterritorially regulate.  Should she be a neo-Aristotelian, she 
 
145 For an explanation as to why Rawls’s threshold definition of the “political conception 
of the person” should not exclude Aristotelians, communitarians, or republicans, see id. at 
1120-22. 
146 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1098a15, 1103b1-1103b5 (Terence Irwin trans., 
1985). 
147 This is not to suggest that they would elect to create a political structure that 
accommodated all possible political theories.  For a discussion of those which would not be 
accommodated, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  109, at 1068-71. 
148 For more on exit, see id. at 1097-106.  The constraint of “well-orderedness” 
presumably would not be implicated insofar as state policies still would be limited by 
constitutional limitations.  See id. at 1093-97 (arguing that the “well-ordered society” 
requirement entails substantive limitations on subfederal sovereigns, which deny such specific 
powers as making treaties with foreign nat ions and constrain other activities that have 
significant effects outside of the community). 
149 RAWLS, supra  note 114, at 311. 
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could live in a polity that did so regulate.  For these reasons, permitting a 
state to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is not fundamentally 
unfair for purposes of due process.150  To the contrary, permitting such 
extraterritorial regulation is normatively desirable from a Rawlsian 
perspective, and a political structure that flatly proscribed states from 
extraterritorially regulating to curb travel-evasion would be unjust. 
D. Bigelow v. Virginia and Extraterritoriality 
In the 1975 case of Bigelow v. Virginia,151 the Supreme Court made 
some observations that Professor Seth Kreimer has construed as disallowing 
states from criminalizing their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.152  Professor 
Donald Regan has come to a different conclusion, arguing that the 
principles of extraterritoriality enunciated in cases such as Skiriotes and 
Strassheim remain good law and that any anti-extraterritoriality statements 
in Bigelow are mere obiter dicta.  Professors Kreimer and Regan have 
closely analyzed one section of the Bigelow opinion that touched on 
extraterritoriality, and a careful review strongly supports Professor Regan’s 
conclusion that it is dictum.153  There is a second point in Bigelow, not 
discussed by the two scholars, in which the Court asserts an even more 
forceful anti-extraterritoriality statement.  This too is best understood as 
dictum.  Furthermore, subsequent caselaw has narrowed Bigelow such that 
what remains of any extraterritoriality principle it may have articulated 
would have no bearing on the types of extraterritoriality that are the subject 
of this Article. 
The Virginia statute at issue in Bigelow prohibited the sale or 
 
150 Professor Kreimer surveys a number of potential justifications for a state’s 
extraterritorial regulation of its citizens and finds them all to be lacking.  See Kreimer, 
Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 924-38 (exploring possible justifications for a 
citizen’s obligation to obey extraterritorial state laws, i.e., consent, fairness, and the necessity 
of order).  He does not consider the arguments made above, however, and common sense 
suggests that even one legitimate justification would suffice to take extraterritoriality out of 
the cat egory of fundamentally unfair. 
151 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
152 See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 462 (arguing that Bigelow establishes 
the principle that states cannot “punish their citizens for conduct that is protect ed in the sister 
state where it occurs”).  Professor Lea Brilmayer at one point suggested that Bigelow “casts 
some doubt on a state’s authority to regulate the activities of residents while in other states,” 
LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 327 (1986), but she appears to have backed off from this view in a more recent work, 
see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. RE V. 1217, 1241 (1992) (“It is also fairly well established that a state 
may regulate its residents, even when they are acting outside the state.”). 
153 See Appendix:  Analysis of the Kreimer/Regan Debate Concerning Bigelow. 
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circulation of any publication that encouraged or prompted the procuring of 
an abortion.  The editor of a Virginia newspaper was convicted for violating 
the statute because the paper had printed an advertisement for low-cost 
abortion services in New York that had been placed by a for-profit abortion 
referral service.  The Court ruled that such an application of the statute 
violated the First Amendment. 
The relevant passage from the opinion that Professors Kreimer and 
Regan have considered states that Virginia could not “prevent its residents 
from traveling to New York to obtain those services or, as the State 
conceded, prosecute them for going there.  Virginia possessed no authority 
to regulate the services provided in New York . . . .”154  The section of the 
opinion in which this assertion appears concerned the question of whether 
commercial advertisements should receive First Amendment protection.  
The quoted language constitutes dictum for the reasons explained in this 
Article’s Appendix. 
Consider next the extraterritoriality discussion in Bigelow that was not 
discussed by Professors Kreimer and Regan.  After establishing that the 
advertising received First Amendment protection, the Court applied the 
then-applicable constitutional test155—a balancing of interests—and 
concluded that the Virginia statute infringed upon the editor’s First 
Amendment rights.  At this point in the decision, in relation to assessing the 
quantum of Virginia’s governmental interest, the Court once again 
discussed extraterritoriality.  The Court stated: 
To be sure, the agency-advertiser’s practices, although not then illegal, may 
later have proved to be at least “inimical to the public interest” in New York.  
But [a] this development would not justify a Virginia statute that forbids 
Virginians from using in New York the then legal services of a local New 
York agency.  Here, Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what 
Virginians may hear or read about the New York services.  It is, in effect, 
advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information about [b] 
activities outside Virginia’s border, activities that Virginia’s police powers do 
not reach.  This asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, 
if any, weight under the circumstances.156 
This discussion, which assesses the extent of the government’s interest, 
is essential to the Court’s ultimate holding that the Virginia statute violated 
the editor’s rights under a balancing of interests.  What, if any, of it 
 
154 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824 (citations omitted). 
155 The Court has since adopted a four-part test that governs First Amendment 
challenges to commercial speech.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (applying the four-step analysis to a ban on promotional 
advertising). 
156 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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constitutes a holding, however, is difficult to say.  Dicta, of course, typically 
refers to statements in opinions that are not necessary to support the Court’s 
outcome.157  Neither statement [a] nor statement [b] were necessary to the 
Court’s ultimate conclusion that the government’s interest is outweighed by 
the individual’s interest in having access to information concerning services 
available out of state.  This can be seen by noting that the principle that a 
state may regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is not incompatible 
with the principle that a state may not control its citizens’ knowledge of 
what activities are permissible in other states.  The latter principle may well  
interfere with the preconditions to a meaningful exercise of the citizens’ 
right to travel (the decision to remain where she lives or instead to relocate 
to a new jurisdiction), whereas extraterritorial regulation does not.158  The 
Bigelow Court consequently did not have to decide any larger 
extraterritoriality principles in coming to its conclusion that Virginia’s 
statute violated the First Amendment, rendering the Court’s 
extraterritoriality observations mere dicta. 
Furthermore, understanding statements [a] and [b] as dicta is consistent 
with the canonical distinction between dicta and holding.  As explained by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia,159 dicta is afforded less weight 
than holdings because only “[t]he question actually before the court is 
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other principles 
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case 
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely 
investigated.”160 
Consistent with this understanding of dicta, the Bigelow Court did not 
give careful consideration to the extent of a state’s extraterritorial powers.  
Nowhere in the opinion did the Bigelow Court discuss the caselaw (such as 
Strassheim and Skiriotes) with which its anti-extraterritorial position was 
inconsistent.  Further, although the Court did cite three cases to support the 
anti-extraterritorial proposition (cases that were the subject of Professor 
Kreimer and Professor Regan’s dispute), Professor Regan’s conclusion that 
“none of the three cases is apposite” is unimpeachable: 
United States v. Guest stands for the proposition that there is a right of 
interstate movement which is constitutionally protected against private 
 
157 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994).  Dorf 
ultimately criticizes this generally accepted understanding of dicta and offers an alternative.  
See id. at 2040-42 (illustrating the difficulty of ascertaining the scope of judicial decisions). 
158 See infra  Part II.B (describing the modest limitations that the right to travel imposes 
on Home States’ powers to regulate). 
159 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). 
160 Id. at 399-400. 
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interference.  Shapiro v. Thompson is about a right of interstate migration, 
which involves precisely changing one’s state citizenship.  Doe v. Bolton 
involves the article IV privileges and immunities clause, and establishes that 
New York (Georgia, in the original) cannot deny nonresidents access to 
abortion referral services (abortion services, in the original) operating in New 
York.  This is obviously a quite different issue from whether Virginia can deny 
its own citizens access to services in New York.161 
All that needs to be added is that Professor Regan’s analysis is 
undisturbed by the Court’s most recent pronouncement concerning the right 
to travel in Saenz v. Roe,162 which explained the cases analyzed by Professor 
Regan in terms virtually identical to his own.163  In short, Bigelow’s 
observations concerning extraterritoriality are comfortably characterized as 
dicta because they were not necessary to the Court’s holding, they were 
unsupported by the cases to which they made an oblique reference, and they 
did not take account of the caselaw with which they were at odds. 
In any event, Bigelow has been significantly modified by subsequent 
cases.  The Supreme Court held in United States v. Edge Broadcasting 
Co.164 that nonlottery states have a legitimate interest in shielding their 
citizens from advertisements for lotteries in states in which lotteries are 
legal. 165  The Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy 
would have been undermined had a North Carolina broadcaster been 
permitted to broadcast advertisements for an activity that was legal in 
another state but prohibited in North Carolina.  The parallels between the 
statutes at issue in Edge and Bigelow were thus quite striking:  in both cases, 
the statutes prevented in-state informational media from broadcasting out-
of-state advertisements of activities legal out of state, but not at home.  
Unlike Bigelow, however, the Edge Court upheld the statute at issue against 
a First Amendment challenge. 166  To be sure, Edge does not flatly overrule 
Bigelow, since the statute upheld in Edge was federal rather than state.  
 
161 Regan, supra  note 27, at 1907 (citations omitted). 
162 526 U.S. 489, 500-02 (1999).  The Saenz decision did not deal with limitations on a 
state’s power to regulate its citizens’ out -of-state activities, but concerned limits on a state’s 
powers to discriminate between old-time residents and newcomers.  
163 See id. at 498, 500-02 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), for the 
proposition that the constitutional right to travel from one state to another, though not in the 
text of the Constitution, is firmly embedded in the Court’s jurisprudence; emphasizing that the 
holding in Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618 (1969), focused on the right to interstate 
migration; and explaining that Doe v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179 (1973), concerns nonresidents who 
enter a state for the procurement of medical services) . 
164 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
165 See supra  notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis in 
Edge). 
166 509 U.S. at 426-36. 
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Nonetheless the Edge case undercuts Bigelow’s flat assertion that one state’s 
police powers do not extend into another state; if states have a legitimate 
interest in their citizens’ out-of-state conduct, as Edge holds, then why do 
their police powers categorically end at their borders?  Edge’s holding 
surely is more consonant with cases such as Strassheim and Skiriotes, which 
upheld the out-of-state exercise of police power because a state’s legitimate 
interests can be implicated by out-of-state activities.167 
Furthermore, the holding in Bigelow was expressly limited in Posadas 
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.168  The Court in 
Posadas held that Puerto Rico could prohibit Puerto Rican gambling 
establishments, which had been established to cater to travelers, from 
advertising to Puerto Rican residents.169  In so holding, the Court had to 
explain its holding in Bigelow.  The Posadas Court could have distinguished 
Bigelow on the ground that Bigelow concerned extraterritoriality, but the 
Posadas Court did not do so.  Instead, the Posadas Court explained that the 
advertising restrictions in Bigelow  were problematic only because the 
“underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions 
[abortion] was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited 
by the State.  Here, on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely 
could have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico 
altogether.”170  Thus, even if (contrary to the conclusion above) Bigelow’s 
anti-extraterritorial discussions constituted a holding, Posadas would appear 
to provide an important caveat:  Bigelow’s assertion that Virginia’s interest 
was entitled to little, if any, weight because its “police powers do not reach” 
activities outside of Virginia’s borders171 must be understood after Posadas 
to mean that the Home State’s police powers do not extend to the 
extraterritorial regulation of matters that the Constitution prohibits Home 
States from banning.172  Any such limitation on extraterritoriality is 
 
167 See supra  Part I.A (reviewing early Supreme Court caselaw to confirm the 
proposition that Home States have the power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial 
conduct). 
168 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
169 Id. at 340-44. 
170 Id. at 345-46. 
171 Bigelow v. Virginia , 421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975). 
172 Rather than limiting Bigelow, it could be argued that Posadas merely explained 
limiting language that already appeared in Bigelow itself.  The Bigelow opinion stated that 
Virginia “is, in effect, advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information about 
activities outside Virginia’s borders, activities that Virginia’s police powers do not reach.  
This asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, if any, weight under the 
circumstances.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, “the circumstances” under which 
Virginia had no interest in regulating the extraterritorial conduct of its citizens were when the 
underlying conduct was constitutionally protected.  In any event, it makes no difference to the 
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immaterial to the regulations that are the subject of this Article, namely, 
laws that regulate activities that are not constitutionally protected, such as 
gambling, riding a motorcycle without a helmet, and the like.173 
To quickly summarize, consistent with the teachings of the Model Penal 
Code and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, Home States indeed 
have a presumptive power to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities to 
avoid travel-evasion.  Such extraterritorial powers are wholly consistent 
with contemporary due process doctrine; states have special interests both in 
the welfare of their citizens and in ensuring that legitimate state policies not 
be thwarted through the expedient of travel.  Such powers are consonant 
with longstanding Supreme Court caselaw, and they have not been 
undermined by the case of Bigelow v. Virginia or any Supreme Court 
decision since. 
II. FEDERALISM’S PUTATIVE BROAD-BASED LIMITS ON HOME STATES 
As several commentators have correctly noted, the Constitution 
imposes, aside from due process-related concerns, limits on Home States’ 
ability to regulate the out-of-state conduct of their citizens.  The scope of 
these limitations, however, has been overstated in the literature.  Examined 
in this Part are the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the right 
to travel, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and various “structural” 
constitutional considerations.  Properly understood, these constitutional 
limits on Home States’ extraterritorial powers are only modest; they leave 
ample room for a Home State to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state 
activities.174 
A.  Privileges and Immunities Clause 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides that “[t]he 
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.”175  Professor Kreimer has suggested that this 
 
types of extraterritoriality discussed in this Article whether Posadas is understood as limiting 
or merely clarifying Bigelow. 
173 This is true even with respect to parental notification laws, for states are free to 
condition a minor’s abortion on parental notification and consent.  See Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992) (holding that the parental consent requirement of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1992 did not violate the Constitution).  The underlying 
activity in Bigelow, by contrast, was an adult’s obtaining of an abortion, for which there is a 
clear constitutional right under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
174 Part III will explain more fully why states’ extraterritorial powers over their citizens 
does not lead to anarchy that would undermine our nation’s federal system. 
175 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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clause flatly precludes the Home State from regulating its citizens’ conduct 
in sister states.176  According to Professor Kreimer: 
[H]ome States cannot waive the Article IV rights of their citizens when the 
states regard those rights as unnecessary to guard against interstate friction; 
rather, the citizens as individuals are “entitled” to local privileges and 
immunities when they visit neighboring states .  As citizens from different states 
travel and interact on a basis of equality, they develop and maintain 
consciousness of themselves as equals and members of a single polity.177 
This argument falls short on several grounds.  To begin, no claim based 
on the Privileges and Immunities Clause can serve as a general argument 
against Home State regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state conduct because 
the clause properly applies to only a limited category of regulations, as 
demonstrated below in Subsection 1.  Furthermore, the argument put 
forward by Professor Kreimer is inconsistent with longstanding privileges 
and immunities caselaw.  As discussed below in Subsection 2, well-
established caselaw provides that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does 
not apply to a State’s regulation of its own citizens, but rather applies to the 
regulation of states’ relationships with visitors who are citizens of other 
states; in the lingo of this Article, the clause addresses Host States, not 
Home States.  Even so, the clause could indirectly interfere with the Home 
State’s effort to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct if it were 
construed as compelling the Host State to apply its laws to the visitor 
irrespective of the Home State’s policy.  Subsection 3 shows that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause compels no such result.  The clause does 
not bar a Host State from applying the Home State’s laws to visitors if there 
are good reasons to do so and applying another state’s laws to traveling 
citizens of that state for the purpose of maintaining the legitimate policies of 
the Home State should satisfy this standard.  Finally, Subsection 4 will 
 
176 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 917-21. 
177 Id. at 918-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  That Professor Kreimer interprets 
the clause’s entitlement as extending broadly to cover virtually all laws is strongly suggested 
by the sentences that follow those quoted above in the text: 
By contrast, a system in which my opportunities upon entering California remain 
subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania undercuts this sense of national unity.  
Such a system would deny to me, because of my status as Pennsylvanian, the 
privileges that the Californians I pass on the street share as their birthright.  This 
situation hardly advances the goal of establishing a single national identity. 
Id. at 919.  Such a goal of national unity would appear to require that one’s Home State 
identity not diminish the opportunities that a Pennsylvanian visiting California has vis-à-vis 
Californians in all respects.  See also  Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 463 (advancing 
a similar argument based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a provision which, 
Kreimer argues, embodies the “constitutional commitments to national union and national 
citizenship”). 
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explain why the doctrinal status quo described in Subsections 1 through 3 is 
normatively desirable. 
1. The Limited Activities that Constitute “Privileges” or “Immunities” 
It is important to understand what is and what is not at stake under 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The clause provides 
protection only to “privileges” and “immunities” and therefore could not be 
the source of an across-the-board prohibition against a Home State’s 
regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state conduct.178  The Supreme Court has 
defined privileges and immunities so that they encompass only “such basic 
and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes 
of the formation of the Union.”179  This has been held to include only a 
limited number of things, including “the pursuit of common callings, the 
ability to transfer property, . . . access to courts”180 and the right of 
nonresidents to settle in a new state.181  For example, the Court has held that 
“[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-
being of the Union,” in upholding a statutory elk-hunting license scheme 
that imposed substantially higher license fees on nonresidents than 
residents.182 
 
178 Professor Kreimer’s position on the question of what activities fall within the 
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is unclear.  On the one hand, the logic of his 
analysis of the clause suggests the position that visitors from sister states should be subject to 
all of the Host State’s laws.  See supra  note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Kreimer’s 
suggestion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause flatly precludes the Home State from 
regulating its citizens’ conduct in sister states).  Furthermore, much of his argument takes the 
form of positive analysis.  See, e.g., Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 
918 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), for the proposition that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause imposes limitations on the Home States).  For my critique of Professor 
Kreimer’s interpretation of Toomer, see infra  notes 197-204 and accompanying text.  For a 
clear description of the distinctions among positive, prescriptive, and normative analyses, see 
generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1474-75 (1998). 
 On the other hand, Professor Kreimer refers in a footnote to cases that have found certain 
matters to be outside the scope of a protected “privilege” or “immunity.”  Kreimer, Law of 
Choice, supra  note 5, at 499 n.167.  Perhaps his argument, which gives rise to a very broad 
scope of “privileges and immunities,” is intended to be a prescriptive rather than a positive 
analysis.  If that is so, then the crux of my response is not found in Subsections 1 through 3, 
which is primarily an analysis of the contemporary doctrine, but instead appears in Part II.A.4, 
which explains why the doctrinal status quo is wise as a normative matter.  Subsections 1 
through 3 are still important, however, insofar as it is critical to have a clear understanding of 
the current law regardless of whether one is defending or criticizing it. 
179 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978). 
180 Id. 
181 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
182 Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 388. 
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In short, the terms “privileges” and “immunities” do not embrace a 
general right of visitors to be treated as in-staters, but instead have a more 
limited meaning.  Many “distinctions between residents and nonresidents 
merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States,” 
and it is “[o]nly with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing 
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity [that the state must] treat all 
citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.”183 
None of the peripatetic citizens’ activities discussed in this Article 
would appear to constitute a “privilege” or “immunity” for purposes of 
Article IV.  This can be illustrated by considering what might be the most 
controversial of the extraterritorial limitations considered in this Article; 
that is, a regulation barring a state’s citizens from circumventing its Home 
State’s parental notification laws by traveling to a jurisdiction that is 
without such a requirement.  Obtaining an abortion without parental 
notification plainly does not fall into any of the aforementioned protected 
activities.  Furthermore, given the fact that parental notification statutes are 
constitutional, it would be difficult to argue that an activity that cannot be 
legally undertaken at home becomes part of the class of “such basic and 
essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of 
the formation of the Union”184 when the ban is extended out of state.185  
Nonetheless, because it is conceivable that a Home State might wish to 
regulate a protected “privilege” or “immunity,”186 it is necessary to examine 
more fully Professor Kreimer’s argument. 
2. Inapplicability to the Home State 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause has long been understood as 
having created limitations on Host States with respect to citizens vis iting 
from other states, but at no point has it been understood to limit a state’s 
regulatory powers over its own citizens.  This is because the clause 
consistently has been understood as being directed toward eliminating 
“‘discriminating legislation against [visiting citizens] by other States.’”187  
The “disabilities of alienage in other States”188 that the clause proscribes 
 
183 Id. at 383. 
184 Id. at 387. 
185 The only plausible argument to this effect would be parasitic on the right to travel, 
which I discuss infra  Part II.B.  
186 For example, an antigambling state may wish to prevent its citizens from working in 
gambling establishments located in states in which gambling is legal. 
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are, by their nature, regulations that emanate from Host States rather than 
Home States.  Thus, in the 1872 case of Bradwell v. Illinois, the Court 
rejected a privileges and immunities claim asserted by an Illinois woman 
who challenged an Illinois law that barred women admission to the bar189 on 
the ground that the clause does not constrain Home States: 
As regards the provision of the Constitution that citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, the 
plaintiff in her affidavit has stated very clearly a case to which it is 
inapplicable.  The protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly 
held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.  
If the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Illinois, that provision of the 
Constitution gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation.190 
The Court in the Slaughter-House Cases restated this understanding, 
observing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV “does not 
profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its 
own citizens.”191  Fully consistent with this observation, the Court in United 
States v. Wheeler noted in passing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
provides that “one State should not deny to the citizens of other States rights 
given to its own citizens.”192  And more recently, the Supreme Court 
confirmed this understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the 
1984 case of United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of 
Camden,193 noting that although out-of-state citizens could pursue a 
privileges and immunities claim against the New Jersey municipality of 
Camden, “disadvantaged New Jersey residents have no claim under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”194  As the Court explained, “New Jersey 
residents at least have a chance to remedy at the polls any discrimination 
against them.  Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity . . . .”195  In 
other words, the clause limits Host States, but not Home States. 
Professor Kreimer, however, asserts the converse proposition that the 
 
189 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138 (1872). 
190 Id. 
191 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-77 (1873) (construing Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to aid in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause). 
192 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920); see also  Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) 
(reasserting the validity of a narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
193 465 U.S. 208 (1984). 
194 Id. at 217 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77). 
195 Id.  For the canonical discussion of the logic behind this approach to constitutional 
interpretation, what is now often spoken of as a “representation-reinforcing” method, see 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).  
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Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to Home States as well.196  To 
support his claim, Kreimer quotes language from the 1948 case of Toomer 
v. Witsell,197 stating that the clause “was designed to insure to a citizen of 
State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of 
State B enjoy.”198  While it is true that this phrase is ambiguous, and on its 
own could be read to create a limitation on the Home State as well as the 
Host State, the holding in Toomer struck down a Host State’s statute, not a 
Home State’s law.  Moreover, other language in the opinion undermines 
Professor Kreimer’s interpretation of the phrase.199  More importantly, there 
are far more recent cases than Toomer where the Court has confirmed the 
traditional view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not impose 
limitations on the Home State.  The aforementioned case of Camden is 
one.200  Another is the 1982 case of Zobel v. Williams,201 where the Court 
also concluded that the clause was inapplicable to a claim asserted by a 
citizen against her Home State.  At issue in Zobel was the constitutionality 
of an Alaska statute that awarded distributions from the state’s mineral 
 
196 See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 913, 917-21 (arguing 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandates “a territorial conception of state 
regulatory authority over state citizens’ activities in sister states”). 
197 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
198 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 918 (referencing Toomer, 
334 U.S. at 395).  
199 Thus, even if Professor Kreimer’s interpretation were correct, the Toomer language 
would be mere dicta.  In any event, a close reading of the opinion strongly suggests that the 
Toomer Court’s language is best understood as applying only to Host States.  The sentence 
following the one that Professor Kreimer quotes makes the most sense if understood to speak 
only of the State A citizen’s right not to be treated differently by Host State B because she is 
not a citizen of State B.  That next sentence states that “[f]or protection of such equality the 
citizen of State A was not to be restricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic 
processes and official retaliation.”  Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395.  If the Home State were the 
source of disparate treatment, the Court would have been suggesting that the citizen of State A 
might attempt to get her Home State to act differently by using the “diplomatic processes” of 
the Host State.  This would be strange for two reasons.  First, noncitizens typically are not 
beneficiaries of diplomatic processes.  Second, the more direct way for a citizen to effectuate 
change would be to lobby the representatives of her Home State, and one would have 
expected the Court to have mentioned this as a possible route to addressing her 
dissatisfactions.  Further support for the conclusion that the Toomer case is not making any 
radical doctrinal expansions is the Court’s explanation one sentence later that the clause was 
designed to “‘remov[e] from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other 
States.’”  Id. at 396 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868)).  
“Disabilities of alienage” likely refers to disparate treatment at the beckoning of the Host 
State, the state that typically is the source of such disparate treatment. 
200 See supra  notes 193-95 and accompanying text (noting that the Camden Court 
recognized no cause of action under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against the Home 
State and emphasizing the availability of a political remedy in the Home State which did not 
exist in the Host State). 
201 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
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income to its citizens but adjusted the size of compensation on the basis of 
how long the citizen had been a resident of Alaska.  Said the majority: 
 The Alaska statute does not simply make distinctions between native-born 
Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other states . . . . The Alaska 
statute also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born 
residents. . . . 
 The statute does not involve the kind of discrimination which the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Art. IV was designed to prevent.  That Clause “was 
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same 
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.”  The Clause is thus not 
applicable to this case.202 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause would have applied if Toomer 
actually meant what Professor Kreimer suggests it does.  Thus, in addition 
to constituting a holding,203 Zobel confirms the understanding that Toomer 
did not announce an expanded doctrine of privileges and immunities that 
extends to Home States.204  In short, there has been no break in the long-
 
202 Id. at 59-60 n.5 (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395). 
203 Professor Kreimer is mistaken when he asserts that only in one case—the Bradwell 
decision discussed above—was the clause’s inapplicability to Home States the grounds for the 
Court’s decision.  See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 512-13.  Zobel and Camden 
also held the clause inapplicable to Home States.  
204 To be sure, Professor Kreimer does not overlook the Zobel case.  His use of the case, 
however, is dubious.  He suggests on the basis of Zobel that “Justice O’Connor—joined on 
occasion by both Justices Brennan and Rehnquist—has manifested skepticism” regarding the 
principle announced in the Slaughter-House Cases  that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
“‘does not profess to control the power of State governments over the rights of its own 
citizens.’”  Id. at 512-13 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 
(1873)). 
 However, a close look at Justice O’Connor’s concurrence does not suggest that she 
doubts the Slaughter-House principle, but instead that she holds the traditional view that the 
clause only regulates states’ relationships with noncitizens.  According to Justice O’Connor, 
the statute at issue in Zobel had an impact on interstate migration insofar as it awarded smaller 
distributions of the state’s mineral income to recent immigrants than to long-term residents.  
By making it less attractive for newcomers, the statute implicated the “right to establish 
residence in a new State.”  Zobel, 457 U.S. at 77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor 
specifically refused to characterize the case as “discriminat[ing] among classes of residents, 
rather than between residents and nonresidents” and instead noted that the statute “classifie[d] 
citizens on the basis of their former residential status.”  Id. at 75.  While it was true that the 
Alaska statute applied to persons who technically already had become residents of Alaska, 
“[t]he fact that this discrimination unfolds after the nonresident establishes residency does not 
insulate Alaska’s scheme from scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”  Id.  
Justice O’Connor deployed Toomer’s doctrinal statement that the clause “was designed to 
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens 
of State B enjoy” and then explained that “the citizen of State A who ventures into [Alaska] to 
establish a home labors under a continuous disability.”  Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-75 (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In short, Justice O’Connor’s analysis—which, in any event, has never commanded a 
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standing doctrine that the Priv ileges and Immunities Clause does not 
constrain Home States. 
3. Obligations Imposed on the Host State 
Even if this reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not 
limit the power of Home States to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state 
activities, virtually identical constraints on Home States would obtain if the 
clause were construed to require the Host State to apply its laws to visitors 
from other states irrespective of the Home States’ policy.205  Professor 
Kreimer appears to propound such an interpretation of the clause when he 
cites the case of Austin v. New Hampshire206 for the proposition that “the 
status of the [H]ome [S]tate’s antiabortion policy would not dilute the 
entitlement of out-of-state visitors to obtain abortions on a basis of equality 
with domestic residents.”207  A closer look at Austin shows that the case 
 
majority of the Court—does not express “skepticism” concerning the Slaughter-House 
principle.  Rather, it is a practical, functional analysis that refuses to allow change of 
residency to ipso facto terminate the clause’s regulation of states’ relations with noncitizens.  
According to Justice O’Connor, in other words, under the circumstances of a state law that 
affects interstate migration by treating long-term residents more favorably than those who not 
long ago were nonresidents, the Privileges and Immunities Clause still is applicable.  Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, likewise concerned a statute that 
affected interstate migration.  See 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that New York’s restriction of civil service preference to veterans who entered the 
armed forces while residing in New York was constitutional under intermediate scrutiny 
because New York legitimately may seek to reward those who represented the state while in 
the armed forces).  Professor Kreimer has suggested that this dissent stands for the same 
principle he attributes to O’Connor’s Zobel concurrence.  Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 
5, at 513 n.209. 
205 Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not bar the Home State from 
regulating its citizens’ out-of-state activities under this approach, the Home State likely would 
not be able to prosecute or otherwise penalize its citizens for doing what the Constitution 
required them to do while they were in the Host State.  In short, under this understanding of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Home State would be able to legislate vis-à-vis its 
traveling citizens, but would not be able to enforce its regulations.  As a practical matter, such 
a constraint would be quite similar to what would obtain if the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause were directly applicable to Home States (the position discussed, and rejected, above in 
Subsection 2).  Almost, but not exactly similar, for laws on the books can have real effects 
even if they are not enforced.  See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals:  The 
Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) 
(using sodomy laws to demonstrate the harms suffered by individuals targeted by “harmless” 
unenforced laws). 
206 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
207 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 919 n.41.  Professor 
Kreimer argues that “[H]ome [S]tates cannot waive the Article IV rights of their citizens when 
the states regard those rights as unnecessary to guard against interstate friction; rather, the 
citizens as individuals are ‘entitled’ to local privileges and immunities when they visit 
neighboring states.”  Id. at 918-19.  I think this is best understood as a claim that the 
 
902 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 150: 855 
stands for a significantly different principle.  Moreover, the larger web of 
privileges and immunities decisions definitively shows that the clause does 
not create an unqualified duty for Host States to apply the same laws to 
visitors that are applicable to their citizens irrespective of the Home State’s 
policy. 
Austin concerned a privileges and immunities challenge to New 
Hampshire’s income tax.  New Hampshire’s statute had the effect of taxing 
the New Hampshire income of nonresidents, but not the income of 
residents.  However, under the terms of the statute, Host State, New 
Hampshire, would not tax the nonresident’s New Hampshire income if the 
nonresident’s Home State did not grant a credit for taxes paid to New 
Hampshire.  Like every other state, the Home State of Maine gave its 
citizens a tax credit for income taxed by other states.  Thus, Maine could 
have wholly eliminated the taxes its citizens had to pay on income earned in 
New Hampshire, thereby putting them on equal footing with New 
Hampshire residents, simply by terminating Maine’s statutory credit for 
taxes paid by its citizens to New Hampshire.208 
The Austin Court struck down New Hampshire’s tax law under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause because of the statute’s inequitable 
“treatment for the citizens of the taxing State and nonresident taxpayers.”209  
The Court concluded it was irrelevant that Maine, by repealing its tax credit, 
could have eliminated the differential treatment its citizens were accorded 
by New Hampshire because “the constitutionality of one State’s statutes 
affecting nonresidents [cannot] depend upon the present configuration of the 
statutes of another State.”210  The Austin Court supported this proposition by 
approvingly quoting language from the earlier case of Travis v. Yale & 
Towne Manufacturing Co.:  “‘A State may not barter away the right, 
conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy 
the privileges and immunities of citizens when they go into other States.’”211 
Professor Kreimer relies on Austin and Travis to support his claim that 
the status of the Home State’s antiabortion policies does not affect out-of-
state visitors’ rights to obtain abortions on an equal basis with domestic 
residents.212  Austin and Travis, however, involve scenarios that are 
 
Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes an obligation on the Host State that cannot be 
changed by the Home State.  In any event, the analysis of Austin  and Travis in text below 
would be equally applicable even if Professor Kreimer’s argument were construed as another 
limitation on the Home State. 
208 Austin , 420 U.S. at 666.  
209 Id. at 665. 
210 Id. at 668. 
211 Id. at 667 (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920)).  
212 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 919 n.41. 
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importantly different from Professor Kreimer’s abortion example.  In both 
Austin and Travis, the Host State was discriminating against nonresidents to 
advance its own interests.213  The states in each case did so via laws they 
enacted that expressly discriminated between residents and nonresidents.  
These two cases rejected the argument that self-interested discrimination 
could be saved from unconstitutionality by statutory provisions permitting 
the Home State to terminate the Host State’s discrimination against the 
former’s citizens by in turn discriminating against the Host States’ citizens.  
Austin refused to accept the New Hampshire scheme because “New 
Hampshire in effect invites [the Maine appellants] to induce their 
representatives, if they can, to retaliate against [differential tax treatment]” 
by amending Maine’s laws “so as to deny a credit for taxes paid to New 
Hampshire while retaining it for the other 48 States.”214  Travis found the 
New York scheme equally objectionable because it allowed New York’s 
differential treatment of nonresidents to be undone only if other states 
“retaliat[ed]” with similar exemption schemes.215 
Professor Kreimer’s analysis thus assumes without argument that Austin 
and Travis’s teachings are fully applicable to the altogether distinct 
circumstance of a Host State seeking to accommodate the Home State’s 
interests in seeing that its citizens not engage in travel-evasion.  Such an 
assumption is unwarranted.  The self-interested discriminations struck down 
in Austin and Travis are examples of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that are 
unquestionably at odds with a national union.  Indeed, such policies are 
policed by other constitutional doctrines as well, such as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’s concern with eliminating state protectionism.216  
 
213 See Regan, supra  note 27, at 1911 (providing similar analysis of Austin); cf. Lea 
Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws:  The Respective Roles of Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 101 n.31, 
104 (1984) (noting the constitutional distinction between discrimination against another 
state’s laws and consistent deference to the other state’s laws).  In Travis the Court struck 
down a New York law that granted exemptions to residents but not nonresidents.  Of 
relevance to Austin  was that the New York law in Travis was not saved by a provision that 
gave nonresidents a credit for taxes paid to their Home State on New York-derived income if 
their Home State gave a reciprocal credit to New York residents subject to that state’s income 
taxes.  New York had argued that this provision allowed the other states to circumvent New 
York’s discrimination against their citizens by adopting income taxes that provided “similar 
exemptions similarly conditioned.”  Travis, 252 U.S. at 82.  Responded the Court:  “a 
discrimination by the State of New York against the citizens of adjoining states would not be 
cured were those States to establish like discriminations against citizens of the State of New 
York. . . . Nor can discrimination be corrected by retaliation . . . .”  Travis, 252 U.S. at 82. 
214 Austin , 420 U.S. at 666-67. 
215 Travis, 252 U.S. at 82. 
216 See infra  notes 277-98 and accompanying text (summarizing Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence as applying heightened scrutiny to state policies that are methods of 
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Further, the Home State behavior invited by the statutory schemes in Austin 
and Travis to “correct[]” the Host State discrimination was retaliation, the 
avoidance of which “was one of the chief ends sought to be accomplished 
by the adoption of the Constitution.”217  None of this is true in the context of 
a Host State assisting a Home State to advance its policies vis-à-vis visitors 
from the Home State.  The Host State is not discriminating against 
nonresidents generally, but is simply treating nonresidents from certain 
Home States the way the Home States want them to be treated.  This is not 
the “evil at which” the Austin and Travis holdings are directed, namely, “the 
unilateral imposition of a disadvantage upon nonresidents.”218  To the 
contrary, Austin specifically did not “denigrate the value of reciprocity,”219 
and Host State assistance of the Home State is more fairly characterized as a 
species of reciprocity rather than unilateral impos ition of disadvantage. 
A broader look at the caselaw confirms that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause does not impose a flat obligation on the Host State to 
apply its laws to visitors from other states irrespective of the Home State’s 
policies.  If it did, there could not have been a case like Bradford Electric 
Light Co. v. Clapper,220 in which a Host State not only was permitted, but 
was required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply the Home 
State’s law.  Indeed, a flat obligation would be wholly inconsistent with the 
well-established doctrine that the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s 
 
economic protectionism).  See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State 
Protectionism:  Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH . L. REV. 1091, 
1114 (1986) (“[P]rotectionsim is conceptually inconsistent with political union.”). 
217 Travis, 252 U.S. at 82. 
218 Austin , 420 U.S. at 667.  For a similar analysis, see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the 
“Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA. L. RE V. 1045, 1065-69 (1989), which argues that one state’s 
deference to another state’s laws in respect of the second state’s citizens may reduce interstate 
friction and thus be consistent with the Privileges and Immunities Clause; and Kramer, supra  
note 125, at 307 n.93 (1990), which presents “deference to the law of other States” as a 
justification for treating residents and nonresidents differently.  A recent commentator has 
argued otherwise—stating that the clause “[b]y its words . . . grants rights to individuals, not 
to their states” and observing correctly that “the Supreme Court has never suggested that 
states may waive the rights of their citizens to the privileges and immunities of other states’ 
laws.”  Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH . L. 
REV. 2448, 2526 (1999).  Such analysis, however, overlooks the fact that the clause does not 
apply to Home States, as shown above in the text. 
219 Austin , 420 U.S. at 667 n.12. 
220 286 U.S. 145 (1932).  Most scholars believe that the Clapper opinion has been 
overturned on the basis of subsequent full faith and credit caselaw.  See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., 
supra  note 124, at 146 (stating that the Court has “abandoned the attempt to strike a balance 
between conflicting state interests” for which Clapper was cited).  Regardless of Clapper’s 
current status under full faith and credit, it could not have been decided as it was if the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause imposed a flat obligation on Host States to apply their laws 
to visitors.  
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protections are not “‘absolute.’”221  States are permitted to draw lines 
between citizens and noncitizens—if there are good reasons for doing so.  
States may distinguish between residents and nonresidents if “‘there is a 
substantial reason for the difference in treatment’” and “‘the discrimination 
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s 
objective.’”222 
There is a strong basis for concluding that a Host State’s desire to 
further a Home State’s policy with respect to its journeying citizens would 
qualify as a “substantial reason” for these purposes.223  The case of Sosna v. 
Iowa224 is instructive.  There, the Court upheld, despite equal protection and 
right to travel challenges, an Iowa law that imposed a one-year residency 
requirement for those seeking a divorce, discriminating against noncitizens 
and new citizens alike.  The Court held that the Iowa law justifiably 
reflected the state’s desire to avoid “officious intermeddling in matters in 
which another State has a paramount interest.”225  And what makes another 
state’s interest paramount?  The divorce petitioners’ de facto citizenship:  
the petitioners for divorce in Iowa might really intend to return to their true 
Home State after obtaining an Iowa divorce, in which case their Home 
States have the paramount interest.226 
To be sure, Sosna does not definitively answer the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause question; its holding did not address that clause,227 and it 
 
221 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 489-502 (1999) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 
385, 396 (1998)).  
222 Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (quoting Supreme 
Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)).  For examples of state laws discriminating 
between residents and nonresidents that were upheld against Privileges and Immunities Clause 
challenges, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 390-91 (1977), requiring 
nonresidents to pay more than residents for hunting licenses; and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441, 445 (1973), charging nonresidents higher tuition fees to attend state universities.  
223 If so, it is axiomatic that applying the Home State’s law would satisfy the second test 
of bearing a substantial relationship to the Host State’s objective insofar as the Host State’s 
application of the Home State’s law is the only means by which the Host State can help to 
counter travel-evasion. 
224 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
225 Id. at 407. 
226 As the Court wrote in Sosna: 
A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to become a 
divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short a time as appellant 
had when she commenced her action in the state court after having long resided 
elsewhere.  Until such time as Iowa is convinced that appellant intends to remain in 
the State, it lacks the “nexus between person and place of such permanence as to 
control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance.” 
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 407 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945)). 
227 Sosna preceded the general restatement of Privileges and Immunities Clause 
jurisprudence that the Court provided in Baldwin .  One might ask why Sosna neglected to 
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could be argued228 that Sosna’s equal protection analysis demanded a lower 
level of scrutiny (the legislation “may reasonably be justified”) than does 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause (which requires a “substantial reason” 
for differential treatment).  At the very least, however, Sosna shows that 
there is constitutional weight to a Host State’s desire not to interfere in the 
policy of a sister state.  Furthermore, even if Sosna were read as requiring 
only a low-level reasonable basis scrutiny, the fact that the policy of 
noninterference satisfied such review in Sosna certainly does not mean it 
would not satisfy a stricter level of scrutiny under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  The conclusion that noninterference can be a 
substantial justification for differential treatment is buttressed by the 
normative analysis provided immediately below. 
4. Normative Considerations 
The propositions established in the preceding Subsections collectively 
mean that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prevent a citizen of 
State A from being subject to State A’s regulations even when she is in State 
B.  To establish definitively the validity of the propositions, however, it 
must be shown that a federal system where citizens may be subject to their 
Home State’s laws while traveling is normatively desirable. 
Most of the work establishing the normative appeal of such a system 
was provided earlier in this Article, which shows the important respects in 
which a state would be hamstrung if it did not enjoy the power to regulate 
its citizens’ out-of-state conduct and the benefits of political heterogeneity 
that result from allowing extraterritoriality.229  Even critics do not deny this.  
 
mention the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  After all, Sosna concerned access to courts, a 
right that early privileges and immunities caselaw identified as being protected under the 
clause, see, e.g., Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) (reaffirming the rights of 
citizens to bring actions in other states as set forth in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552-
53 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)), as Baldwin  itself recognized three years after Sosna was 
decided, see Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 383, 387 (noting that the fundamental right of access to 
courts had been identified in early caselaw).  The likely answer is that the plaintiff in Sosna 
did not plead a privileges and immunities claim because she was a resident of Iowa, the state 
whose law she was challenging, and, as explained above, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause does not apply to Home States.  Supra  Part II.A.2.  
228 Here I seek only to anticipate a possible objection, for in my view the Sosna opinion 
is unclear on the precise level of scrutiny the Court utilized.  In addition to not precisely 
stating the level of review, the Sosna Court analyzed the equal protection question by drawing 
on cases that appear to have used more than merely rational basis review.  See Sosna, 419 
U.S. at 405 (citing to Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), which required a 
“compelling governmental interest”; Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), which 
required a “substantial and compelling interest”; and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 
415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974), which required a “compelling” state interest). 
229 See supra  Part I.C.3 (contending that extraterritoriality justly prevents avoidance of 
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Many of their arguments instead are made from the perspective of the goals 
of federal union and national unity.230  Professor Kreimer, as usual, puts the 
argument well: 
[T]he citizens as individuals are “entitled” to local privileges and immunities 
when they visit neighboring states.  As citizens from different states travel and 
interact on a basis of equality, they develop and maintain consciousness of 
themselves as equals and members of a single polity. 
 By contrast, a system in which my opportunities upon entering California 
remain subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania undercuts this sense of 
national unity.  Such a system would deny to me, because of my status as a 
Pennsylvanian, the privileges that the Californians I pass on the street share as 
their birthright.  This situation hardly advances the goal of establishing a single 
national identity.231 
Although national unity long has been understood to be one of the 
clause’s central goals,232 Professor Kreimer’s argument does not support the 
weight of its conclusion.  First, though it is true that all Americans are 
“members of a single polity,”233 it is equally certain that Americans 
simultaneously are members of one of fifty different subfederal polities 
known as states (not to mention of a far larger number of local 
 
such things as state gambling and abortion regulations and permits states to advance 
paternalistic policies that promote the moral behavior of citizens, as well as those that protect 
third-party interests). 
230 An additional argument is that applying the Home State’s laws to its visiting citizens 
may interfere with legitimate Host State policies.  This is a real potential cost, but I explain 
below why such costs do not mean that the Host State’s legislative jurisdiction ought to trump 
the Home State’s legislative jurisdiction as a per se matter.  Infra Part II.D.1.  Instead, a 
collection of constitutional and nonconstitutional principles appropriately govern this conflict 
between Home and Host States.  Infra  Part III.  It seems to me that accounting for the 
competing states’ interests is best done by const itutional provisions aside from the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, which, by its terms, is directed to citizens, not states.  In short, in my 
view the Supreme Court is correct in understanding the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a 
provision that grants protections for individuals against discriminations by Host States, and 
that has consequent effects on our nation’s federal union, but not as a clause that has as its 
primary subject the states.  
231 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 919. 
232 For an early exposition of this, see Paul v. Virginia , 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), in 
which the Court stated:  “It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has 
tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.”  For a 
more recent statement, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948), in which the Court 
stated:  “The primary purpose of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] . . . was to help fuse 
into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States.”  Both the Paul and Toomer 
formulations have been quoted with approbation in numerous subsequent cases.  See, e.g., 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (citing to the formulation from Paul); Baldwin v. 
Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978) (same); New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 
274, 279 (1985) (citin g to the formulation from Toomer); United Building and Constr. Trades 
Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984) (same).  
233 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 919. 
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governments).  The dialectic between oneness (national unity) and 
differentness (subfederal heterogeneity) is the essence of federalism.  As a 
purely methodological matter, looking at only one pole of the dialectic, as 
Professor Kreimer’s national unity-focused argument does, is inadequate for 
the task of critically analyzing extraterritoriality.  Any serious doctrinal or 
theoretical analysis must take into account both poles of the dialectic.234 
Second, Professor Kreimer’s argument rests on an unexplained, yet 
nonaxiomatic, assumption about the nature of our country’s national 
identity.  It assumes without explanation that a regime in which Home 
States could regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct is inconsistent with 
national unity.  But this is not self-evident.  Let the analysis of this matter 
start with two definitions.  Under a regime of “hard” legal pluralism, a state 
may insist that its citizens abide by constitutional substantive policies even 
when they venture out of state.  Under a “soft” regime of legal pluralism, a 
state’s regulations end at its borders, and national citizenship entails the 
right of a non-Iowan to do in Iowa what Iowans are permitted to do under 
their Iowa law. 
The question is:  Is our country’s national identity only consistent with 
a regime of “soft” pluralism, as Professor Kreimer’s analysis assumes?  At 
issue is the nature and extent of the legal pluralism across the country 
concerning those substantive policies for which the Federal Constitution 
does not require national uniformity.  It simply is untrue that “hard” 
pluralism is logically inconsistent with a national political community.  It is 
at least plausible that the substantive limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, along with the broad swaths of federal law and regulations, are 
sufficient to create a national identity.  Indeed, one might suggest that part 
of that national identity is permitting states to differ radically about 
substantive issues not foreclosed to them under the Constitution, even to the 
extent of requiring that their citizens abide by their laws when traveling in 
 
234 Ignoring the “differentness” end of the dialectic is the imperfection in Professor 
Kreimer’s argument that a regime in which each state citizen is “equally bound by the law of 
[her] Home State” runs afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s guarantee.  Id.  He 
argues that it is untrue that “each citizen will be equally subject to the laws of her Home 
State” because no Host States grant visitors exemptions from their local criminal law so as to 
replicate the legal regime of the visitor’s Home State.  Id.; see also  Brilmayer, supra  note 26, 
at 887-89 (making virtually the identical argument in the abortion context).  This is true but 
immaterial insofar as there is no mandate of absolute equality; each citizen belongs to a 
different subfederal polity, and this difference explains why some citizens might be subject to 
their Home State’s laws while traveling and others might not.  See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & 
Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“Some distinctions between residents and 
nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are 
permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or 
the development of a single Union of those States.”). 
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other states.235 
Such a federal scheme of “hard” pluralism is not an oxymoron that 
“hardly advances the goal of establishing a single national identity.”236  The 
national identity that such a system fosters is one that permits rich pluralism 
and heterogeneity in respect of those policies that are constitutionally 
permissible for a state to pursue.  “Soft” pluralism, by contrast, systemically 
disfavors states that regulate matters that other states elect not to regulate, 
thereby undermining diversity across and experimentation among states.237  
Surely, one tie binding the states and preserving national identity is the right 
of states to differ from each other in their policies and politics.  
Furthermore, a “hard” pluralism regime may well be the logical outgrowth 
of Rawlsian liberal commitments; only such a regime can accommodate 
persons having both atomistic and more communal political philosophies, 
and people in the “original position,” not knowing the persons they actually 
represent, would think it fair to select a political structure that could 
accommodate a broad array of persons that would include those who are 
both atomistic and communitarian-minded.238  The national identity of a 
regime of “hard” pluralism allows both liberals and communitarians to 
govern themselves within subfederal communities as they deem fit within 
the range of policy options that the Federal Constitution leaves open to 
them.  Such a conception of national identity is not a contradiction-in-terms.  
Indeed, there is evidence of its plausibility in that contemporary law already 
permits “hard” pluralism in at least some circumstances:  Under the Model 
Penal Code, for example, a Home State may impose criminal liability on 
activities undertaken in another state in which the activity is permissible.239 
To be sure, “hard” pluralism is not an axiomatic form of national 
 
235 Donald H. Regan’s article cites to an analogous proposition: 
We are a single nation, but we are a nation constituted of separate states, with 
separate legal systems.  The Constitution expressly recognizes the reality and 
significance of state citizenship, both in article IV and in the fourteenth amendment.  
Why should we not think of a state as having an interest in its citizens which justifies 
regulation of their conduct wherever they may be? 
Regan, supra  note 27, at 1908. 
236 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 919. 
237 See supra  Part I.C.3 (arguing that allowing extraterritorial regulation of citizens to 
curb travel-evasion promotes political heterogeneity).  
238 See RAWLS, supra  note 114, at 27 (contending that the “veil of ignorance” feature of 
the “original position” concept “has no specific metaphysical implications concerning the 
nature of the self”); see also  supra text accompanying notes 137-50 (explaining why the just 
liberal state would accommodate the broadest possible array of persons). 
239 See infra  notes 398-406 and accompanying text (discussing the MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 1.03 (1985), which grants the Home State legislative jurisdiction under these 
circumstances). 
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identity.  The relevant point here, however, is that neither is the national 
identity presumed by Professor Kreimer’s argument, as this brief discussion 
of a plausible alternative, “hard” pluralism, shows.240  The nature of our 
national identity is deeply contested, and bald appeals to “national identity” 
of the sort made by Professor Kreimer cannot decide the question at issue.  
The doctrinal status quo is not premised on a philosophy that is flatly at 
odds with our national identity.  Though incompatible with “soft” pluralism, 
that status quo is perfectly consistent with a “hard” pluralist approach to our 
national identity.  The burden is on those who advocate the radical retooling 
of our longstanding privileges and immunities doctrines, and the argument 
propounded by Professor Kreimer does not suffice to counter the potent 
considerations that counsel in favor of the “hard” pluralist conception of 
national identity that contemporary law permits. 
B.  Right to Travel 
The right to travel imposes a modest but important limit on Home 
States’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities:  A Home 
State cannot interfere with its citizens’ rights to leave for the purpose of 
visiting another State nor prevent its citizens from returning.  Either would 
violate “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another 
State.”241  The recent case of Saenz v. Roe noted two other components of 
the right to travel, neither of which is implicated by a Home State’s 
 
240 Several of Professor Kreimer’s other arguments fall prey to the same error of 
presuming a nonaxiomatic nature of the national identity.  For example, Professor Kreimer 
argues that the alternative approach of allowing citizens to be governed by their Home State’s 
law “emphasizes the differences between individuals as citizens of different states rather than 
their commonalties” and thereby “undercuts rather than fosters common national citizenship.”  
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 920.  He also baldly asserts that the 
clause “imparts to individual American citizens the freedom that accompanies national 
citizenship,” in particular the ability to “take advantage of opportunities legal in other states.”  
Id.  As a final example,  Professor Kreimer argues that prohibiting its citizens from engaging 
in behaviors that are permitted under Host State laws would constitute an unconstitutional 
“abridge[ment]” of the attributes of national citizenship under the “fourteenth amendment’s 
privileges and immunities clause.”  See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 517-18 
(discussing a woman’s right to obtain an abortion outside of her Home State).  All of these 
arguments assume without argument that included among the rights inherent in national 
citizenship is a visitor’s unconditional right to be governed by the Host State’s regulations, 
irrespective of the Home State’s laws.  This unargued premise appears to be connected, once 
again, to Professor Kreimer’s nonaxiomatic understanding of national identity.  An additional 
problem with the last argument is that the case on which it is premised, Colgate v. Harvey, 
296 U.S. 404, 431 (1935), has been overruled, as Professor Kreimer himself notes.  See 
Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 518 (noting that the decision was overruled in 
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)).  
241 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). 
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regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state activities.  The Constitution 
guarantees travelers the “right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than 
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State.”242  This 
is the protection afforded by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV,243 and for the reasons discussed above this does not apply to the Home 
State and hence would not preclude a Host State from applying Home State 
law to a visitor for the purpose of aiding the sister Home State.244  The third 
aspect of the right to travel, “the right of the newly arrived citizen to the 
same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same 
State,”245 plainly is not implicated by Host State regulation of its citizens’ 
out-of-state activities. 
Professor Kreimer has proposed a more expansive understanding of the 
right to travel that would severely curtail a Home State’s power to regulate 
its citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  He argues that the very point of the right 
to travel is to “undermine[] parochial conformity” by “provid[ing] us with 
the ability to experiment with modes of living other than those sanctioned at 
home and to return with the potentially transformative knowledge we have 
gained.”246  As a consequence, he argues, “[a] system that allows states to 
truncate these experiments by allowing travel but punishing its object has 
the effect of undercutting this liberty.”247 
No case has suggested that the right to travel encompasses a general 
right (much less an ostensibly unconditional right) to behave as the citizens 
in the host jurisdiction do.248  Professor Kreimer apparently recognizes this, 
for his argument here, in contrast to his others, is bereft of relevant caselaw 
citation.249  The absence of such a doctrine is a good thing.  Traveling, even 
 
242 Id. 
243 See id. at 501 (“The second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly 
protected by the text of the Constitution, [in Article IV, Section 2, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause].”). 
244 See supra  Parts II.A.2-.3 (concluding that noninterference with the Home State’s 
regulation of its citizens can be a substantial reason for purposes of justifying treating visitors 
differently from residents). 
245 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. 
246 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 915. 
247 Id. 
248 The most recent restatement of the right to travel, which surveys caselaw dating back 
to 1823 in its attempt to articulate the doctrine, Saenz, 526 U.S. at 498-511, certainly does not 
embrace such a theory.  It cannot readily be fit into any of the three components of the right to 
travel identified by the Court.  The most promising candidate, “the right of a citizen of one 
State to enter and to leave another State,” id. at 500, refers to the right not to be actually 
obstructed from “ingress and regress to and from” neighboring states, as the caselaw cited by 
the Saenz Court in explaining this aspect of the right to travel makes clear, id. at 501. 
249 See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 915-17 (citing only to 
T HE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 22 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1981), to buttress his 
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without a concomitant Kreimerian right to do as the natives do, allows the 
visitor to learn all sorts of things, and she can then return to her home 
jurisdiction and seek to convince others in her political community of the 
wisdom of such alternative ways.250  But unilaterally taking upon herself to 
do in a foreign jurisdiction those things that her home jurisdiction has 
sought to proscribe is another matter.  “[M]odes of living other than those 
sanctioned at home”251 frequently entail third-party effects and, in addition, 
may serve to socialize the actor to modes of behavior that the Home State 
paternalistically wishes to discourage.  For example, gambling produces 
third-party effects on both the gambler’s family and the Home State that 
must absorb the bulk of the costs of the family’s becoming public charges.  
Consider as well a hypothetical jurisdiction that eliminated the sanctions 
that attend adultery; a philanderer’s out-of-state sexual acts may well have 
third-party effects on his spouse and children.  Attendant costs that flow 
from such activities (such as funding the judges who will hear the divorce 
case) fall primarily on the Home State.  Furthermore, neighbors’ out-of-state 
activities might well shape local norms in ways that the Home State wishes 
to fight against; there is evidence to suggest that the behaviors of people we 
know play an important role in shaping our sense of what behaviors are 
acceptable.252 
For these reasons, I believe that Professor Kreimer is incorrect when he 
states that “[w]hen I visit California, my actions, whatever they may be, do 
not threaten the public order of Pennsylvania any more than the actions of 
Californians do.”253  Such an assertion ignores third-party effects and norm-
shaping motivations that the Constitution permits states to take account of in 
formulating their laws.254  In short, it sometimes is the case that 
Pennsylvania’s concerns are undermined by a visiting Pennsylvanian’s 
 
argument). 
250 The right to travel undeniably has this effect.  Whether this is normatively desirable 
is another question.  What Professor Kreimer praises as “undermin[ing] parochial 
conformity,” Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 915, could equally be 
decried as interfering with fragile distinctive local norms that readily can be disrupted by 
outside influences.  Nor can it be said that fragility corresponds to inferiority or that which 
appropriately is displaced; virtuous behavior may be difficult to cultivate and yet be superior 
to those behaviors that are more readily pursued.  See sources cited in supra  note 146 
(discussing the Aristolelian conception of virtue). 
251 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 915. 
252 See Kahan, supra note 132, at 356-59 (describing “the role of social influence in 
criminal decisionmaking”). 
253 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 937. 
254 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra  note 95, at 907, 910 (arguing that the government and the 
law are rightfully involved in “norm management,” “expressing social values,” and “shifting 
social norms”). 
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actions in California, even though Pennsylvania is unaffected by the 
Californian’s identical activity in California.  This is true because the 
welfare of other Pennsylvanians is interconnected with the visiting 
Pennsylvanian’s welfare in ways that it is not interconnected with the 
Californian’s.  That is part of what it means to share a political community 
with another person, and fellow Pennsylvanians share a political community 
in a way that a Pennsylvanian and Californian do not.255 
Interestingly, Professor Kreimer asserts that his conception of the right 
to travel advances the values of “diversity and experimentation,” whereas a 
system under which Home States retain regulatory authority over their 
citizens’ out-of-state activities compromises such values.256  His argument is 
that “[i]f the only way to escape from the force of a state’s laws is to move 
to another state, we can expect increasing moral homogeneity in the state, as 
the most passionate or mobile dissenters relocate to other jurisdictions.”257 
I believe that this argument misconceives the conception of diversity 
that is relevant to federalism and that, properly understood, it is in fact 
Professor Kreimer’s conception of the right to travel that threatens diversity.  
It seems to me that the relevant level of analysis for purposes of 
understanding federalism’s diversity benefits is the nation as a whole:  Does 
one set of institutional arrangements permit more or fewer meaningful 
political options across subfederal polities?  Political diversity at the 
subfederal level is particularly meaningful if the various options themselves 
are important enough that some people will want to be subject to one set of 
political institutions and that other people will want to be subject to others.  
Thus, meaningful diversity of polit ical regimes at the subfederal level 
naturally leads to “increasing moral homogeneity” at the subfederal level 
insofar as those who prefer a particular set of political institutions or laws 
are likely to elect to locate themselves in the subfederal polity that satisfies 
those political desires.258  Perceived from the federal level, such localized 
homogenization could be said to be one of the very foundations and goals of 
 
255 That the Californian and Pennsylvanian share a national political community does not 
undermine this point.  The more intimate political community of common statehood entails 
additional financial interconnections insofar as many citizens’ needs are financed primarily or 
exclusively by state rather than federal funds. Furthermore, insofar as norm-shaping is a 
function of proximity and personal knowledge of those who are engaging in the behaviors in 
question, the behaviors of one’s fellow state citizens may matter more than the behaviors of 
people from other states.  
256 See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 915-16. 
257 Id. 
258 Cf. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956) (outlining an economic model showing efficiencies arising from different distributions 
of public goods across polities). 
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federal diversity. 
Conversely, dampening the “moral homogeneity” at subfederal levels in 
the manner advocated by Professor Kreimer comes at a cost:  increasing 
political homogeneity across subfederal polities.  People who feel strongly 
about politics are less apt to “vote with their feet” and move to a political 
community for the purpose (at least in part) of joining that community to the 
extent there is little difference among polities.  Professor Kreimer’s 
conception of the right to travel would have such an effect of diminishing 
the significance of which State’s political community a person is part of; 
this is the natural result of granting all citizens of the United States a right to 
opt-in to any state’s laws on an issue-by-issue basis while remaining a 
citizen of a single state. 
Furthermore, Professor Kreimer’s proposal would not diminish 
diversity across polities in a neutral manner, but would operate as a 
systematic bias toward the most lenient substantive state policies.  It would 
grant as a matter of federal constitutional law a personal right for citizens to 
engage in travel-evasion and thereby circumvent Home State laws that seek 
to protect third-party effects, advance paternalistic concerns, and shape local 
norms.259  Certain political theories are more prone to seek to advance these 
concerns through regulation; in particular, communitarian, republican, and 
neo-Aristotelian approaches to politics would more likely advocate such 
regulation.  Adherents of these political commitments would be 
significantly hampered in advancing their agendas, whereas political 
philosophies that are less regulation-minded (such as libertarianism) would 
be little affected.  Such systematic disadvantaging of one set of political 
philosophies is another respect in which a Kreimerian right to travel would 
undermine diversity among states and the possibilities of experimentation 
across polities.260 
 
259 Moreover, in contrast to the limitations imposed by other constitutional doctrines 
explored above (Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and Immunities, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clauses), such a right to travel limitation may constrain the Congress as well as the 
states; the Supreme Court has suggested that certain aspects of the right to travel limit the 
federal government.  See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507 (noting that Congress may not allow states to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment by creating residency requirements as part of welfare 
programs).  A Kreimerian right to travel thus might flatly preclude the accommodation of 
Home States’ interests in a way that the aforementioned other doctrines do not, for the other 
doctrines impose limitations on states that leave unfettered the congressional power to require 
Host States to accommodate Home States’ interests, as Congress sought to do last year in the 
Child Custody Protection Act.  See supra  note 11 and accompanying text (noting the passage 
of legislation which would have made the transportation of a minor across state lines in order 
to circumvent the Home State’s parental notification and/or notice laws a federal crime, other 
than in the case of a parent of the minor). 
260 See supra Part I.C.3.b (arguing for political heterogeneity). 
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Moreover, limiting political diversity across subfederal polities may 
even lead to increasing moral homogeneity of the sort that Professor 
Kreimer is concerned.  Insofar as law may have a socializing effect that 
cannot be reproduced by other social institutions, foreclosing certain forms 
of political institutions might actually preclude certain forms of social life 
from developing or maintaining themselves over time.261  Diminishing 
political diversity thus may diminish the diversity of the people found in 
society as a whole, thereby leading to increasing moral homogeneity of the 
sort that Professor Kreimer decries. 
In short, there is more than one aspect of “diversity,” and the 
relationship among those aspects is complex.  In some respects they may be 
mutually incompatible; “diversity” of members in a political community 
may come at the cost of “diversity” of polities insofar as that diversity of 
members is achieved by undermining the differences across polities that 
attract one or another sort of person to live there.262  On the other hand, 
these two aspects of diversity may be directly related, but in the opposite 
direction Professor Kreimer suggests:  diminishing the range of political 
options may well lead to increasing homogeneity of persons across the 
country as certain forms of social life are not given room to survive.  In any 
event, achieving the type of “diversity” Professor Kreimer discusses comes 
at the expense of the aspects of diversity that federalism arguably is most 
concerned with:  diversity of political institutions and laws across states.  To 
date, the caselaw has not construed the right to travel in the manner 
Professor Kreimer has proposed.  In so large and diverse a country as ours, 
the theory advanced by Professor Kreimer would be a troublesome clamp 
on the experimentation and political heterogeneity that federalism allows.  
Apart from the modest limitation discussed above of not precluding exit or 
re-entry, the right-to-travel caselaw wisely does not bar Home States from 
regulating the out-of-state conduct of their citizens. 
C. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Another body of constitutional doctrine that offers important limitations 
 
261 See RAWLS, supra  note 114, at 193-97 (noting that democratic regimes can lead to 
the demise of certain forms of social life even when the state does not discriminate against 
them).  See generally Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1063-71 (describing 
communities that believe their members will be unable to fully realize themselves unless 
political institutions can assist them in leading virtuous lives); Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal 
Cultures, supra  note 141 (manuscript at 5-6) (discussing respects in which general society’s 
political institutions might impede the survival of valuable cultures). 
262 I say “may come” because it surely is possible that a given polity might have a 
political ethic of membership diversity. 
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on Home States’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct is 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Before examining this field of law, 
however, it should be recalled that Dormant Commerce Clause limitations 
are not absolute, for Congress can exercise its powers under the Commerce 
Clause and permit what the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence disallows.263  Dormant Commerce Clause prohibitions 
nonetheless erect significant burdens on the states as a practical matter, for 
they must successfully lobby Congress to reverse a problematic Dormant 
Commerce Clause decision. 
1. Extraterritoriality and Inconsistent Regulations 
There is a line of Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw in which the 
Court has stated that it was striking down “extraterritorial legislation” that 
“directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a 
State.”264  The Court has said that such laws are virtually per se 
unconstitutional. 265  Taken out of context, language in these cases appears to 
flatly prohibit Home States from regulating their citizens’ out-of-state 
conduct.266  Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
 
263 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well established that Congress 
may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise 
forbid.”); see also  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (standing for the same 
proposition, in holding that Congress may grant states the right to regulate interstate 
transportation of radioactive waste). 
264 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).  One of the earliest principal cases is 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935), which famously stated that “New 
York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in 
that state for milk acquired there.”  Baldwin  struck down a provision of New York law that set 
a minimum price at which milk distributors in New York could purchase milk from Vermont 
that would be sold in New York, and prohibited milk purchased at prices below that minimum 
from being sold in New York.  Id. 
265 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (“[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring 
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s 
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended 
by the legislature.”).  For example, the Court held unconstitutional a New York law that 
forced alcohol distributors to post at the beginning of the month the price of alcohol they were 
selling outside New York for that month.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State 
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986).  The law also required that the alcohol be sold to 
New York wholesalers for no more than the posted price.  As a result of the law, “[o]nce a 
distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to change its prices elsewhere in the 
United States during the relevant month.  Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in 
one State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce.” 
Id. at 582.  The law was struck on the ground that New York could not “‘project its legislation 
into [other states] by regulating the price to be paid’” for liquor in those states.  Id. at 582-83 
(quoting Baldwin , 294 U.S. at 521). 
266 See, e.g. , Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (classifying a regulation as a violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause if “the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct 
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Circuit recently relied on the Dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a 
Wisconsin regulation that sought to counter travel-evasion in the business 
context.267  Analyzed more closely, however, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases concerning extraterritoriality are best understood as standing 
for a narrow principle that does not affect the extraterritorial regulations that 
are the subject of this Article (and, furthermore, that should not have led to 
the demise of Wisconsin’s regulation). 
a. Commerce 
To begin with, the Dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritorial 
limitations are not flat prohibitions against extraterritorial regulation, but 
instead only apply to such regulations that concern “commerce.”268  Recent 
Commerce Clause caselaw has identified important limits on Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers,269 and these likewise limit the scope of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause;270 after all, the Dormant Commerce Clause is 
understood to limit State activity in respect of matters about which Congress 
has not legislated, but over which Congress has the power to regulate.  
Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause concerns only those activities that 
themselves constitute interstate commerce or those activities that are 
“economic endeavor[s]” and have “substantial effects on interstate 
commerce.”271  To fall under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the activity 
would have to concern “what is truly national” rather than “what is truly 
local.”272 
Though the precise boundaries erected by this language are unclear, the 
general implication is clear enough:  not every activity is potentially subject 
 
beyond the boundaries of the State”). 
267 I critically analyze the case immediately below in Part II.C.2. 
268 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987) (“The 
principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against 
interstate commerce. . . . This Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated 
statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce . . . .”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.  
624, 642 (1982) (“The Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to 
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
269 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“We accordingly 
reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 558-60 (1995) (holding that congressional Commerce Clause power is limited 
to regulating channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of commerce, and activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce). 
270 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 573 
(1997) (citing Lopez for its narrowing definition of “articles of commerce”).  
271 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. 
272 Id. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
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to the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitations.  The Dormant Commerce 
Clause caselaw creates a two-tiered system in which a state’s extraterritorial 
powers in relation to “commerce” are less than the state’s powers with 
respect to the general police powers (such as criminal law).  The reason for 
the stricter limitations on states in the context of commerce is well 
understood.  Whereas the Constitution created a federal system wherein 
each State can pursue its own vision of the social good, it also created a 
single national market; thus although states “‘as political communities, [are] 
distinct and sovereign, and consequently foreign to each other’”273 for 
purposes of criminal law and most police powers, “‘the states are not 
separable economic units.’”274  “‘[W]hat is ultimate’” under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Court has said, “‘is the principle that one state in its 
dealing with another may not place itself in a position of economic 
isolation.’”275  The Court has also established that “our economic unit is the 
Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the 
economy.”276  Accordingly, any Dormant Commerce Clause bar on 
extraterritoriality should not apply to matters unconcerned with the national 
market, as determined by Lopez and its progeny. 
b. Protectionism 
Although the Court has not yet directly confronted the question,277 a 
strong argument can be made that the Dormant Commerce Clause’s near per 
se prohibition of extraterritorial regulation, the clause’s form of heightened 
scrutiny, applies only to state statutes that are forms of economic 
protectionism.  This would be consistent with general Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, under which heightened scrutiny is applicable only if the 
state regulation is a species of “economic protectionism,” and thus not 
applicable to “health and safety” regulations.278  It has long been held that 
 
273 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Bank of 
United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 53-54 (1838)). 
274 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (quoting H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)). 
275 City of Philadelphia , 437 U.S. at 623 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).  
276 Hood, 336 U.S. at 537. 
277 It has not been directly confronted because no case before the Supreme Court has 
pitted the states’ traditional police powers against a claim of problematic extraterritoriality 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.  For discussion of such a case heard in the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see infra  Part II.C.2. 
278 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (noting that 
“[f]or Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic 
protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other”). 
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although the “State may not promote its own economic advantages by 
curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce,” there is “broad power in 
the State to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, 
fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of measures which 
bear adversely upon interstate commerce.”279  The 1949 case of H.P. Hood 
& Sons v. Du Mond, for example, noted that the 
distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces 
to their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate 
from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict 
the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted 
in both our history and our law.280 
Modern Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw maintains this distinction 
between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and “health and safety” 
regulations that only incidentally affect interstate commerce, on the other.  
Laws that amount to “simple economic protectionism” are virtually per se 
invalid,281 while health and safety regulations are subject to a far more 
deferential review282 under which the law will be struck down only if it 
imposes costs on interstate commerce that are “clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”283  For example, in Head v. New Mexico 
Board of Examiners in Optometry,284 the Court upheld a state law that 
“unquestionably imposed some restraint upon [interstate] commerce” 
 
279 Hood, 336 U.S. at 531-32. 
280 Id. at 533.  In terms of history, the Court noted that “[t]he sole purpose for which 
Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution” was to create 
nationwide commercial harmony.  Id.  “The desire of the Forefathers to federalize regulation 
of foreign and interstate commerce stands in sharp contrast to their jealous preservation of the 
state’s power over its internal affairs” concerning the “social conditions” of the states.  Id. at 
533-34. 
281 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 144 (1986) (noting that state statutes 
that “affirmatively discriminate against” interstate commerce “ are subject to more demanding 
scrutiny” known as “the strictest scrutiny”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
624 (1978) (noting the “virtually per se rule of invalidity” for laws reflecting “economic 
isolation” and “simple economic protect ionism”). 
282 Some have argued that nonprotectionist state statutes should be subject to no 
Dormant Commerce Clause review at all.  See Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town 
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 608 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[J]ust as a public health 
justification unrelated to economic protectionism may justify an overt discrimination against 
goods moving in interstate commerce, ‘so may health and safety considerations be weighed in  
the process of deciding the threshold question whether the conditions entailing application of 
the dormant Commerce Clause are present.’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 
278, 307 (1997))); Regan, supra  note 216 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
properly addresses only economic protectionism and arguing that there is no lower-level Pike 
balancing in relation to nonprotectionist state legislation). 
283 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
284 374 U.S. 424 (1963). 
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because the Dormant Commerce Clause was “never intended to cut the 
States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and 
safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the 
commerce of the country.”285  Laws “addressed to protection of the public 
health,” which are part of what “is compendiously known as the police 
power,” are constitutional if they “[do] not discriminate against interstate 
commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity.”286 
The Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that speaks of a near per 
se prohibition of extraterritoriality likewise should be understood as 
applying only to protectionist state statutes; some lower-level balancing of 
the local interests against the costs imposed on interstate commerce is 
appropriate in respect of statutes emanating from the state’s historical police 
powers that regulate extraterritorially.287  The identical policy and historical 
reasons enumerated in Hood and applied in Head to explain why state 
statutes concerning citizens’ safety and welfare should be treated more 
deferentially than protectionist regulations are equally applicable to state 
statutes intended to regulate the health, life, and safety of cit izens, even 
when those statutes must regulate those citizens’ extraterritorial conduct to 
be effective.  Indeed, as a descriptive matter it clearly is true that “[s]tate 
regulations are routinely upheld despite what is obviously a significant 
impact on outside actors”;288 consider, for example, products liability 
actions against out-of-state manufacturers and nuisance actions against 
polluters across the border.289  The types of laws that have been discussed in 
 
285 Id. at 427-28 (internal quotations omitted). 
286 Id. at 428-29 (internal quotations omitted). 
287 For an excellent recent article that also concludes that extraterritoriality does not, and 
should not, per se run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 
O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 803-06 
(2001), which discusses some of the many state laws that have the effect of extraterritorially 
regulating and advocates a balancing test for evaluating extraterritorial state laws under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 
 It might be asked why the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine concerns itself with 
extraterritoriality if such extra-state regulation only is problematic in the context of 
protectionism, which itself is subject to heightened scrutiny.  See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska 
ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (noting that where a statute serves as “an 
explicit barrier to commerce between” two states, the restriction must be “narrowly tailored” 
to a nondiscriminatory policy).  The answer is that extraterritoriality is a tool that can help to 
smoke out protectionism, which frequently is difficult to identify definitively, since 
extraterr itoriality not infrequently is also present where there is protectionism.  The suggestion 
of protectionist intent is particularly strong where, as is true in the Supreme Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause extraterritoriality cases, the party to whom the regulation primarily is 
extraterritorially applied is not a citizen of the regulating state. 
288 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra  note 287, at 803. 
289 Id. 
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this Article would readily qualify as nonprotectionist.  They do not “shield[] 
in-state industries from out-of-state competition”290 or otherwise benefit in-
staters at the expense of out-of-staters.291  Even if the economic burden of a 
law fell primarily or exclusively on out-of-staters, as would be the case if a 
Home State prohibited gambling in its midst and also sought to disallow its 
citizens from gambling out of state, that would not propel a state statute into 
the category of protectionist under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.292  The question is whether a state statute gives in-staters a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace over out-of-staters,293 and the 
statutes discussed in this Article are not of that sort.  They accordingly 
should not trigger the Dormant Commerce Clause’s rule of per se invalidity 
of extraterritorial regulation. 
Understanding the rule of per se invalidity of extraterritorial regulation 
as applying only to protectionist statutes works well with the holdings of the 
caselaw.  Although several of the extraterritorial cases admittedly have 
deployed language that is not limited to protectionist statutes,294 all but one 
of the Supreme Court cases that have struck down state regulations on the 
basis of extraterritoriality have concerned statutes that are readily 
characterized as protectionist.295  In the singular exception, Edgar v. MITE 
 
290 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).  
291 See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351-52 (1977) (holding that 
a North Carolina protectionist law favoring in-state dealers at the expense of out -of-state 
dealers violated the Commerce Clause). 
292 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978) (stating that “the fact 
that the burden [of a state regulation] falls solely on interstate companies . . . does not lead, 
either logically or as a practical matter, to a conclusion that the State is discriminating against 
interstate commerce” and accordingly runs afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause); cf. 
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra  note 287, at 806 (coming to a similar conclusion using a normative 
framework premised on economic efficiency). 
293 Exxon Corp , 437 U.S. at 126 (concluding that a Maryland statute did not discriminate 
against interstate commerce because the statute did not give in-state dealers a competitive 
advantage over out -of-state dealers). 
294 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989) (stating that extraterritoriality 
is problematic due to the possibility that it would create “inconsistent obligations”). 
295 See Healy, 491 U.S. at 343 (holding that a Connecticut contemporaneous affirmation 
provision requiring out-of-state alcohol distillers to attest they were not selling alcohol at 
lower prices outside of Connecticut was unconstitutional); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986) (holding that a prospective affirmation 
provision requiring alcohol distillers to post prices of alcohol to be  sold in neighboring states 
during the upcoming month and prohibiting them from selling alcohol in New York for a 
price exceeding the price to be charged in other states violated the Commerce Clause); 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (invalidating a law prohibiting New 
York milk distributors from purchasing milk in Vermont at lower than a fixed price New York 
milk producers could match); see also  Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 496 (“[A]ll of 
the cases in which statutes have been invalidated have involved laws which in some sense 
could be characterized as economic protectionism or predation.”). 
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Corp., a plurality of the Court struck down a nonprotectionist Illinois statute 
due to its extraterritorial effects.296  Nevertheless, five years later in CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,297 the Supreme Court rejected the 
MITE plurality’s reasoning and upheld a nonprotectionist statute that was 
virtually indistinguishable from what had been struck down in MITE, using 
a legal test that deployed lower-level scrutiny than the virtual per se rule. 298  
Thus, taking into account CTS’s reworking of MITE, it is fair to say that 
under the current state of Dormant Commerce Clause law, the per se 
invalidation rule concerning extraterritoriality is invoked only with respect 
to protectionist statutes.  The proposition that the per se rule is not 
applicable to nonprotectionist statutes accordingly is consistent with 
applicable precedent. 
c. Regulating noncitizens 
There is yet another possible distinction between the Dormant 
Commerce Clause extraterritoriality cases that have invoked the rule of per 
se invalidity and the issue of a Home State’s power to regulate its citizens’ 
out-of-state conduct.  All the Dormant Commerce Clause cases have struck 
down statutes in which the extraterritorial regulations applied primarily to 
noncitizens of the regulating State. 299  By contrast, the extraterritorial 
 
296 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).  Indeed, a plurality of the Court appeared to hold in MITE 
that a state statute having a “direct restraint on interstate commerce” by imposing “sweeping 
extraterritorial effect[s]” is invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause “regardless of the 
purpose with which it was enacted.”  Id. at 642 (internal quotations omitted). 
297 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
298 Both MITE and CTS concerned anti-takeover statutes in which the regulating state 
sought to regulate the purchase and sale of stock that occurred outside the state.  The Illinois 
law struck down in MITE required that certain corporate takeover offers be registered with the 
Illinois secretary of state and gave her the power to refuse registration.  MITE, 457 U.S. at 
626-27.  The Indiana law upheld in CTS required approval by a majority of preexisting 
shareholders when a potential buyer sought to acquire a substantial number of voting shares, 
even if neither the proposed purchase nor sale was to occur in Indiana.  CTS, 481 U.S. at 72-
75; id. at 99-100 (White, J., dissenting).  The CTS Court concluded that it was “not bound by 
[MITE’s] reasoning” because MITE  was a plurality opinion.  Id. at 81. 
299 There is one Supreme Court case in which it is not clear whether the regulated party 
was a noncitizen of the regulating state, the 1935 case of Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511 (1935).  In  any event, this case is not inconsistent with the above text because the 
unusual statute in that case was patently protectionist.  To protect New York’s milk producers, 
the New York law precluded dealers from selling in New York milk they purchased out of 
state at less than the minimum price fixed by the statute.  Id. at 519 n.1.  Indeed, a fair reading 
of the opinion reveals that the Court’s concern was not with extraterritoriality per se, but with 
how such a regulation could “set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective 
as if customs duties . . . had been laid upon the thing transported.”  Id. at 521.  In other words, 
the Court’s concern was with economic protectionism, and extraterritoriality was problematic 
only insofar as it had the protectionist “effect of establishing an economic barrier against 
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regulations contemplated in this Article would be applied only to citizens. 
The distinction between citizen and noncitizen has been critical in the 
cases.300  This was the basis on which the CTS Court explained why there 
was no inconsistency between its upholding Indiana’s anti-takeover statute 
and the MITE Court’s striking down of Illinois’ similar anti-takeover law.  
Under both laws, the regulating state sought to regulate purchases and sales 
of corporate stock that occurred outside its borders.301  The important 
distinction, according to the CTS Court, was that the Illinois law “applied as 
well to out-of-state corporations as to in-state corporations,” whereas the 
Indiana Act “applie[d] only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.”302  
Moreover, whereas the Illinois statute could have applied even where there 
were no Illinois shareholders,303 “the Indiana Act applies only to 
corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana.”304  
Of partic ular significance to the issue of Home State power to regulate its 
citizens’ out-of-state behavior, the Court upheld the statute in CTS because 
“every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of 
Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in 
protecting,”305 even though the out-of-state commercial activ ities of 
noncitizens also were regulated by the law.306  If the Dormant Commerce 
 
compet ition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents.”  Id. at 527. 
300 I will not attempt in this Article to explain why this is an important distinction for 
purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause (though I suspect it is best understood as being 
connected to protectionism insofar as representation reinforcement concerns may be less 
pressing in respect of state statutes that regulate both citizens and noncit izens).  I am content 
to rest on formalistic legal argumentation here for two related reasons:  (1) the Court’s 
extraterritoriality strand of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is woefully 
undertheorized and arguably not internally consistent; and (2) this Article primarily provides 
positive rather than prescriptive and normative legal argumentation.  Providing a theoretical 
account of the significance of citizenship for the Dormant Commerce Clause would, I believe, 
transform the analysis into prescriptive and normative argumentation.  Goldsmith and Sykes’s 
fine article, by contrast, is firmly a normative argument that is more willing to reject cases as 
having been incorrectly decided than is this Article. 
301 See supra  note 298 (outlining statutory provisions regulating extraterritorial sale of 
stock at issue in both MITE and CTS). 
302 CTS, 481 U.S. at 93. 
303 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 642 (noting that the Illinois statute “could be applied to 
regulate [takeovers] which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder”). 
304 CTS, 481 U.S. at 93. 
305 Id. 
306 The statute operated extraterritorially by requiring approval by a majority of pre-
existing shareholders when a potential buyer sought to acquire a substantial number of voting 
shares even if neither the purchase nor sale was to occur in Indiana.  See Id. at 99-100 (White 
J., dissenting) (noting that “people from all over the country buy and sell CTS’ shares daily” 
and that under the Indiana law “any prospective purchaser will be effectively precluded from 
purchasing CTS’ shares if the purchaser crosses [a certain] threshold ownership level[] and a 
majority of CTS’s shareholders refuse to give the purchaser voting rights”). 
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Clause countenances extraterritorial regulation of noncit izens’ commercial 
activities due to Indiana’s “substantial interest[s]” in its citizens’ primarily 
commercial activities,307 it would follow that the clause does not pose an 
insurmountable bar to a Home State regulating its citizens’ out-of-state 
activities when those activities are primarily or exclusively noncommercial. 
d. Impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation 
This is not to suggest that the Dormant Commerce Clause poses no 
limitations regarding extraterritoriality in commercial contexts under CTS.  
But unlike the plurality opinion in MITE, under whose rationale 
extraterritoriality would appear to be per se unconstitutional, 308 CTS 
introduced a lower level of scrutiny under which the relevant question is 
whether the state statute “may adversely affect interstate commerce by 
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.”309  The Indiana statute was 
not problematic, according to the CTS Court, because it is well-established 
that the state of incorporation regulates its domestic corporations, including 
shareholders’ voting rights.310  Consequently, “each corporation will be 
subject to the law of only one State,” and accordingly there is no 
“impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different States.”311  
The types of regulations discussed in this Article would not lead to 
impermissible risks of inconsistent regulation for purposes of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  The parentheticals provided by the CTS Court to gloss 
the cases to which it cites speak of “subjects that ‘are in their nature 
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”312  
For example, the CTS Court referred to the “‘confusion and difficulty’ that 
 
307 Id. at 93. 
308 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43 (concluding that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
“precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State”). 
309 CTS, 481 U.S. at 88.  CTS thus substituted a more flexible test for MITE’s bright line 
prohibition of extraterritoriality.  The CTS Court explicitly stated that it was “not bound by 
[MITE’s] reasoning” because it was only a plurality opinion.  Id. at 81.  To be sure, one post -
CTS case, see Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 328 (1989) (stating that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause “‘prohibit[s] the state from controlling the prices set for sales occurring 
wholly outside its territory’” (quoting United States Brewers Ass’n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 
282 (2d Cir. 1982))), appears to have returned to MITE’s approach to extraterritoriality, but 
Healy was a case that involved a state statute that was clearly protectionist, namely, 
Connecticut’s contemporaneous affirmation provision that required alcohol distillers to attest 
they were not selling alcohol at lower prices outside of New York, where such heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate. 
310 CTS, 481 U.S. at 89. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 88-89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852)). 
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would attend the ‘unsatisfied need for uniformity’ in setting maximum 
limits on train lengths”313 and similarly cited to a case that struck down a 
state law limiting permissible truck lengths that was “‘out of step with the 
laws of all other [neighboring] States.’”314  The Court’s discussion confirms 
that inconsistent regulations of a given activity are not per se 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to dramatically 
circumscribe the states’ regulatory powers; this is so because 
[t]here is nothing unusual about nonuniform regulations in our federal system.  
States are allowed to make their own regulatory judgments about scores of 
issues.  The mere fact that states may promulgate different substantive 
regulations of the same activity cannot possibly be the touchstone for illegality 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.315 
For example, states have different libel standards, tax regimes, and tort 
laws that might simultaneously be applicable to the same activity.316  The 
Dormant Commerce Clause wisely has not been held to disallow these types 
of inconsistent regulations.  The caselaw suggests that inconsistent 
regulations are problematic for purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
only if such inconsistencies threaten the free flow of interstate commerce; it 
is readily apparent that inconsistent state laws governing train or truck 
lengths might impose severe compliance costs that could make it effectively 
impossible for the regulated parties to engage in interstate commerce.317 
The policy differences among the states of the sort contemplated in this 
Article are, however,  not “subjects that ‘are in their nature national, or 
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”318  Inconsistent 
state regulations of this sort accordingly do not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Just the opposite:  under the Constitution, states are 
permitted to differ among themselves on such hotly contested matters as 
parental notification laws, gambling, motorcycle helmets, and the like, and 
extraterritorial regulation might be necessary to ensure the efficacy of these 
laws.  The mere fact that applic ation of the Home State’s law to its traveling 
citizens affects interstate commerce does not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause; as the Supreme Court has observed, “there is a residuum 
 
313 Id. at 88 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774 (1945)). 
314 Id. at 88 (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981)). 
315 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra  note 287, at 806. 
316 See id. at 804 (noting that multistate firms oft en encounter varying state laws 
governing taxes, libel, securities, etc.). 
317 See id. at 807 (observing that the Supreme Court cases invalidating transportation 
safety regulations turn on the “judicial judgment that the regulatory benefits of [those 
regulations] were illusory while the costs of complying . . . were severe”). 
318 CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 
319 (1852)). 
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of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which 
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some 
extent, regulate it.”319  Our federal system contemplates that the states can 
have different political theories that animate their legislative dec isions, and 
it would be a perversion of that system to treat such antic ipatable 
nonuniformities as problematic, “inconsistent regulations”320 that run afoul 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
2. The Example of Dean Foods v. Brancel 
A recent federal appellate court decision mentioned above,321 Dean 
Foods Co. v. Brancel,322 provides an excellent test case for Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis of a Home State’s effort to regulate 
extraterritorially.  The State of Wisconsin was concerned about the future of 
small dairy farmers in Wisconsin, having lost approximately 15,000 small 
dairy farms over a period of fifteen years.  In addition to the economies-of-
scale that large dairy farmers enjoyed, the large farmers had arrangements 
with milk processors (purchasers of raw milk from the farmers) under which 
the large farmers were paid premiums exceeding the processors’ cost 
savings in procuring milk from large farmers.323  The Wisconsin 
Department of Agriculture did not seek to counteract the price differential 
attributable to the economies-of-scale and transaction costs savings of the 
large farms.  But the Department deemed all payments by processors in 
excess of costs savings to constitute “unjustified” premiums and banned 
them.324  Wisconsin hoped the new regulation would put small Wisconsin 
dairy farmers on equal ground with large Wisconsin farmers without 
discounting the real economic benefits of large farming operations. 
Dean Foods was an out-of-state milk processor that purchased milk 
from dairy farms in Wisconsin.  Under long-standing practice, Dean Foods 
hired milk haulers to collect and transport milk from Wisconsin farmers.  
After the new regulation was enacted, however, Dean Foods “announced a 
new milk-purchasing program intended to circumvent” the ban on 
unjustified premiums.325  Under the new plan, Dean Foods allowed 
Wisconsin farmers to contract directly with haulers to transport their milk to 
 
319 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981). 
320 For a similar point, see Regan, supra  note 27, at 1884-85. 
321 Supra  text accompanying note 12. 
322 187 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 1999). 
323 Id. at 611. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 612. 
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Dean Foods’ facilities in Illinois.  Transfer of title technically occurred in 
Illinois under the new plan, and Dean Foods accordingly concluded that 
Wisconsin’s regulation would not apply.  Under the plan, Dean Foods 
continued to pay to large dairy farmers the premiums that had been deemed 
“unjustified” and banned by Wisconsin.  The Wisconsin Department of 
Agriculture, however, attempted to apply its regulation to milk purchased 
under the new plan, given Wisconsin’s many connections with the 
transaction.  At issue in the case was whether Wisconsin had the power to 
do this. 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the transactions under the new plan 
were beyond Wisconsin’s regulatory powers.  The Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the sales under the new plan “ha[d] an effect that is felt, 
perhaps even predominantly, in Wisconsin” given the “reality that these 
sales involve[d] Wisconsin farmers and Wisconsin milk.”326  The court 
nonetheless ruled that Wisconsin could not regulate the sales because they 
occurred in Illinois, citing MITE and Healy for the proposition that one 
State cannot “regulate commerce which occurs outside of its 
jurisdiction.”327 
The Dean Foods analysis is problematic.  Although the regulation at 
issue in Dean Foods makes for a harder case under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause than most of the other Home State extraterritorial regulations 
analyzed in this Article because it was a regulation that concerned 
commerce, even this type of regulation should be permitted.  To begin with, 
it is important to recognize that Dean Foods fits the paradigm of a Home 
State seeking to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct for the purpose of 
ensuring that domestic policies are not circumvented by mere travel:  The 
Home State of Wisconsin was taking steps to ensure that its citizens—the 
large dairy farmers—did not circumvent Wisconsin regulations that  were 
directed at securing a certain result in Wisconsin—helping to maintain small 
dairy farms.328 
 
326 Id. at 619. 
327 Id. at 619-20. 
328 The regulation varied from the paradigm on account of the fact that the party whose 
actions were the subject of the regulation was a noncitizen; the regulation barred milk 
processors from paying the premiums.  One state’s effort to regulate the extraterritorial 
conduct of noncitizens presents a greater constitutional hurdle than a Home State’s efforts to 
regulate its own citizens.  Nonetheless, this aspect of the Wisconsin regulation readily could 
have been altered without interfering with the regulation’s functional efficacy; the regulation 
could have proscribed large dairy farmers from accepting the banned premiums.  Such a 
modification of the regulation would not have saved the regulation under the Seventh 
Circuit’s understanding of the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, for the regulated sale 
still would have occurred outside of Wisconsin.  See id. at 619-20 (“[T]he fact that a particular 
transaction may affect or impact a state does not license that state to regulate commerce which 
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Under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the Dormant Commerce Clause 
prevented Wisconsin from making certain that its police power interests 
were not circumvented by mere travel.  The Dean Foods Court was wrong 
to subject Wisconsin’s regulation to a per se rule of extraterritorial 
unconstitutionality under the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, because 
the regulation was not a species of economic protectionism.  Indeed, if 
anything, the regulation disadvantaged Wisconsin farmers vis-à-vis out-of-
state farmers by making the produce of large farmers more expensive than it 
otherwise would have been.329  The appropriate test, instead, was CTS’s 
lower-level risk-of-inconsistent-regulations analysis.330 
Wisconsin’s regulation should have been sustained under such review 
for two reasons.  First, the Wisconsin regulation was not inconsistent with 
any Illinois law nor was an Illinois statute imposing conflic ting duties on 
milk producers “readily imagin[able].”331  Second, the subject of the 
regulation—a prohibition on payments in excess of cost savings for the 
purpose of putting small farmers on more equal grounding with large 
farmers—is not the type of matter about which there must be national 
uniformity.  Nonuniformity across states about such matters of economic 
and social theory wisely is permitted under our federal system. 
 
occurs outside its jurisdiction.”). 
329 Although the Seventh Circuit observed that “[a]nother apparent reason for the ban on 
these premiums is that smaller in-state processors are less likely to be able to pay them,” id. at 
611, this appeared to be an ancillary goal of the regulation, see id. (stating that the secretary 
promulgated the regulations to stem the tide in which Wisconsin had lost “roughly 15,000 
dairy farmers in the past 15 years”).  More importantly, there was no suggestion that this 
functioned to the sole disadvantage of out-of-staters, a necessary element of economic 
protectionism.  See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (“The absence 
of any of these factors fully distinguishes this case from those in which a State has been found 
to have discriminated against interstate commerce.”).  
330 Unlike the district court opinion, Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 22 F. Supp. 2d 931 
(W.D. Wis. 1998), the Seventh Circuit did not wholly overlook CTS.  The State of Wisconsin, 
however, “ma[de] no mention of the ‘inconsistent regulations’ strand of dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine,” and the Seventh Circuit accordingly treated any arguments under CTS as 
having been waived.  Dean Foods, 187 F.3d at 616.  This does not excuse the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis, however, because a party’s failure to raise the applicable doctrine does not 
give a court license to analyze the legal questions by means of inapplicable law.  Furthermore, 
the Dean Foods court in dicta suggested that CTS’s rule might be limited to the context of 
corporations law, see id. at 615 (“CTS may be distinguishable from most other 
extraterritoriality cases because it dealt with corporations, which are uniquely creations of 
state law.”), and inclined toward the view that the Dormant Commerce Clause otherwise 
provides a per se prohibition against extraterritorial regulation, see id. at 616-17 
(“[E]xtraterritoriality principles ban a state from regulating ‘sales that take place wholly 
outside it.’” (citation omitted)). 
331 Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 427-29 (1963). 
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D. Structural Constitutional Considerations 
Two prominent scholars, Professor Lea Brilmayer and Professor Seth 
Kreimer, have argued that structural constitutional considerations place 
severe limits on Home States’ powers to regulate the out-of-state conduct of 
their citizens.332  With all due respect, I do not believe that their arguments 
withstand careful scrutiny. 
1. Exclusive Territory-Based Jurisdiction in Respect of Policies About 
Which There Are Sharp Moral Disagreements Among States 
Professor Lea Brilmayer has sought to ground limitations on the Home 
State’s powers to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct in structural 
constitutional considerations.333  She has concluded that with respect to 
issues about which there are sharp moral disagreements among states, such 
as abortion and the right to die, “the structure of our federal system clearly 
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically 
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”334  Her argument is 
beguilingly simple.  Where two states’ laws purport to govern a transaction 
or occurrence and the laws directly clash, there must be a method to 
prioritize the laws so as to determine which one applies.  Professor 
Brilmayer concludes that “territoriality trumps residence”335 in most cases 
of direct clash between state policies,336 including abortion (such as when 
 
332 Professor Donald Regan also concludes that structural considerations limit states’ 
extraterritorial powers, but the bulk of his discussion concerns state efforts to regulate 
noncitizens.  Regan, supra  note 27, at 1884-1913.  Though his remarks are self-consciously 
preliminary, see, e.g., id. at 1887 (“I shall discuss some specific extraterrit oriality problems, 
actual and hypothetical—not with an eye to presenting a general theory, but in the hopes of 
encouraging someone else to try to develop one.”), he comes to provisional conclusions that 
are consistent with this Article, see id. at 1896 (noting the “possibility that states may be able 
to legislate extraterritorially where their own citizens are concerned”); id. at 1909 (“[T]o say 
that one can always abandon one’s state and its laws by changing one’s citizenship is not to 
say that one can take a holiday from the state’s laws, while remaining a citizen by sojourning 
elsewhere.”). 
333 See Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 875 (making clear that her position is that a “prolife 
state’s attempt to prohibit abortions extraterritorially” when its citizen is located in a state that 
“desire[s] to ensure freedom of choice” would be “constitutionally invalid”); id. at 881 (noting 
that her article “assess[es] the constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction”).  
334 Id. at 876. 
335 Id. at 884.  Professor Brilmayer uses the term territoriality in the same way that I use 
the term “Host State.” 
336 Professor Brilmayer helpfully notes the distinction between state policies of 
“indifference” to an activity and “license” of that activity, and observes that “indifference” 
cannot be inconsistent with another state’s affirmative desire to prohibit the activity.  Id. at 
888, 892.  In other words, differences in respect of what activities are permitted by different 
states do not necessarily give rise to “direct clashes” between the states’ laws.  Id. at 876. 
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the Home State, but not the Host State, has parental notification laws), 
because “pro-life states are undoubtedly unwilling to give up the right to 
regulate abortions within their own borders.  If the residence of the woman 
[determined which law applied] . . .  then pro-life states would have to allow 
nonresident women to have abortions in local medical facilities.”337  
Because they do not, Brilmayer concludes that pro-life Home States are 
likewise without power, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to regulate 
the out-of-state conduct of their own citizens in respect of matters such as 
abortion and the right to die.338  
Professor Brilmayer’s argument is premised on two problematic 
propositions.  The first is that some structural and, apparently, constitutional 
principle 339 compels there to be a single “connecting factor” that determines 
which state’s law applies with respect to matters about which states are 
deeply divided.340  The second is that the Host State’s regulation trumps the 
Home State’s when the two directly clash. 
a. The problematics of a single “connecting factor” 
First let us consider Professor Brilmayer’s argument that a structural 
constitutional principle compels that there be a single “connecting factor” 
that determines which state’s law applies with respect to matters about 
which states are deeply divided.  This is the foundation of her contention 
that a pro-life state that wished to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct 
has opted for a residence principle that accordingly requires it to permit 
visitors from pro-choice states to be governed by their Home State’s laws 
during their travels.  Under Professor Brilmayer’s analysis, the pro-life 
 
337 Id. at 886.  Professor Brilmayer provides a second justification, that “[r]esidence-
based regulation is problematic where a single rule must decide the legal rights of more than 
one person, because the individuals may hail from different states.”  Id. at 885.  She 
acknowledges that this difficulty can be readily eliminated if the Home States relinquish 
claims to regulate noncitizens (such as the doctors in the out-of-state hospital).  Id. at 885-86.  
Accordingly, the only justification for the proposition that territoriality trumps residence that 
remains for present purposes (where I consider only Home State powers to extraterritorially 
regulate its own citizens) is Professor Brilmayer’s second explanation, which is analyzed 
above in the text.  Nonetheless, because a Home State’s ability to regulate its citizens’ out-of-
state conduct conceivably could be aided were it to have the power to regulate noncitizens 
who abetted the cit izens, I hope to pursue the other justification at greater length in the future. 
338 See id. at 889 (noting that her approach seeks to “prioritiz[e] the various connecting 
factors” and “singl[e] one out as constitutionally sufficient” so as to identify only one state as 
having legislative jurisdiction). 
339 See supra  notes 333, 338 (noting that concurrent jurisdiction is constitutionally 
invalid in many contexts and that a constitutionally sufficient connecting factor would solve 
this problem). 
340 Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 886-88 (explaining the application of the “connecting 
factor” in the abortion context). 
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Home State that will not allow visitors from pro-choice states to have 
abortions within its borders has rejected residence as the single connecting 
factor and accordingly cannot invoke residence as a basis for regulating its 
own citizens’ out-of-state conduct.341 
Professor Brilmayer does not provide a legal source for the supposedly 
constitutional principle that a single connecting factor determines which 
single state has the power to regulate in circumstances of direct clash 
between state regulatory regimes.342  This is because there is no legal source 
for the proposition.  Indeed, a close look at Professor Brilmayer’s carefully 
phrased argument confirms that this all- important principle is hypothetical:  
“if  we are to eliminate concurrent jurisdiction by singling out a unique, 
constitutionally adequate connecting factor,” then, she concludes, at least in 
the abortion context, territoriality should trump residence.343 This 
formulation accurately reflects the fact that identifying a single factor for 
purposes of choice of law is not a requirement of contemporary 
constitutional or choice-of-law doctrine, a fact that Professor Brilmayer 
herself explicitly notes elsewhere.344  The Supreme Court has not ruled that 
the Constitution requires a particular choice-of-law methodology.  Indeed, 
the Court recently upheld a state choice-of-law methodology that takes 
account of multiple factors,345 as the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
itself does.346 
What undergirds Professor Brilmayer’s “single factor” proposition is 
not precedent, but a policy argument.347  Her argument is in two steps.  
First, concurrent jurisdiction is “unworkable” in contexts of “direct clash” 
between two or more states.348  Second, a noncategorical “case-by-case 
 
341 See id. at 888 (stating that a single connecting factor, such as residence or 
territoriality, has to be chosen “to divide the spheres of regulation fairly and equally between 
the contending states”). 
342 See id. at 886-89 (stating that a constitutionally sufficient connecting factor is 
necessary to settle the conflict, but not explicating the derivation of that principle). 
343 Id. at 886 (emphasis added). 
344 See id. at 877 (“No single connecting factor uniquely validates the forum’s claim to 
apply its law; different contacts are relevant in different sorts of cases.”). 
345 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (1981) (upholding the 
application of Minnesota law on the basis of three factors:  nominal residence; state-party 
contacts; and state locus of the occurrence contacts). 
346 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969) (listing seven 
factors for the courts to consider in choosing the applicable rule of law). 
347 See Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 884-85 (exploring the implications of a residence-
based, territory-based, and case-by-case assessment system of determining problems of 
concurrent jurisdiction). 
348 See id. at 883-84 (“The constitutional limits on concurrent jurisdiction . . . turn on 
whether policies directly clash . . . .”). 
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assessment” of which state’s law ought to be given effect is problematic 
because the uncertainty it would create would allow potential defendants to 
protect themselves only by conforming to the more restrictive state’s laws, 
thereby “violating the principle of sovereign state equality.”349  Therefore, 
concludes Professor Brilmayer, an easily applied rule that looks to only one 
factor to determine which state has legislative jurisdiction is necessary.350  
(She argues that the Host State’s laws should categorically prevail, a matter 
which I discuss at some length in the next Subsection; this Subsection, it 
should be recalled, is concerned solely with the propriety of adopting a 
single factor test to determine which state has legislative jurisdiction.) 
I do not believe that Professor Brilmayer’s two-step argument is 
persuasive.  To begin, Professor Brilmayer is not clear about when 
concurrent jurisdiction is “unworkable” (such that the entire exercise of 
eliminating one state’s power to regulate must be initiated).  At one point in 
her article she discusses the Supreme Court’s “inconsistent regulations” 
jurisprudence under the Dormant Commerce Clause,351 but she does not 
explain why regulations in respect of abortion or the right to die would run 
afoul of this body of law.  Indeed, I suggested above why such regulations 
would not qualify as problematic “inconsistent regulations.”352  Although 
such state regulations do have an impact on interstate commerce, they are 
primarily concerned with paradigmatic exercises of police power in pursuit 
of health and welfare—not protectionism—and they are directed at the 
enacting state’s own citizens.  Further, the regulated subjects are not matters 
about which national uniformity is necessary to preserve interstate 
commerce.  Just the opposite:  having diverse approaches among the states 
to such hotly contested matters that the Federal Constitution does not 
resolve is precisely where heterogeneity across states is most important. 
As suggested above, however, Professor Brilmayer’s understanding of 
unworkability may not be directly tied to precedent (in this case, the precise 
contours of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).  Instead, her notion of 
unworkability appears to be connected to more general policy principles 
relating to personal protections and constitutional structure.  If this is so, her 
argument would not be vulnerable to the accusation that it is inconsistent 
 
349 Id. at 885.  As will be shown below in the text, these two steps are actually 
interrelated. 
350 See id. (“This leaves us with a choice between allowing the residence state to regulate 
and allowing the terminal state to regulate.”). 
351 See id. at 881-82 (discussing various Supreme Court cases, including trucking and 
state takeover cases, in which several states might impose inconsistent requirements on 
interstate activities). 
352 See supra  notes 312-20 (arguing that inconsistent regulations only violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause if the inconsistencies threaten interstate commerce). 
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with contemporary doctrine insofar as her argument would be premised on 
prescriptive and normative claims rather than positive description of what 
the law is.353  The force of her position would then turn not on its 
consistency with precedent, but on the strength of its policy argument. 
Even under this criterion, however, Professor Brilmayer’s argument that 
concurrent jurisdiction is unworkable in respect of polic ies about which 
states are deeply divided does not fare well.  The policy arguments she 
makes—based on personal protections and constitutional structure—are 
interconnected.  She claims that if one state “expressly licensed what the 
other prohibited, potential defendants could protect themselves only by 
conforming to the more restrictive rule.  This outcome would consistently 
subordinate the licensing policy of the first state, violating the principle of 
sovereign state equality.”354  Consider first Professor Brilmayer’s personal 
protections argument.  Two things can be said in response to the assertion 
that “potential defendants could protect themselves only by conforming to 
the more restrictive rule.”355  First, this is surely an overstatement, for 
potential defendants will have to conform to the more restrictive rule only 
when their Home State wishes to regulate their out-of-state activities; when 
the Home State is only concerned with what its citizen does in the state, the 
visitor can be governed exclusively by the Host State’s law. 
Second, even when the Home State does wish to regulate its citizens 
extraterritorially, the fact that the visitor must conform to the more 
restrictive rule is not necessarily a bad thing.  In fact, it is merely the other 
side of the coin of not allowing citizens to escape their Home State’s legal 
obligations by merely traveling to more permissive states.  Thus, observing 
that visitors will have to conform their behavior to the more restrictive legal 
regime356 does not answer the normative arguments advanced above as to 
why a Home State should have continuing power over its traveling citizens 
if it so wishes.357  If, as argued above, it is better that Home States have the 
power to ensure the efficacy of policies they are constitutionally entitled to 
 
353 See Jolls et al., supra  note 178, at 1474-75 (providing a clear explanation of the 
relationship between positive, prescriptive, and normative analysis). 
354 Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 884-85. 
355 Id. at 884. 
356 The analysis is no different in the converse case of a traveler from a more lenient 
Home State visiting a restrictive Host State.  There is no basis for concluding that the Host 
State’s law should be overridden; for the reasons discussed below, our country’s federal 
system is characterized by presumptive concurrent jurisdiction, so the Host State’s restrictive 
rule presumptively would apply to the visitor.  See infra Part III (supporting the argument that 
the legal system functions under a concurrent regulatory jurisdiction regime). 
357 See supra  Part I.C.3 (arguing that the power to regulate extraterritorially ensures the 
efficacy of constitutional state policies and protects political heterogeneity among states). 
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pursue–-a power that supports political heterogeneity across states358—then 
requiring visitors to conform to the Home State’s more restrictive law, when 
a Home State so desires, is normatively good.  The fairness of this 
conclusion can be illustrated by conducting the Rawlsian thought 
experiment discussed above under which people are asked to try to step 
away from their current commitments by imagining what political structure 
they would choose if they did not know who they actually were.  Such a 
thought experiment leads to the conclusion that a political system in which 
Home States have the power to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct, 
if they so wish, is the most fair political structure.359  It would follow that it 
is not unfair to require a person to conform to her Home State’s laws insofar 
as she ex ante would agree that it is fair to create a political structure in 
which Home States have such extraterritorial powers. 
Consider next Professor Brilmayer’s structural argument that a single 
connecting factor is necessary to protect the principle of “sovereign state 
equality.”  Her claim is that permitting the Home State’s regulations to 
apply would systematically “subordinate the licensing policy of the first 
state,” thereby “throw[ing] the licensing state’s policy to the wolves.”360  
This argument is unconvincing.  To begin with, it is hyperbolic.  Far from 
being thrown to the wolves, the Host State’s licensing policy still would be 
applicable to its own citizens and to visitors from states that elect not to 
regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities.  In fact, under Professor 
Brilmayer’s solution, it is the Home State’s laws that systematically would 
be “subordinated” and “thrown to the wolves,” for allowing the Host State’s 
law to categorically trump the Home State’s law would render the latter’s 
policy open to wholesale circumvention in respect of many types of laws.361  
Furthermore, it is highly dubious whether a state’s extraterritorial regulation 
of its citizens even implicates the issue of “sovereign state equality” in the 
first place.  Assumed without explanation in Professor Brilmayer’s 
argument is that a valid aspect of state sovereignty is the power to regulate 
the behavior of the Home State’s citizens against the Home State’s wishes 
when the bulk of the consequences of the visitor’s activity will be felt by the 
 
358 See supra Part I.C.3.b (positing that the possibility of extraterritorial regulation 
expands political heterogeneity by allowing states to impose paternalistic and norm-driven 
legal constraints that cannot be evaded by travel, which would render the regulations 
ineffectual). 
359 Id. (arguing from the premise that the fairest political structure is one that 
accommodates a broad range of lifestyle choices, including those who require a political 
structure that allows extraterritorial regulation). 
360 Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 885. 
361 See supra  Part I.C.3.a (discussing how extraterritorial regulation is fair because it 
ensures the efficacy of constitutional state policies). 
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Home State.  My hunch is that many would think that regulating the 
behavior of noncitizens, against the wishes of the Home State, falls outside 
the proper domain of the Host State’s legislative jurisdiction in the first 
place.362  If that is so, then permitting the Home State’s regulations to trump 
does absolutely no violence to sovereign state equality. 
Moreover, the conclusion that sovereign state equality is not at issue 
can still hold even if the Host State is deemed to have some interest in 
regulating visitors.  If the Home State’s interest in its peripatetic citizens’ 
particular activity is greater than the Host State’s, then permitting the Home 
State’s interest to prevail in no way threatens the principle of sovereign state 
equality.  The Host State and the Home State would be understood to be 
differently situated vis-à-vis the visitor, and permitting the Home State’s 
regulation to trump when the bulk of effects will be felt at home would not 
undermine state equality. 
Indeed, it is Professor Brilmayer’s solution that could be said to 
threaten sovereign state equality.  Disallowing Home States from regulating 
their traveling citizens would undermine the principle of sovereign state 
equality insofar as it would allow Host States to interfere with the 
relationship between the Home State and its citizens by permitting Host 
States to serve as havens from restrictive Home State laws.  This would 
significantly undermine the state sovereignty of certain types of states—in 
particular, those that favor government regulation and those states that are 
communitarian-minded—by preventing them from ensuring the efficacy of 
their policies.363  By systematically disfavoring states that have a proclivity 
toward regulation, Professor Brilmayer’s solution accordingly could be said 
to violate state sovereign equality. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the twentieth century’s experience with 
the field of conflict of laws may well have something to teach about the 
need to resist the impulse of attempting to make choice of law turn on a 
single factor.  The last doctrinal system that attempted to resolve choice-of-
law disputes by means of a single connecting factor—Professor Beale’s 
“vested rights” approach, a largely territory-driven system under which the 
activity was governed by the law of the place where the last aspect of the 
activity occurred—has been almost universally recognized as a failure. 364  
Since its  rejection, virtually no courts or commentators advance choice-of-
 
362 Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987) (“We agree that 
Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations.”). 
363 Supra  Part I.C.3.a.  
364 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra  note 124, at 20-25 (arguing that the “vested rights” 
approach is too rigid and mechanical and noting that many critics have recognized these 
deficiencies). 
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law rules under which a single factor alone determines the applicable law.365  
Indeed, most choice-of-law scholars have concluded from the experience of 
the last century that any successful choice-of-law system inevitably must be 
highly nuanced and case-sensitive. 366  Professor Brilmayer’s single-
connecting factor approach runs against the weight of scholarly consensus 
in this respect.367 
Indeed, there are solid theoretical reasons to believe that attempting to 
solve the conflicts problem in the context of deeply divisive policies by 
isolating a single factor of either territoriality or residence would be deeply 
problematic.  Gains in ease of application of such a rule would be offset by 
the costs of the precarious outcomes that such a bright-line rule would 
create.  The fundamental trouble with such an approach is that both 
residence and territoriality are crucial aspects of political community and 
state sovereignty.  To arbitrarily select one as per se trumping the other 
would do serious violence to the political community’s and sovereign state’s 
welfare, crucial considerations that any choice-of-law methodology must 
take into account.  Instead, a more nuanced, case-specific approach is 
necessary. 
To quickly conclude, there is little to support Professor Brilmayer’s 
argument that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a single connecting 
factor must determine which single state’s law is applicable when two (or 
more) states’ laws directly clash.  The caselaw does not support such a 
principle.  Furthermore, a careful look at the policy arguments grounded in 
personal and structural protections does not counsel in favor of such a 
principle.  And as will be seen below in Part III, many of Professor 
Brilmayer’s “unworkability” concerns are addres sed not by a single 
categorical rule under which the Host State trumps, but by the interplay of 
four constitutional provisions.  To be sure, obtaining the result under this 
rule of interplay is more complex than Professor Brilmayer’s simple, 
formulaic rule.  Nonetheless, simplicity is not always the best solution.  
 
365 See id. at 22-102 (tracing the development of conflict -of-laws approaches following 
Beale’s vested rights theory and concluding that the traditional, single connecting factor 
approach has been ultimately rejected in favor of methodologies that consider multiple 
factors); Kramer, supra  note 29, at 1992-97 (providing a useful overview of modern conflict -
of-law approaches, all of which eschew solutions that turn on one connecting factor). 
366 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra  note 95, at 1233 (“One lesson of this century’s many 
failures in top-down choice-of-law theorizing is that choice-of-law rules are most effective 
when they are grounded in and sensitive to the concrete details of particular legal contexts.”). 
367 Professor Brilmayer’s approach is properly conceptualized as a conflict -of-law rule 
similar to Beale’s principle, which resolved the question of which law applies by identifying 
only one state as having legislative jurisdiction.  See generally Roosevelt, supra  note 218, at 
2455-58 (noting t his aspect of Beale’s system). 
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Indeed, nuance and complexity are necessary here to accommodate fairly 
the various states’ and parties’ interests. 
b. The problematics of categorically subordinating the Home State’s 
interests 
Even if a single connecting factor did determine which state’s law 
should apply under circumstances of direct clash, there are powerful 
structural reasons for concluding that the social policies that states are most 
acutely divided over are the very policies about which the Home States’ 
regulations should trump the Host States’.  The political heterogeneity made 
possible by federalism is most important precisely in respect of those 
policies not proscribed by the Federal Constitution and about which the 
states are most heatedly divided.  To permit territoriality to categorically 
trump residence would undermine the political heterogeneity that our 
constitutional federal system allows and the experimentation across states it 
makes possible.368  By definition, it would create a political structure under 
which citizens of any state could always avail themselves of the least 
restrictive law of any of the states, foreclosing the possibility of having 
states whose systems do not permit their citizens to effectively opt into a 
different legal regime merely by crossing a border. 
By making the most permissive state’s law a ready option for all United 
States citizens regardless of which state they are citizens, Professor 
Brilmayer’s approach of allowing the Host State’s rules to trump would 
systematically bias public policies toward the most permissive laws in the 
country.  This would sabotage constitutionally permissible state efforts to 
achieve paternalistic and norm-shaping ends.  It would also be particularly 
costly to the communitarian-minded, who believe that law plays a vital role 
in shaping the character of the citizenry, that citizens’ values and behaviors 
are shaped by the behaviors of their neighbors regardless of where the 
behaviors occur,369 and that the law accordingly must be concerned with 
citizens’ out-of-state activities.  In short, the potential for political 
heterogeneity is one of federalism’s great benefits, and averting its dilution 
constitutes a structural reason for concluding, contrary to Professor 
Brilmayer, that Home States ought to have the power to extraterritorially 
regulate their citizens in respect of social policies over which the states are 
deeply divided.370 
 
368 Supra  Part I.C.3.b.  
369 See, e.g., Kahan, supra  note 132, at  356-59 (discussing the impact of social influence 
on people’s values and behaviors). 
370 As is made clear below, this does not mean that the Home State’s law should trump 
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The proper solution to interstate conflict is a less categorical approach 
that takes account of both the Home and Host States’ interests by 
recognizing that both states ordinarily have concurrent jurisdiction, even 
where their policies directly clash.  To be sure, this solution is less 
streamlined than Professor Brilmayer’s, but that is all right:  There is no 
constitutional basis for prematurely tidying the field by categorically 
stripping one state (under Professor Brilmayer’s approach, the Home State) 
of legislative jurisdiction over traveling citizens, and the costs of creating 
such a basis would be prohibitive.  Part III explores in some detail how our 
country’s system of concurrent jurisdiction operates and provides a 
preliminary explanation as to why it is not “unworkable.” 
2. Exclusive State Sovereignty over Conduct Within a State’s Borders 
Professor Kreimer also has argued that structural constitutional 
considerations severely constrain the extraterritorial powers of Home States.  
He asserts that “[t]he American Constitution acknowledges exclusive state 
sovereignty over conduct within the territories defined by state borders.”371  
The support for this claim is that “[m]any aspects of the constitutional 
structure would make no sense otherwise.”372  The constitutional provisions 
to which he cites, however, are fully consistent with a structure of 
concurrent jurisdiction between or among interested states.  Moreover, 
Professor Kreimer’s analysis overlooks the many aspects of our 
jurisprudence—including, most importantly, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s 
dual sovereignty doctrine—that reflect the fact that ours is a system of 
presumptive concurrent legislative jurisdiction, not “exclusive,” territory-
based jurisdiction. 
To begin, the constitutional provisions that Professor Kreimer cites do 
not compel the conclusion of exclusive territory-based jurisdiction, but are 
fully consistent with a regime of concurrent jurisdiction.  Professor Kreimer 
is correct that “[t]he understanding that a citizen of one state who ventured 
into another state would be bound by the local law was the premise for the 
adoption of Article IV’s Priv ileges and Immunities Clause.”373  The need 
animating the clause, ensuring that the Host State does not discriminate 
against out-of-staters, says nothing, however, about whether the Home State 
retains legislative jurisdiction.  In other words, the Privileges and 
 
the Host State’s regulation as a per se matter; there would be great costs to such a categorical 
rule.  The point here, though, is to showcase the profound structural costs that Professor 
Brilmayer’s categorical approach would create. 
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Immunities Clause is perfectly consistent with a regime of concurrent 
jurisdiction. 
Professor Kreimer next points to Article IV’s Extradition Clause, which 
provides that an accused who flees from the state where a crime is 
committed is to be “delivered up[] to be removed to the State having 
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”374  Although Professor Kreimer believes that this 
clause “acknowledges that the sole responsibility and prerogative for 
punishment rests with the state within which the crime occurred,”375 the 
clause does no such thing.  It simply refers to the “State having Jurisdiction 
of the Crime” without specifying the criteria that establish jurisdiction.  
Since Michigan has criminal jurisdiction over a person who engaged in 
bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a scheme to fraudulently sell 
used machinery to the State of Michigan,376 the State of Michigan could 
successfully invoke the Extradition Clause if the accused fled back to 
Illinois after having entered Michigan subsequent to the crime.  In short, 
because the presence of legislative jurisdiction turns on a host of due 
process-type considerations and not simply the actor’s territorial 
presence,377 the Extradition Clause cannot be said to “make . . . sense” only 
if there is “exclusive state sovereignty over conduct within the territories 
defined by state borders.”378 
Finally, Professor Kreimer points to the Article IV provision under 
which the federal government agrees to protect each state against “Invasion” 
and to provide assistance to states against “domestic Violence” at their 
request.379  While this indeed indicates that territorial borders are of 
constitutional consequence, and while several other provisions similarly 
establish the constitutional significance of state borders,380 these provisions 
provide no support for the thesis that there is exclusive jurisdiction based on 
 
374 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
375 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 922. 
376 See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed supra  Part I.A, 
explaining that states are permitted to punish behavior “done outside a jurisdiction, but 
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it.”  
377 See supra  Part I.C (arguing that legitimate state interests may, consistent with the 
Due Process Clause, justify legislative jurisdiction over persons when they are outside of a 
state’s border). 
378 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 922. 
379 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, discussed in Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra 
note 49, at 923. 
380 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (giving Congress the power to create state 
borders).  See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:  
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 315-20 (1992) 
(discussing the const itutional significance of state borders in the allocation of governmental 
authority). 
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territory.  The mere fact that the federal government will dispense assistance 
in combating domestic violence or border incursions says nothing about the 
scope of one state’s legislative jurisdiction. 
Perhaps most importantly, Professor Kreimer’s thesis that “[t]he 
American Constitution acknowledges exclusive state sovereignty over 
conduct within the territories defined by state borders”381 ignores 
entrenched practices and constitutional doctrines that testify to the existence 
of concurrent jurisdiction.  To begin with, “exclusive” state sovereignty 
does not occur very frequently; rather, in most situations more than one 
state is permitted to, in effect, regulate a given activity.  For example, a 
manufacturer in Michigan can be subject to both Kansas’s and New Jersey’s 
products liability law.382  Similarly, the National Enquirer is subject to both 
California’s and Pennsylvania’s defamation law.383  Consider as well the 
dual sovereignty doctrine:  “When a defendant in a single act violates the 
‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has 
committed two distinct ‘offences’” and may be prosecuted by both states.384  
More generally, as the earlier discussion of due process establishes, what 
matters doctrinally for purposes of legislative jurisdiction is not physical 
location per se, but whether the state has a legitimate interest.385  Though 
the state’s interest frequently is triggered when events occur within its 
borders, territorial presence is not a prerequisite.  For this reason, legislative 
jurisdiction is not tied to territory.  Because more than one state may have a 
legitimate interest in a particular matter, more than one state may regulate it.  
The next Part of this Article elaborates the law that establishes and regulates 
our country’s system of concurrent jurisdiction. 
III. OUR SYSTEM OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
As shown in Parts I and II, states have the presumptive power under due 
process and consistent with the Tenth Amendment to extraterritorially 
 
381 Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 922 (emphasis added). 
382 See McKernan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 3 P.3d 1261 (Kan. 2000) (holding that  a 
products liability claim against General Motors was not barred by Kansas’s  “Firefighter’s 
Rule”); Poliseno v. Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) 
(clarifying General Motors’ liability under the crashworthiness products liability doctrine 
developed in New Jersey courts). 
383 See Gilbert v. Nat’l Enquirer, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1275 (1997) (noting a 
defamation action against the National Enquirer based on California law); Dominiak v. Nat’l 
Enquirer, 266 A.2d 626, 627 (Pa. 1970) (noting Pennsylvania libel action against the National 
Enquirer based on Pennsylvania law). 
384 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 
377, 382 (1922)).  
385 Supra  Part I. 
 
2002]   EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY  941 
regulate their traveling citizens, and no other constitutional provisions 
categorically limit this power.  The Host State also typically has extensive 
legislative jurisdiction over visitors from other states.  The result is a system 
of concurrent jurisdiction under which both the Home and Host States 
typically have simultaneous power to regulate.  This Part shows as a matter 
of positive law that there is in fact a concurrent regulatory jurisdic tion 
regime in place—a feature of our federal system that has eluded some noted 
commentators.  This Part also provides a prolegomenon of why concurrent 
jurisdiction generally functions smoothly.386  Although primarily an 
exercise in positive law, Part III also identifies select aspects of the current 
doctrine that merit reconsideration, particularly in the light of this Article’s 
earlier conclusions concerning the extent of Home State extraterritorial 
powers. 
A.  The Fact of Concurrent Regulatory Jurisdiction 
One might be tempted to suggest that the claim that there is concurrent 
regulatory jurisdiction is belied by the constitutional provision that requires 
that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”387  Professor Rollin 
M. Perkins propounded such an  argument when he asserted that “California 
could not validly make it a crime for its citizens to ‘play the slot machines’ 
in Las Vegas, Nevada, where this is lawful.  Such a statute would violate the 
full faith and credit clause.”388  He is not alone in this view.389 
This analysis is incorrect, however, because it conflates two aspects of 
choice of law:  (1) determining whether two (or more) states have legislative 
jurisdiction; and, if they do, (2) determining which state’s law applies in a 
particular litigation.390  As of the time Perkins was writing, full faith and 
 
386 A full exposition must await another day.  Rosen, supra note 9, at 8-40. 
387 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
388 Rollin Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 
1164 (1971).  It should be noted that Perkins’ analysis does not run afoul of the principle that 
full faith and credit does not apply to criminal laws insofar as that principle simply means one 
state is not required to apply the penal statutes of another.  See, e.g., Nelson v. George, 399 
U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States 
enforce a foreign penal judgment.”).  Perkins is arguing the wholly different proposition that 
the Home State does not have the power to regulate in the first instance. 
389 See PERKINS & BOYCE , supra  note 25, at 42 (concluding that full faith and credit 
would preclude such a regulation); Larry Kramer, Note, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony 
Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1451 n.111 (1983) (“The availability to the states of a 
nationality principle to justify punishing citizens for acts committed in other states may be 
limited by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution . . . .”). 
390 Cf. Kramer, supra  note 125, at 280 (making clear the two-step nature of choice-of-
law problems); Roosevelt, supra  note 218, at 2467-68 (distinguishing between “rules of 
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credit, unlike due process, did not govern the scope of a state’s legislative 
jurisdiction.  Instead, full faith and credit determined which state’s law was 
to be applied by a particular court in the course of a given litigation.  Thus, 
the Court explicitly observed in several of its seminal Full Faith and Credit 
Clause cases that, although the clause permitted the forum state to apply its 
law to the controversy, the nonforum state would have been free to apply its 
laws to the self-same parties and occurrences had the lawsuit been filed 
there;391 this of course presumes that both states had regulatory powers over 
the parties and occurrence, and that the only question under full faith and 
credit was which state’s laws were to be applied by the particular court that 
was hearing the matter.392  Consider as well the case of Thomas v. 
 
scope” and “conflict rules”). 
391 See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 
(1939) (“[T]he full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own 
statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even 
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with 
respect to the same persons and events.” (emphasis added)); Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 540 (1935) (concluding that California law could apply by 
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause even though “the employee, had he chosen to do so, 
could have claimed the benefits of the Alaska statute” by suing in Alaska). 
392 In the few cases where the Court held that full faith and credit required the forum to 
apply nonforum law, the rationale was not that full faith and credit limited the forum’s 
legislative jurisdiction.  Rather, under the Court’s analysis, only one state’s law (the 
nonforum’s) was conceivably applicable and full faith and credit disallowed the forum state 
from refusing to apply that law.  See John Hancock Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 
178 (1936) (requiring the forum state to apply a nonforum state’s contract law to an insurance 
policy bought in the nonforum state by an insured who spent the remainder of his life in the 
nonforum state); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (applying the 
nonforum state’s worker compensation laws to resolve claims arising from the employee’s 
death while working in the forum state, in which he neither resided nor regularly worked).  
T hese opinions reveal that the Court’s conclusion that the forum was without legislative 
jurisdiction did not rest on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but derived from the Court’s 
territory-based conception of state sovereignty, under which a state’s legislative jurisdiction 
was deemed to be coterminous with its physical borders.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 722 (1877) (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of 
one State have no operation outside its territory . . . .”).  That is why the opinions in Clapper 
and Yates localize the regulated entities in the nonforum state, see Clapper, 286 U.S. at 158 
(“The relation between Leon Clapper and the company was created by the law of [the 
nonforum]; and as long as that relation persisted its incidents were properly subject to 
regulation there.”); Yates, 299 U.S. at 182 (“[T]he contract of insurance was made, and the 
death of the insured occurred in [the nonforum state].  In respect to the accrual of the right 
asserted under the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence, nothing done, to 
which the law of [the forum] could apply.” (citation omitted)), and undertake to explain why 
the application of nonforum law is not extraterritorial, see Clapper, 286 U.S. at 158 (“The 
mere recognition by the courts of one state that parties by their conduct have subjected 
themselves to certain obligations arising under the law of another State is not to be deemed an 
extraterritorial application of the law of the State creating the obligation.”); Yates, 299 U.S. at 
182 (“Such recognition does not give to the [nonforum state’s] statute extraterritorial effect.”).  
Even under this territory-based system, there were discrete doctrines that gave states 
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Washington Gas Light Co., where the Court ruled that full faith and credit 
required that the District of Columbia be allowed to apply its workmen’s 
compensation laws to one of its residents who had sustained a work-related 
injury in Virginia—even though Virginia already had applied its laws in 
respect of the identical person and occurrence.393  Thomas thus definitively 
establishes that full faith and credit doctrine coexisted with concurrent 
regulatory jurisdiction, for it upheld the application of both states’ laws to 
the identical occurrence.  Thus, to return to Professor Perkins’ example, full 
faith and credit at the time of Perkins’ article said nothing about whether 
California had the power to regulate its citizens when they were in Nevada; 
full faith and credit only had something to say about which state’s laws 
would be applied in a litigation in Nevada. 
To be sure, since Professor Perkins’ article was published, the Supreme 
Court has held that full faith and credit does limit legislative jurisdiction.  
The Court has, however, held that full faith and credit and due process 
requirements  impose precisely the same choice-of-law limitations.394  In 
other words, the Court has folded full faith and credit into the due process 
inquiry that this Article explored at length above. 395  As shown above, under 
today’s combined due process/full faith and credit analysis, California could 
regulate its citizens’ conduct in Nevada because such conduct affects 
California’s legitimate paternalistic policy and interests in guarding the 
 
legislative powers vis-à-vis acts undertaken outside their physical borders.  See, for examples, 
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed supra  notes 34-36 and 
accompanying text; and Clapper, 286 U.S. at 156.  In Clapper the Court states:  “But, 
obviously, the power of [the nonforum state] to effect legal consequences by legislation is not 
limited strictly to occurrences within its boundaries.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Over time, the 
Court’s territorialist conception of sovereignty has been modified.  No longer talismanic, 
territorial location now is one among many factors deemed relevant in determining whether a 
state has a significant contact such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985) 
(acknowledging the visibility of a forum state’s “own interests in furthering its public policy” 
when deciding whether to apply the laws of nonforum states).  The bottom line is that as of 
the time of Professor Perkins’ article, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not used to 
determine the scope of a state’s legislative jurisdiction but instead was a provision that 
disallowed the forum from refusing to apply nonforum law where only nonforum law 
conceivably was applicable. 
393 448 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1980). 
394 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 n.2 (1988) (stating that full faith and 
credit imposes no additional constitutional limitations beyond due process in the choice of law 
context); WEINTRAUB, supra  note 32, at 624-25 (“[T]he full faith and credit clause imposes 
no further limitation on a state’s choice of law than is imposed by the basic requirements of 
due process.”). 
395 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (holding that a state can apply its law, consistent with the 
requirements of due process and full faith and credit, only if there are “significant 
contact[s]  . . . creating state interests, such that choice of law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair”).  See generally supra  Part I.C (discussing what this case requires). 
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welfare of third parties (such as the gambler’s family).  Such conduct 
accordingly qualifies as significant contacts that create state interests, such 
that the applic ation of California law would be neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.396  In short, the conclusion is the same irrespective of 
the time frame consulted:  under no circumstances would full faith and 
credit bar California from regulating its citizens’ gambling activities in 
Nevada.  If Nevada also wished to regulate the Californian when she is in 
Nevada, we accordingly would be presented with a circumstance of 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
There is another important point to note about our country’s regime of 
concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.  Each state’s regulations may materially 
conflict.  It is the conflict between their laws, after all, that typically 
provides the incentive for litigating parties to engage in choice-of-law 
battles; one state’s law is more favorable to one of the parties.397  Our law of 
full faith and credit thus contemplates a regime of concurrent regulatory 
jurisdic tion under which the parties’ legal rights may vary depending on 
which state’s law is deemed to apply.  In short, regulatory authority is 
concurrent even when the states’ regulations substantively conflict. 
There is concurrent jurisdiction in respect of certain criminal matters, as 
well.  Consider the Model Penal Code.  The Code provides that a Home 
State has legislative jurisdiction if “either the conduct that is an element of 
the offense or the result that is such an element occurs within” the Home 
State.398  Many states have adopted these provisions,399 and as long ago as 
1966, one commentator observed that courts have found no difficulty in 
finding an act or result occurring in their state even where the conduct “for 
all important purposes took place beyond the state’s boundaries.”400  For 
example, the Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld the prosecution of a 
divorced father for custodial interference under an Alaskan statute despite 
the fact that “all the acts constituting the offense were committed outside of 
 
396 Supra  Part I.C.  
397 See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 498-99 
(1939) (considering whether Massachusetts law, under which an employee was deemed to 
have waived his common law right of action to recover for personal injuries suffered during 
the course of employment unless he has given appropriate notice to his employer in writing, or 
California law, which did not have such a notice requirement, applied). 
398 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (1985).  
399 E.g., ARIZ.  REV.  STAT.  ANN. § 13-108(A)(2) (West 2001) (conferring jurisdiction 
over out-of-state conspiracies to commit a crime in Arizona if the offenders have also done 
something within the state to further that conspiracy); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102(a)(2) 
(West 1998) (giving Pennsylvania jurisdiction if events occurring outside the state constitute, 
under Pennsylvania law, a conspiracy to commit a crime in Pennsylvania). 
400 B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH . L. REV. 
609, 622 (1966). 
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the state;”401 the child had traveled to Arizona to spend the summer with her 
father, in accordance with the divorce decree’s visitation schedule, but the 
father prevented the child from returning to her mother in Alaska at 
summer’s end.402  This is an example of concurrent jurisdiction because the 
father’s actions were also governed by Arizona law.403 
Further, there is concurrent regulatory jurisdiction in criminal matters 
even where there is a policy conflict between the Home and Host States.  
Consider once again the Model Penal Code.404  One section states that the 
Home State can exercise legislative jurisdiction if the “actor purposely or 
knowingly caused the result within the [Home] State,” even though 
“causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result is 
caused by conduct occurring outside the State that would not constitute an 
offense if the result had occurred there.”405  Another provision addresses the 
converse situation.  It states that as long as a “legislative purpose plainly 
appears to declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result,” 
the Home State may treat an act committed in the Home State as criminal 
even if “causing a specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of causing 
such a result is an element of an offense and the result occurs or is designed 
or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where the conduct charged 
would not constitute an offense.”406 
Finally, it is important to note that there is more extensive concurrent 
regulatory jurisdiction in criminal than civil matters in one important 
respect.  A civil judgment rendered in a Host State’s courts must be granted 
full faith and credit by a Home State’s courts and accordingly will have res 
judicata effects, barring application of the Home State’s laws if the parties 
or their privies were to file a subsequent lawsuit in the Home State in 
 
401 Wheat v. Alaska, 734 P.2d 1007, 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). 
402 Id. at 1007-08. 
403 In Arizona, the law is as follows: 
A.  A person commits custodial interference if, knowing or having reason to know 
that the person has no legal right to do so, the person does one of the following: 
. . . . 
3.  If the person is one of two persons who have joint legal custody of a child takes, 
entices or withholds from physical custody the child from the other custodian. 
4.  At the expiration of access rights outside this state, intentionally fails or refuses to 
return or impedes the return of a child to the lawful custodian. 
ARIZ. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(A) (West 2001). 
404 Additional evidence can be found under double jeopardy jurisprudence.  See infra 
Part III.B (discussing the implications of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction when the state 
laws involved materially differ from one another). 
405 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(3) (1985). 
406 Id. § 1.03(2). 
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relation to the same transaction or occurrence.407  In this sense, it could be 
said that concurrent legislative jurisdiction in the civil context largely ends 
at the moment a court renders a civil judgment.408  This is not so, however, 
in the context of criminal law.  Full faith and credit is not applicable to 
criminal judgments,409 and the Double Jeopardy Clause permits the Home 
State to prosecute on the basis of a transaction or occurrence that already 
has been the subject of the Host State’s prosecution.410 
Tellingly, the Court has justified this outcome under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause on the basis that concurrent jurisdiction is a natural and 
acceptable byproduct of a federal system of meaningfully empowered states.  
The key case on this issue is Heath v. Alabama.411  The defendant there had 
been convicted in Georgia for “malice murder” and was subsequently 
prosecuted in Alabama for “murder during a kidnapping.”412  The Supreme 
Court ruled that the two crimes were greater and lesser offenses and hence 
the “same” offense for purposes of Double Jeopardy if applied within a 
single state.413  The Court nonetheless upheld the two convictions, ruling 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions by 
two states for the same conduct.414 
Heath’s holding turned on the fact that a single act may implicate the 
regulatory interests of two states, and the Court held that under the “dual 
sovereignty doctrine,” each sovereign state is entitled to vindicate its own 
interests:  “The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law 
conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the 
government.  When a defendant in a single act violates the ‘peace and 
dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed 
 
407 See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“For claims and issue 
preclusion (res judicata) purposes . . . . [t]he judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide 
force.”). 
408 There are two important caveats here.  First, this might have no effect on the pre-
litigation regulatory effect of the laws because parties would not know in which forum a 
lawsuit first would be filed and so would have the incentive to abide by both states’ laws.  
Second, very frequently only one state has regulated the relevant field, and so only it is likely 
to be the forum; under a circumstance where the Home State has regulated and the Host State 
has not, the only way there first could be a judgment in the Host State would be by means of 
declaratory judgment. 
409 See, e.g., Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (noting that states do not have 
to enforce other states’ penal judgments); cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (10 Wheat), 122-23 
(1825) (“The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”). 
410 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (holding that “successive prosecutions 
by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause”). 
411 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
412 Id. at 84-85. 
413 Id. at 87. 
414 Id. at 88-89. 
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two distinct ‘offences.’”415  “[T]he crucial determination” for purposes of 
the dual sovereignty doctrine, said the Court, “is whether the two entities 
that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same course of 
conduct can be termed separate sovereigns.  This determination turns on 
whether the two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from 
distinct sources of power.”416  The Court then held that states qualify as 
“separate sovereigns.”  Their “powers to undertake criminal prosecutions 
derive from separate and independent sources of power and authority 
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to 
them by the Tenth Amendment.”417 
One might suggest that Heath’s acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction is 
limited to circumstances where there is no conflict between state policies; 
after all, both Alabama and Georgia proscribed the defendant’s behavior.418  
This, however, would be a dubious limitation, for the rationale deployed by 
the Heath Court in no way turns on the absence of conflict.  Instead, the 
opinion focuses on the fact that a single act can implicate the legitimate 
interests of two states, and it is not infrequently the case that different 
jurisdictions treat identical acts differently. 
Additional powerful support for the conclusion that Heath’s holding 
does not depend on the absence of conflict between the relevant 
jurisdictions is in the Heath Court’s treatment of Nielsen v. Oregon,419 a 
concurrent jurisdiction case whose holding pointed in an opposite direction 
than that taken by the Court in Heath.  Heath accordingly had to distinguish 
Nielsen.  Importantly, even though Nielsen involved conflict between two 
states, the Heath Court’s analysis did not draw a distinction on the basis of 
that conflict.  Nielsen concerned a circumstance in which Congress granted 
Oregon and Washington concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River.  
 
415 Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). 
416 Id. 
417 Id. 
418 For such a suggestion, see Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 481, stating:  
“[T]here is a difference between seeking to deter acts that both states agree are evil and 
seeking to punish an action . . . protected by . . . the state in which it occurs.”  On a separate 
point, one might think that the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated only when two states 
prohibit a particular activity and then prosecute, and that Double Jeopardy is not even of 
threshold relevance unless there is no conflict between the two sovereigns.  But this is not so.  
Consider the Heath  case:  Imagine that the defendant had been acquitted in Georgia for malice 
murder because his actions did not satisfy the statutory elements but that the defendant’s 
actions would have constituted murder during kidnapping under Alabama law.  In such a case 
there is “conflict” between the two states’ laws, yet one would expect that the defendant 
would invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause to preclude prosecution in Alabama were it not for 
the dual sovereignty doctrine. 
419 212 U.S. 315 (1909). 
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The Court in Nielsen set aside the conviction of a Washington resident in an 
Oregon court for operating a particular type of fishing net pursuant to a 
valid license from Washington.  The Nielsen Court’s rationale had been 
explicitly tied to the presence of an interstate conflict of policies:  where 
“the opinion of the legislatures of the two States is different . . . the one 
State cannot enforce its opinion against that of the other, at least as to an act 
done within the limits of that other State.”420 
This would have been a simple basis on which the Heath Court could 
have distinguished Nielsen.  But this Heath did not do.  Instead, it held that 
“Nielsen is limited to its unusual facts and has continuing relevance, if at all, 
only to questions of jurisdiction between two entities deriving their 
concurrent jurisdiction from a single source of authority [i.e., Congress].”421  
In short, Heath did not limit Nielsen on the basis of interstate conflict, 
which had figured prominently in the Nielsen opinion itself, but instead 
distinguished the case on the ground that the concurrent jurisdiction had not 
emerged from inherent powers of the two states but instead had been 
granted by the Congress.  The approach taken toward Nielsen in Heath 
accordingly supports strongly the view that Heath’s rationale extends to 
circumstances of policy conflict between or among states as long as the two 
or more jurisdictions’ powers are derived from independent sources.  And, 
as Heath itself makes clear, state criminal law satisfies this condition:  “The 
Constitution leaves in the possession of each State ‘certain exclusive and 
very important portions of sovereign power.’  Foremost among the 
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal 
code.”422  This suggests that a Home State’s criminal jurisdiction emerging 
from the police power is concurrent with the Host State’s criminal 
jurisdiction over a visitor from the Home State, even where there is 
substantive conflict between the two states’ criminal laws. 
Understanding the constitutional law governing concurrent jurisdiction 
helps to shed light on an intriguing hypothetical mentioned above423 that 
was originally put forward by Professor Kreimer.  Suppose that New Jersey 
recognizes a “battered wife” defense, that Pennsylvania does not, and that a 
Pennsylvanian battered wife kills her Pennsylvanian husband while both are 
 
420 Id. at 321. 
421 Heath , 474 U.S. at 91.  
422 Id. at 93 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E.  Cooke 
ed., 1961)); see also  id. at 93 (“States, ‘as political communities, [are] distinct and sovereign, 
and consequently foreign to each other.’” (quoting Bank of United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. 
(12 Pet.) 32, 54 (1838))); id. (suggesting that “States are no less sovereign with respect to each 
other than they are with respect to the federal government”). 
423 Supra  note 5 and accompanying text. 
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on vacation in New Jersey.  Professor Kreimer argues that New Jersey could 
not deny the noncitizen wife a battered wife defense in a New Jersey 
prosecution.424  That would appear to be correct insofar as full faith and 
credit does not require one state (here, New Jersey) to apply the penal laws 
of another (here, Pennsylvania’s rejection of the battered wife defense).425  
This is of only limited practical import, however, because the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would not preclude the Pennsylvanian wife from 
accomplishing what her home jurisdiction does not want to permit.  
Pennsylvania also could prosecute the wife, its own citizen, and apply its 
law of homicide, which does not recognize the defense.426  Once again, the 
two states have concurrent, conflicting regulatory jurisdiction under current 
law. 
*     *     * 
To quickly conclude, concurrent legislative jurisdiction among states is 
an entrenched part of federal constitutional law.  It permits all interested 
states to regulate so as to protect their interests.  Moreover, states’ criminal 
jurisdiction is in one important respect more extensive than their civil 
legislative jurisdiction:  whereas full faith and credit’s constitutional rules of 
res judicata preclude a second trial where there has been a civil judgment in 
another state, neither the Full Faith and Credit nor the Double Jeopardy 
 
424 See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 499 n.169 (“It would plainly violate the 
privileges and immunities clause to make [the battered woman] defense only available [to 
New Jersey citizens].”). 
425 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825).  Professor Kreimer analyzes the 
question under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but for reasons discussed above I do not 
believe that Clause to be applicable to the issue at hand:  the defense would not appear to fall 
under a protected privilege or immunity and, in any event, New Jersey could justify 
application of Pennsylvania’s law on the basis of not wanting to interfere with Pennsylvania 
law.  Supra  Parts II.A.1-.3. 
426 Pennsylvania has enacted the Model Penal Code provision that permits a Home State 
to prosecute for acts performed out of state that were legal in the Host State but prohibited by 
the Home State.  See 18 PA.  CONS.  STAT.  ANN. § 102(a)(6) (West 1998) (prohibiting 
extraterritorial conduct that violates a Pennsylvania statute where the statute is express and 
reasonably related to the Commonwealth’s in terest).  If the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage 
requirement were incorporated against the states—as of now, “the Supreme Court has never 
directly addressed the issue,” Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra  note 5, at 484-85—then 
Pennsylvania would be permitted to prosecute its citizen only if at least some of the conduct 
constituting the offense occurred in the Home State.  See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 
526 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1999) (describing the federal constitutional vicinage requirement in 
criminal cases).  Were the vicinage requirement applied to the states, states wanting the power 
to prosecute particular crimes for extraterritorial activities would be well advised to draft 
those criminal statutes in a manner that expressly constituted as elements of the offense 
aspects of the activity likely to be performed in the Home State or the activities’ effects.  
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Clause preclude the second state from prosecuting, even after there has been 
a criminal determination in the first state.  
B.  Concurrent Jurisdiction and Interstate Conflict—A Prologue 
One consequence of concurrent legislative jurisdiction is that more than 
one state’s laws may apply to a particular activity.  This can present a 
difficulty if the two (or more) states’ laws materially differ from one 
another.  In fact, it was this very possibility of interstate conflict that led 
Professor Brilmayer to argue against the existence of concurrent legislative 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis issues on which states are deeply divided; by 
eliminating one state’s legislative jurisdiction (the Home State’s), Professor 
Brilmayer sought to eliminate the very possibility of interstate conflict.427  
As explained above, however, there is no constitutional principle that so 
readily eliminates difficult conflicts.  Moreover, the absence of a simple rule 
like “the Home State trumps” is a good thing, for simplicity’s costs in these 
circumstances would be too grave in respect of the interests of the Home 
State and the federal system more generally.428  Of course, a full exposition 
of how our system of concurrent jurisdiction manages interstate conflict is 
beyond the scope of this Article; it is a core part of the field of conflict of 
laws,429 about which I shall not say much here.  In what remains, I hope 
only to sketch the contours of the problems of interstate conflict that arise 
from Home State extraterritorial regulation, as well as to identify the several 
approaches to accommodating such conflicts that are already present in the 
caselaw.  Although a fuller exposition must await another day, this 
discussion will provide the basic concepts necessary for understanding how 
a system of concurrent, conflicting jurisdiction can be workable. 
1. A Simple Taxonomy of Conflicts 
Before discussing how our federal system handles interstate conflict, it 
is necessary to understand the metes and bounds of the problem.  To begin, 
it is important to recognize that the exercise of Home State extraterritorial 
powers does not always give rise to conflicts with the Host State.  Consider 
 
427 See supra  Part II.D.1 (noting Professor Brilmayer’s view that “territoriality trumps 
residence”). 
428 See supra  Part II.D (noting that an univariable dictate like “Home State trumps” 
could undermine sovereign equality and the Host State’s ability to pursue paternalistic and 
norm-shaping ends). 
429 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, at v (6th ed. 2001) (“The 
power of different [governmental] bodies to make or administer law is often unclear and, even 
when clear, frequently overlaps.  Conflicts arise, and a way is needed to resolve them.  This, 
broadly speaking, is the subject matter of ‘conflict of laws.’”). 
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the circumstance where only the Home State has regulated the activity in 
question and the absence of Host State regulation signifies the absence of 
Host State regulatory interest in the matter.  (To be sure, the absence of 
regulation does not always mean an absence of interest—as is discussed 
immediately below—but it sometimes may).  For example, think about 
Wisconsin’s milk regulations in the Dean Foods case.430  Whereas 
Wisconsin felt strongly about discouraging the payment of premiums to 
large Wisconsin dairy farms, it is likely that Illinois was indifferent to the 
matter.431  Under these circumstances, concurrent jurisdiction permits the 
interested state to ensure that its laws are followed, irrespective of where its 
citizen happens to be located.  The Host State should not care much, if at all, 
and the Home State that wishes to regulate its citizens extraterritorially will 
be quite content.  Under this situation, which might be called a “No 
Conflict” circumstance,432 concurrent jurisdiction presents no difficulties in 
respect of interstate conflict; the Home State’s law can be unproblematically 
applied to its peripatetic citizens.  A Home State with a motorcycle helmet 
law that sought to apply its regulation to one of its citizens while she was in 
a Host State that had no such laws might be another No Conflict 
circumstance.433 
Frequently, however, there is a direct conflict between the policies of 
the Host and Home States.  Two dimensions of the conflict are particularly 
important to note for present purposes.  The first is the relative importance 
of each state’s policy.  Of course, it is frequently very difficult in practice to 
make such a comparison:  there are uncertainties as to what the policy 
 
430 Supra  Part II.C.2. 
431 To be sure, it is impossible to know for certain the legislative intent lurking behind 
the Wisconsin statute, which on its face was silent as to extraterritoriality, and much less the 
intent behind the absence of regulation in Illinois.  Professor Brilmayer has put forward a 
powerful critique of the concept of “governmental interests” in the conflict-of-laws context, 
arguing that it amounts to little more than a fictitious constructive intent.  See Lea Brilmayer, 
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH . L. REV. 392, 402-07 (1980).  
Brilmayer’s argument ultimately is “not an objection to a choice of law method alone” but “is 
an objection to a conventional method of statutory construction.”  Kramer, supra  note 125, at 
300.  “The objection thus really amounts to a claim that courts are unable to do something that 
they do all the time.”  Id. at 300-01.  For this reason, I assume for present purposes that courts 
are capable of assessing legislative intent, even if it only amounts to “‘imaginative 
reconstruction,’” for that is a deep part of contemporary legal practice.  Id. at 300 (quoting 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1985)). 
432 This is analogous to “false conflicts” under the conflict-of-laws approach known as 
interest analysis.  LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 51 (2d ed. 1995).  
433 It is possible, however, that behind the absence of a mandatory helmet law is a state 
policy of supporting personal choice in respect of wearing helmets, in which case there would 
be a conflict between the Home and Host State policies. 
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behind a particular law is in the first place,434 and there are often 
incommensurability problems when “weighing” one state’s interest against 
another’s.435  Nevertheless, it is surely possible that one state’s interest in a 
given matter may uncontroversially outweigh another state’s interest.  For 
example, it long has been the case under the law of full faith and credit that 
the Home State’s interest in its citizens on the issues of marriage and 
divorce has been held to exceed the Host State’s.436  Let us call this the 
“Relative Interests Dimension” of interstate conflict. 
The second dimension concerns whether and to what extent the two (or 
more) states’ rules give rise to inconsistent demands over a particular person 
or transaction.  Let this be known as the “Compatibility Dimension” of 
interstate conflict.  Most problematically, a visitor could be subject to the 
laws of two states that require mutually inconsistent behaviors such that 
both cannot be complied with simultaneously.  Consider, for example, a 
“safe” State A that set fifty-five miles per hour as the maximum traveling 
speed on its highways and that sought to impose that limit on its citizens’ 
out-of-state highway travels, and consider further what would happen if one 
of its citizens visited a neighboring “macho” State B that set sixty-five miles 
per hour as the highway minimum.  I will call this a “Hard Conflict” 
circumstance in respect of the Compatibility Dimension. 
Most often, however, it is possible for a person to abide by both states’ 
rules, even if they are at odds with one another.  Consider antigambling 
State A that wished to prevent its citizens from gambling out of state and a 
pro-gambling state, such as Nevada.  A citizen of State A can comply with 
both states’ laws by not gambling—after all, Nevada law does not mandate 
that its visitors gamble.  Nevertheless, there typically is a conflict between 
the two states’ laws along the Relative Interests dimension of conflicts; 
Nevada, for example, wants people to gamble in Nevada.  Another example 
is the relationship between New Jersey and Pennsylvania law concerning 
the battered wife defense:  though New Jersey recognizes the defense, 
 
434 See supra  note 431 (illustrating the difficulty in determining legislative intent). 
435 See generally Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability:  Introduction, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998) (noting that “‘incommensurability’ means the absence of a 
scale or metric” and that this might be understood as referring to a situation where “no 
numerical ranking of the options in the order of their comparative worth is possible”). 
436 See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945) (ruling that only the 
place of “permanence” should have the power to alter “legal relations and responsibilities” of 
such “utmost significance” as marriage).  Similarly, in Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U.S. 393, 396 
(1975), the Court upheld against challenges grounded in equal protection and the right to 
t ravel an Iowa statute that imposed a one-year residency requirement for divorce on the 
ground that Iowa may reasonably be justified in, inter alia, not wanting to “become a divorce 
mill for unhappy spouses” who likely will return to their Home States soon afterward.  Id. at 
407. 
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merely having this law in place does not, of course, dictate that battered 
wives kill their husbands—-that is, a battered Pennsylvanian visiting New 
Jersey abides by both states’ laws by not taking the life of her abusive 
spouse.  On the other hand, New Jersey may well not want any battered 
spouse, whether hailing from New Jersey or elsewhere, to go to jail for 
killing her batterer in New Jersey.  I will call these cases of “Soft 
Conflict”437 along the Compatibility Dimension. 
As will be discussed below, Hard Conflicts are particularly problematic.  
They only infrequently occur, however.  None of the examples of 
extraterritorial regulation discussed in this Article, for example, would 
create Hard Conflicts.  Hard Conflicts are rare because the Host State’s law 
typically is permissive rather than mandatory.  For example, pro-gambling 
states do not require that visitors gamble, and states without parental 
notification laws do not require that pregnant minors undergo abortions 
without parental consent.  For this reason, Home State extraterritoriality 
ordinarily results in situations of No Conflict or Soft Conflict, not Hard 
Conflict. 
2. Why Interstate Conflicts Are Not “Unworkable” 
There are three plausible strategies for coping with potential interstate 
conflict.  First, the conflict can be eliminated by determining that only one 
state in fact has legislative jurisdiction; Professor Brilmayer, as discussed 
above,438 takes this approach.  While her principle of “Host State trumps” is 
problematically coarse, there is merit to her general method.  As I will show 
below, there are several constitutional provisions that dispel conflicts by 
identifying only one state as having legislative jurisdiction, though they do 
not eliminate as many conflicts as Professor Brilmayer’s principle does.  
Second, a nonconstitutional conflict-of-laws regime could be deployed 
under which one state’s law is identified as applicable in the circumstance at 
hand.  Third, both states’ laws could be deemed to be applicable, and the 
individual then could be held responsible to conform her behavior to both 
regimes.  Each of these approaches is applicable in certain circumstances.  
By appropriately utilizing these three approaches, the interstate conflict that 
naturally arises under a regime of concurrent jurisdiction can be 
 
437 Professor Brilmayer makes a similar distinction.  See Brilmayer, supra  note 26, at 
874-75 (“Most states that choose not to prohibit abortion to the extent constitutionally 
permissible are not merely expressing a simple lack of interest in the abortion issue.  They are, 
instead, affirmatively granting to those within their borders the freedom to make the 
choice . . . .”). 
438 Supra  Part II.D.1. 
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successfully managed.439 
a. Eliminating conflict by identifying a single source of law 
Four federal constitutional principles eliminate a significant number of 
potential conflicts by determining that only one state has legislative 
jurisdiction over particular persons or transactions.  Due process is the first:  
it precludes states without reasonable connections to the matter at hand from 
regulating.440  The second is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s inconsistent 
regulations test.  As discussed above, this does not impose a general ban on 
inconsistent regulations, but instead forecloses those inconsistencies that 
unduly interfere with the national economy.441  This is an important, albeit 
limited, constraint on state legislative power.  The third limitation emerges 
from the right to travel.  Professor Kreimer has suggested that the right to 
travel serves a role analogous to Professor Brilmayer’s “Host State trumps” 
principle:  The Kreimerian right to travel effectively eliminates Home State 
legislative jurisdiction over its traveling citizens by creating a right on 
behalf of the traveler to be governed by the Host State’s laws.442  While 
neither precedent nor policy considerations support such a view of the right 
to travel,443 the right to travel likely eliminates the Home State regulatory 
jurisdiction that creates Hard Conflicts.  Hard Conflicts, it could be said, run 
afoul of the right to travel by interfering with a citizen’s right to leave her 
Home State for the purpose of visiting another state.  This is so insofar as 
the specter of inevitably breaking one state’s laws might well be such a 
disincentive to interstate travel that it affirmatively interferes with the right 
to travel, which is part and parcel of American federalism.444 
The fourth constitutional provision that properly plays a role in sorting 
out interstate conflicts is the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  I mention it last 
only because the role it appropriately plays likely would require a reworking 
 
439 As stated above, I intend here to provide only a cursory overview of these 
methodologies.  A fuller exposition of their appropriate scope must await another day. 
440 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819-20 (1985) (holding that 
the forum state of Kansas could not apply its law because Kansas was only “casually or 
slightly related to the litigation”).  
441 It is quite possible that the Dormant Commerce Clause on its own would bar State A 
from extraterritorially regulating in respect of highway speed; the Court in CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), conceptualized cases striking down states’ 
efforts to set maximum train and truck lengths as having been decided under the risk-of-
inconsistent-regulations principle.  Supra Part II.C.1.d.  
442 Supra  Part II.B.  
443 Id. 
444 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (holding that the right to travel includes 
“the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State”). 
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of contemporary full faith and credit doctrine; that is, the analysis that 
follows is normative and prescriptive, rather than positive in nature. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is both textually and conceptually 
suited to playing a role in sorting out interstate conflicts.  By its terms, the 
clause determines when “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in” one state 
to the statute445 of another state; it thus addresses directly the issue 
presented by interstate conflict of determining which state’s law is 
applicable.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause is conceptually suited to this 
task because, unlike the Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel, 
its scope of inquiry naturally includes an assessment of whether the Home 
State or the Host State has overreached.  The Dormant Commerce Clause’s 
risk-of-inconsistent-regulations test, developed to explain under what 
circumstances extraterritoriality is problematic,446 most naturally would be 
construed as limiting only the Home State.  The same likely applies to the 
right to travel:  it too is most readily construed as a limit on only the Home 
State, for it is the Home State’s regulation that is most naturally viewed as 
the obstacle to its citizens’ ability to travel. 
As constitutional limits on interstate conflict in circumstances where 
due process does not eliminate one state’s legislative jurisdiction, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel are incomplete because 
they erect virtually irrebuttable presumptions that the state that has 
overreached is the Home State.  This is problematic because it surely is 
plausible that the Host State has sought to inappropriately interfere with the 
visitor’s relationship to her Home State and, accordingly,  that it is the Host 
State that has precipitated the problematic interstate conflict.  The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, in contrast to the right to travel and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, invites an inquiry as to whether the Home or Host State 
appropriately has the regulatory power.  In fact, an old line of full faith and 
credit decisions employed this very analytic, balancing the Host and Home 
State’s interests in applying their laws and holding in various circumstances 
that the forum/Host State had to apply the Home State’s law.447  In short, 
 
445 The term “public acts” that is found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been 
construed to mean statutes and common law.  See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 
232 (1998) (“Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and 
common law) and to judgments.”). 
446 See supra  note 309 (discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 
69 (1987), and the inconsistent -regulations standard for judging extraterritoriality). 
447 See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624-
25 (1947) (holding that a South Dakota court must give effect to an Ohio Law).  This case’s 
holding was later limited by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964), which characterized Wolfe as “a highly specialized decision 
dealing with unique facts.”  See also  Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 
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under this caselaw, full faith and credit took into account the Relative 
Interests Dimension of interstate conflict and determined when the Home 
State’s interests overrode the Host State’s interests such that the Home 
State’s law trumped the Host State’s—even in the Host State’s courts.448  To 
be sure, most courts and commentators believe this approach to full faith 
and credit to be long dead.449  Though I believe this to be an 
overstatement,450 it is true that today’s doctrine of full faith and credit would 
have to be reworked were the clause to play the role described here.451  In a 
future work, I hope to explain why and how contemporary full faith and 
credit doctrine should be modified.452   
b. Eliminating conflict by recourse to ordinary conflict-of-laws principles 
Many, perhaps most, interstate conflicts will not be resolved by means 
of the above-mentioned constitutional principles.  The next set of tools for 
resolving such conflicts is ordinary conflict-of-laws doctrine.  Like the 
constitutional principles, this approach operates by effectively eliminating 
the legislative jurisdiction of one of the regulating states.  The elimination 
is, however, by means of state common law rather than federal 
constitutional law. 
Taking up Professor Brilmayer’s concern, a skeptic might respond that 
this effectively requires citizens to conform their behavior to the more 
restrictive state’s legal regime due to uncertainty as to which state’s law 
would be applied.  There are two responses to such a critique.  First, 
uncertainty is not inherent, but instead is the result of shortcomings in 
 
(1932) (holding that the Host State of New Hampshire must apply Home State Vermont law).  
But again, this case’s holding was later denied broad applicability by Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410, 421-22 (1979), in which the Court stated that the opposite result of Clapper would be 
permissible as a general principle. 
448 See cases cited supra  note 447. 
449 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra  note 124, at 146-47 (noting that the Supreme Court 
has abandoned the Clapper line of cases). 
450 For other suggestions that Clapper still has vitality, see Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due 
Judgments and Credit Due Laws:  The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 107 n.74 (1984), discussing the Court’s 
resurrection of Clapper, albeit  in a limited way and with a new gloss; and Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 94, 120, 122-24 (1976), arguing that when another state has an interest in applying its 
law that is overwhelming in comparison to the interest of the forum state, then Clapper is still 
authority for the proposition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the nonforum 
state’s law be applied.  
451 For the most important recent statements of the law of full faith and credit relevant to 
sorting out interstate conflicts of legislative jurisdiction, see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 307, 308 n.10 (1981). 
452 Rosen, supra  note 9. 
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contemporary conflict-of-laws doctrine.  If the doctrine were more 
determinate—and if full faith and credit were deemed to require that the 
same choice-of-law doctrine be applied irrespective of the forum in which 
an action was brought453—then this uncertainty would be eliminated and 
parties could know what law governed their activities.  The appropriate 
response is to improve our choice-of-law doctrine, not to manufacture 
constitutional principles that purport to solve the problem through crude 
elimination of the Home State’s legislative jurisdiction over its traveling 
citizens.  The second response, discussed immediately below, is that having 
to conform one’s behavior to more than one state’s laws is not per se 
problematic. 
c. Embracing conflict 
The final approach is to embrace the interstate conflict.  Apart from 
circumstances of Hard Conflict (which, in any event, probably are 
eliminated by the right to travel) and inconsistent regulations that unduly 
interfere with the national economy, having to conform one’s behavior to 
the requirements of all interested states is not problematic.  If one’s 
activities implicate the legitimate interests of two or more states, then it 
makes sense to permit the interested states to regulate the activity so as to 
protect their legitimate interests.  This is the lesson that emerges from the 
Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence.  And it is sensible:  if more 
than one state’s interests are affected by a particular activity, each state 
ought to be able to protect its interests, unless doing so problematically 
interferes with the constitutional federalism-based commitments of 
protecting interstate commerce and not interfering with interstate travel.454 
 
453 See Laycock, supra  note 380, at 310-11 (arguing that “[u]nder the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the identity of the forum is irrelevant to choice of law”). 
454 Professor Kreimer argues that permitting the Home State to regulate its citizens’ out-
of-state activities would be a “disincentive” to interstate travel and that “[i]n a nation whose 
citizenship entails a right to travel among the states . . . such disincentives to interstate travel 
should be minimized.”  Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra  note 49, at 916.  
Professor Kreimer is correct that extraterritorial regulations may serve as a “disincentive” to 
interstate travel, but that fact alone does not answer the question of whether extraterritoriality 
is constitutional.  As a general matter, our constitutional order is characterized by the 
commitment to multiple constitutional principles; const itutional doctrine virtually never 
reflects a decision to maximize one principle, but accommodates the numerous competing 
principles that are applicable in any given circumstance.  So while our constitutional order 
undoubtedly includes a right to travel, constitutional law does not require that this right be 
given its maximum conceivable scope, but instead harmonizes that right with other 
constitutional commitments, such as the states’ powers as subfederal sovereigns (which, as I 
have argued, includes the power to pursue efficacious regulations in respect of subject matters 
that themselves are not unconstitutional).  The “disincentive” Professor Kreimer speaks of 
thus does not bespeak a constitutional deficiency, but instead is a manifestation of the fact that 
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CONCLUSION 
Many constitutional state policies can be skirted when citizens travel to 
jurisdictions that permit activities that are banned in their Home State.  The 
United States’ federal system gives states significant powers to counter such 
“travel-evasion.”  Several constitutional doctrines govern Home State 
extraterritorial powers.  States have presumptive powers to regulate their 
citizens’ out-of-state conduct, and extraterritorial regulation designed to 
protect legitimate state interests from being thwarted by citizens’ out-of-
state activities satisfies due process.  Such extraterritorial powers are not 
precluded by the Dormant Commerce Clause, so long as the regulations are 
not species of economic protectionism and are directed primarily to the 
state’s own citizens.  Nor is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s doctrine of 
inconsistent regulations a significant barrier, insofar as it applies only to 
those subjects that by their nature must be uniform across the country to 
prevent undue interference with interstate commerce.  Due to the right to 
travel, Home States may not prevent their citizens from traveling to other 
states.  Neither the right to travel nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
however, grant a visitor the categorical right to be subject only to the Host 
State’s laws once she leaves her Home State.  The right to travel is mute on 
the subject, and Host States have a substantial interest for purposes of 
privileges and immunities in ensuring that they do not interfere with 
visitors’ relationships with their Home States.  Finally, neither the Full Faith 
and Credit nor the Double Jeopardy Clauses limits Home States’ powers to 
regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial behavior, though full faith and credit 
doctrine as presently constituted undercuts Home States’ powers to apply 
their laws over a particular transaction or occurrence that has been the 
subject of a civil lawsuit in another state.  
A state’s power to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is 
important to secure political heterogeneity across states.  A federal system 
in which states did not have extraterritorial powers over their traveling 
citizens would systematically favor more permissive laws, undermine the 
states’ ability to pursue paternalistic and norm-shaping goals, undercut the 
states’ powers to protect third-party interests, and limit the extent of 
experimentation across subfederal polities that otherwise could occur.  It is 
thus desirable that the Constitution is not interpreted as flatly foreclosing on 
extraterritorial regulation, contrary to the views of many courts and noted 
commentators.  Subject to only a few limitations, the decision whether or 
not to regulate extraterritorially so as to ensure the efficacy of important 
 
constitutional law accommodates not only a right to travel but other constitutional 
commitments, as well. 
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state laws is a matter that states may decide for themselves on the merits.  
Even if no states elect to extraterritorially regulate their citizens, it is 
important that they each have the opportunity to make the choice.  The very 
possibility of extraterritorial regulation of citizens secures rich political 
heterogeneity across states, and a federal regime that allows such diversity 
is normatively desirable under commonly held liberal premises.455 
 
455 I would like to express my deep appreciation for Professor Kreimer’s response, 
which appears immediately following this Article, for Professor Kreimer’s scholarship has 
played a crucial role in shaping my views concerning extraterritoriality.  Seth F. Kreimer, 
Lines in the Sand , supra note 10.  The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
have kindly allowed me a footnote to respond to his comments.   These severe, though 
understandable, space limitations allow me to provide only a partial analysis.  I hope to reply 
to many of Professor Kreimer’s other important points at a future date. 
 It might be useful to start by pinpointing our precise disagreement, for Professor Kreimer 
is correct that there is much about which we concur.  Most relevant, we agree that federalism 
allows room for each state to pursue different political agendas.  Consider substantive policy 
choices that do not implicate the Constitution—such as whether or not a state should ban 
gambling.  Because constitutional rights are not directly implicated, different states can pursue 
different policies in accordance with their views of what is best.  For example, State A can ban 
gambling in an effort to (let us say) paternalistically protect the would-be gambler from 
himself and to guard the third-party interests of his family members, whom his gambling 
might drive into poverty.  Professor Kreimer and I part ways with respect to the extent of a 
state’s regulatory power.  Professor Kreimer believes that the Constitution imposes a 
secondary restriction on states in relation to policies that themselves are constitutional.  For 
instance, even though State A’s constitutional paternalistic and third-party protection goals can 
be readily circumvented if its citizens can travel to a state where gambling is legal and roll the 
dice there, Professor Kreimer believes that the Constitution flatly prevents State A from taking 
steps to counter this side-stepping of its legitimate law.  In contrast, I do not believe that there 
is any such general secondary restriction; though there are discrete limitations on a state’s 
power to regulate its citizens’ out -of-state activities, these constraints largely leave intact 
extraterritorial powers to impede the circumvention of state laws through travel.  My 
argument is primarily positive:  I claim to be describing the current state of the law.  Insofar as 
crucial parts of the contemporary doctrine turn on normative considerations, however, my 
Article also examines normative factors.  
 Now to my brief comments.  First, Professor Kreimer notes that few states have sought to 
extraterritorially regulate, Kreimer, Lines in the Sand , supra note 10, at 975, and that many 
states have vicinage requirements, id. at 976 n.9, app.  These interesting observations do not 
affect my Article’s analysis.  The Article’s express focus is on federal constitutional 
limitations on extraterritorial state regulation.  Supra note 33 and accompanying text.  Indeed, 
extraterritoriality’s rarity reinforces the Article’s importance insofar as it seems to be 
attributable to most states’ (mis)perceptions that the Constit ution flatly precludes such 
regulation.  Supra  note 32.  Similarly, vicinage requirements, which require that crimes be 
tried in the place (variously defined) where they are committed, are a product of an era during 
which it was believed that state legislative power did not extend beyond the state’s borders.  
See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an 
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its 
territory . . . .”).  In any event, states can eliminate vicinage requirements, if they wish, insofar 
as they are state law requirements.  But the extraterritorial regulations discussed in this Article 
likely would not require a change of vicinage requirements.  Most of the regulations discussed 
are civil rather than criminal.  Moreover, even criminal forms of the extraterritorial 
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regulations discussed in this Article could satisfy state vicinage requirements.  While vicinage 
requirements typically are met if any element of a crime occurs in the vicinage, see, e.g., 
United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (providing the federal rule), not 
all states’ vicinage requirements demand that “some element of the crime or preparation must 
occur in the county of trial,” see, e.g. , Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 634 (Cal. 2001) 
(noting that California’s constitution does not), and vicinage requirements typically are not 
absolute, in any event, but may be overridden for good reasons.  See, e.g., State v. Hereford, 
592 N.W. 2d 247, 252 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that “maintaining venue in the county 
where the crime was committed” is not “a fundamental right”).  Furthermore, although no 
state courts apparently have confronted the question, the place where an activity’s effects are 
felt may satisfy venue requirements if the effects are an element of the crime.  Finally, even 
under well-established doctrine, vicinage requirements presumably could be satisfied if 
included as an element of the crime were some in-state activity (like the planning that their 
citizen’s undertook) that typically accompanies the out-of-state activity that the legislature 
wished to regulate. 
 Next, although Professor Kreimer interprets many cases in importantly different ways 
than I do—the details of which I unfortunately cannot address here and will discuss in future 
scholarship—when all is said and done he appears to agree with the following conclusions to 
which I come in my Article.  As a matter of positive law, (1) the extent of a Home State’s 
baseline extraterritorial powers is determined by the Shutts test, which asks whether 
application of a state’s law would be “‘arbitrary’” or “‘fundamentally unfair,’” see Kreimer, 
Lines in the Sand, supra  note 10, at 993 (citations omitted); (2) the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV imposes limits on one state’s ability to regulate noncitizens, but has been 
held to not impose limitations on a Home State’s power to regulate its own citizens, id. at 
1003 & n.121; and (3) the Privileges and Immunities Clause allows a state to distinguish 
between citizens and noncitizens where there is a “substantial” reason for so doing, id. at 
1006-07.  Furthermore, Professor Kreimer does not dispute that (4) the right to travel has not 
been held to include a right for visitors to be subject to the same regulations as citizens if the 
visitor’s Home State wants its peripatetic citizens to be subject to its laws while traveling, id. 
at 1007-08; (5) nor does he dispute that  the Supreme Court upheld an extraterritorial 
regulation over a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge in the CTS case and that, more 
generally, many state laws (such as product liability laws) have significant regulatory effects 
on out-of-state actors.  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 Taken together, these propositions establish two things.  First, as a matter of positive law, 
states are not flatly prohibited from regulating their citizens’ out-of-state activities.  Second, to 
what extent they have such regulatory powers turns on largely normative considerations:  
whether extraterritorial application would be “arbitrary” or “fundamentally unfair,” and 
whether there is a “substantial reason” for a Host State to apply the Home State’s law to a 
visitor in accordance with the Home State’s wishes. (Indeed, several other crucial parts of 
Professor Kreimer’s analysis also are normatively impelled rather than “legally compelled,” 
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, supra  note 10, at 975.  Consider, for example, his argument that 
the right to travel “becomes a hollow shell” unless it includes a visitor’s right to do what 
residents can do, id. at 1007, and that privileges and immunities doctrine be reworked so that 
it limits Home States, id. at 1003.) 
 For these reasons, my Article contains an extensive analysis of the normative 
considerations that attend the question of whether states enjoy the power to extraterritor ially 
regulate their citizens.  Though I will not reproduce that analysis here, I would like to make a 
few comments about Professor Kreimer’s treatment of the Article’s normative analysis.  First, 
a reader of Professor Kreimer’s Article could easily conclude that the only rationale for 
extraterritoriality is the “projection of perfectionist morality”—a goal that most readers 
presumably would not be particularly sympathetic to (more on this shortly).  Kreimer, Lines in 
the Sand, supra note 10, at 1008; see also  id. at 981 (“perfectionist morality”); id. at 986 
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(referring to “Professor Rosen’s regime of extraterrit orial moralism”); id. at 991-92 
(“extraterritorial moralism”); id. at 1006 (same); id. at 1017 (“extraterritorial assertion of 
moralism”).  In fact, this Article explains that the power to regulate extraterritorially is 
important for states to achieve far less controversial goals.  Such powers are critical whenever 
a law seeks to protect third-party interests or to serve paternalistic goals.  Moreover, 
extraterritorial powers help to advance structural federalism interests by allowing political 
diversity and experimentation across states in respect of constitutional substantive policies.  
Supra  Parts I.C.3, II.A.4, II.B.  
 Although Professor Kreimer gives virtually no attention to these latter justifications for 
extraterritoriality, he does critique the Rawlsian argument I provide for why, contrary to what 
one is likely to believe at first, extraterritorial powers that allow the advancement of 
“perfectionist” political agendas are normatively desirable from the perspective of liberalism.  
I developed the core of this argument in an earlier article, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 
109, at 1053-1144, and in this Article I apply it to the issue of extraterritoriality, supra  at Part 
I.C.3.b.  At the outset, it is important to note that my argument does not claim to be a 
straightforward application of Rawls’s framework, but a self-conscious reworking of it.  See 
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1108-10, 1110-24, 1124-25 (arguing that Rawls’s 
analysis overlooks the subfederal polities; that their existence requires the adjustment of 
several aspects of Rawls’s framework; and that liberalism as a result can achieve a greater 
degree of “neutrality in effect” and accommodate more types of persons than even Rawls 
thinks is possible).  As such, I think it is misleading to describe an explicit reformulation as a 
“misappl[ication]” of Rawls’s analytical framework, Kreimer, Lines in the Sand , supra  note 
10, at 1009, particularly insofar as my analysis anticipates Professor Kreimer’s astute 
objections, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1106-26. 
 Professor Kreimer’s core rejoinder to my Rawlsian argument is that a person in the 
original position would not select a political structure in which states had extraterritorial 
powers, because it would be too burdensome.  After all, he argues, if a state enacted a law that 
advanced the behavior norm of Z, and a person were a Z-opponent, that person would be 
forced either to abide by the norm of Z or to “leave[ her] home, 
 . . . job and . . . friends entirely” in the event that the state in which she lived had 
extraterritorial powers.  Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, supra note 10, at 1013.  Faced with this 
prospect, Professor Kreimer argues, a person in the original position would choose a political 
structure in which states did not have extraterritorial powers.  Id. 
 I think that Professor Kreimer’s criticism is mistaken.  This can be seen best by 
considering what he assumes the person in the original position would be willing to sacrifice.  
Professor Kreimer acknowledges that there are persons who hold a good faith belief that their 
ability to self-actualize (in particular, their capacity to formulate a conception of the good) 
depends on the active involvement of some subfederal level of government.  Id. at 1010; 
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra  note 109, at 1064-71, 1090-93.  Professor Kreimer also concedes 
that such persons (whom I have dubbed “localist political perfectionists,” Rosen, Outer 
Limits, supra  note 109, at 1069), might believe that among the powers their subfederal polity 
must have is the power to extraterritorially regulate its citizens.  Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, 
supra  note 10, at 1010.  Professor Kreimer’s argument thus assumes that a person in the 
original position, not knowing whether she represented a non-perfectionist or a “localist 
political perfectionist,” would choose a national political structure in which she could 
actualize herself if she were a nonperfectionist, but not if she happened to be a political 
perfectionist, even though she could  have chosen a political structure in which she could have 
been assured a place in which she could have been accommodated whether she were a 
perfectionist or a nonperfectionist.  I submit that if one takes seriously the original position’s 
thought experiment of attempting to construct a fair society by asking what political structure 
would be chosen by a person who really did not know whether she represented a perfectionist 
or a nonperfectionist, a person would not come to Professor Kreimer’s conclusion.  This is 
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because the downside she would face if she in fact represented a perfectionist (absolute 
inability to self-actualize anywhere in this country) would be far steeper than the relocation 
costs she would bear if she represented a nonperfectionist who were born into a perfectionist 
polity that extraterritorially regulated its members.  Stated differently, basic liberties (i.e., the 
liberty to develop a conception of the good) trump even significant costs of inconvenience 
(i.e., relocation costs).  More generally still, a host of differences among states (e.g., jobs, 
marital prospects, climate, and geography) makes one state more attractive in one person’s 
eyes than another, thereby enticing her to move.  Why should the list of differences among 
states not include full-bodied differences in states’ political communities with respect to 
regulations that themselves are not unconstitutional?  As Tieboutian analysis suggests, diverse 
offerings of public goods across polities can increase utility, for people can choose to live in 
the polity that affords them the public goods they value.  See  Tiebout, supra  note 258, at 416.  
(In any event, even if one were unconvinced by this Rawlsian argument, there remain the 
above-mentioned, less controversial justifications for extraterritoriality.) 
 Finally, I would like to say that I, like Professor Kreimer, believe that states’ physical 
boundaries are very important.  I believe, however, that careful consideration shows that they 
are only imperfect surrogates for demarcating where a polity’s legitimate interests end.  This 
mismatch between physical boundaries and legitimate interests has grown over time due to 
various technological revolutions that increase the frequency of cross-border activities and, in 
the process, provide citizens ever greater opportunities to structure their activities so as to free 
themselves of their Home State’s regulations.  This is true even when those activities 
primarily impact their Home State’s interests for all practical purposes.  Though many 
people—state governmental officials included—think that state legislative jurisdiction is 
coterminous with state borders, this is a bygone, mistaken conception that erroneously 
deprives states of extraterritorial regulatory powers that rightfully are theirs to exercise, if they 
so choose.  Describing the true scope of states’ extraterritorial powers, and explaining the 
normative considerations that attend the exercise of such powers, were the tasks of this 
Article. 
